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“Nous nous tournons vers l’Écosse pour trouver toutes nos idées sur la civilization.” 
 (“We look to Scotland for all our ideas of civilization.”) 
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Many scholars have sought to explain the patterns of success and failure among 
fringe parties which seek to increase their initially limited political influence, but 
prevailing explanations do not fully consider the parties themselves as institutions that 
can generate change.  Based on historical and discursive institutionalism as well as 
existing literature on political parties and the growth of regional parties in Europe, this 
dissertation posits a taxonomy of requirements for internal political party development. 
The progression is conceptualized as a path dependent feedback loop that starts with (1) 
the consolidation of ideas, a process which requires consensus about the party’s primary 
ideological positions and policy. It is followed by (2) a consolidation of methods—or an 
agreement on how to communicate those ideas while also maintaining party discipline. 
The party will then seek to (3) increase its exposure both in the media and with voters, 
before (4) establishing persistence in elections, media coverage, and party membership. 
Finally, leaders will (5) reallocate resources and reorganize party structure as demands on 
the party change over time.  
 
 ix 
Under the premise that separatist parties in Europe and Canada face significant 
barriers to entry in substantive democracies, this dissertation considered 108 Stateless 
Regional National Parties (SNRPs) to select the most extreme case for testing the party 
development taxonomy. Once the Scottish National Party (SNP) was selected as the 
primary case study, then the taxonomy was tested via process tracing using extensive 
archival records including party manifestos, broadcasts, press releases, and other party 
documents, as well as secondary sources, elite interviews, and a detailed content analysis 
of the manifestos from 1992-2017.  
While the taxonomy holds through much of the SNP’s history, the key elements 
to entrenched positive growth were exposure breakthroughs (measured via the party’s 
own increased output or greater volume of coverage in the media) and proactive party 
reforms prior to an electoral breakthrough or significant institutional change such as the 
establishment of Scottish Parliament in 1999.  Further testing should be conducted 
against other parties to establish greater external validity and precision regarding the 









TABLE OF CONTENTS .................................................................................................... x	
LIST OF TABLES ........................................................................................................... xiv	
LIST OF FIGURES .......................................................................................................... xv	
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .......................................................................................... xvi	
CHAPTER ONE: Introduction ........................................................................................... 1	
The Puzzle: From Fringe to Mainstream ........................................................................ 1 
Overview of the Argument ............................................................................................. 6	
Literature Review ...................................................................................................... 13 
Research Design ............................................................................................................ 27	
Case Slection ............................................................................................................. 28 
The Case of the Scottish National Party (SNP) ........................................................ 33 
Plan for Dissertation ..................................................................................................... 39	
CHAPTER TWO: Limits of Existing Explanations for Regional Parties and 
Independence Platforms  ................................................................................................... 40 
Defining concepts, case universe, and "success" .......................................................... 41	
Explanations of Five Most Successful SNRPs ............................................................. 50 
 
 xi 
A Comparison of Scotland and Wales ...................................................................... 56 
 CHAPTER THREE: SNP's Political Infancy--The Fringe Party Stage (1930s–1967)  .. 62 
First Evolutionary Cycle: 1934-1948 ............................................................................ 64 
Consolidation of Ideas .............................................................................................. 65 
Consolidation of Methods ......................................................................................... 72 
Exposure, Persistence, and Resource Reallocation ................................................... 74 
Second Evolutionary Cycle: 1948-1967 ....................................................................... 78 
Consolidation of Ideas .............................................................................................. 80 
Consolidation of Methods ......................................................................................... 84 
Increase Exposure ..................................................................................................... 86 
Persistence ................................................................................................................. 98 
Resource Reallocation ............................................................................................ 100 
Breakthrough and Impact: the Ewing Victory in 1967 ............................................... 106 
Other Factors: Short-term Decline and Accommodation ........................................... 109 
CHAPTER FOUR: Marginal Growth Within the SNP 1967-1999  ............................... 111 
Consolidation of Ideas ................................................................................................ 114 
Nationalism and Identity ......................................................................................... 115 
Independence, Separatism, and Self-Government .................................................. 131 
Party Positioning on the Left-Right Spectrum of U.K. Politics .............................. 138 
Consolidation of Methods ........................................................................................... 141 
Practical Limitations ............................................................................................... 142 
Gradualism and Devolution vs. Independence ....................................................... 143 
 
 xii 
Party Discipline ....................................................................................................... 147 
Campaigning ........................................................................................................... 150 
Increase Exposure ....................................................................................................... 153 
Scottish Broadcasting .............................................................................................. 154 
Party Broadcasts ...................................................................................................... 158 
Media Strategy ........................................................................................................ 161 
Persistence ................................................................................................................... 170 
Resource Reallocation ................................................................................................ 171 
Viability of Other Causes: Accomodation, Decline, and Exogenous Events ............. 176 
CHAPTER FIVE: Internal Accommodation and Regional Government Opposition (1999-
2007) ............................................................................................................................... 181 
Consolidation of Ideas ................................................................................................ 185 
Sport ........................................................................................................................ 186 
Language Policy ...................................................................................................... 191 
Historical Claims .................................................................................................... 193 
Arts and Culture ...................................................................................................... 195 
The Saltire (flag) ..................................................................................................... 197 
Consolidation of Methods ........................................................................................... 198 
Gradualism vs Independence .................................................................................. 199 
Campaigning ........................................................................................................... 202 
Working Within Government Institutions .............................................................. 205 
Messaging vs. Other Parties .................................................................................... 234 
 
 xiii 
Increase Exposure ....................................................................................................... 240 
Protecting Scottish Broadcasting ............................................................................ 240 
Media Strategy ........................................................................................................ 246 
Changes in Media Saliency ..................................................................................... 253 
Persistence: The Creation of the Holyrood Gap ......................................................... 256 
Resource Reallocation ................................................................................................ 259 
Funding and Spending ............................................................................................ 259 
Party Structure ........................................................................................................ 264 
Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 266 
CHAPTER SIX: The SNP in Government (2007-2017) ................................................ 268 
Consolidation of Ideas and Methods ........................................................................... 271 
Increase Exposure ....................................................................................................... 280 
Persistence ................................................................................................................... 292 









LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1.1. SNP Periods of Growth from Fringe to Mainstrem ......................................... 34 
Table 2.1. Regional-Separatist Parties at National and Regional Elections ..................... 48 
Table 3.1. New vs. Old Nationalism Reflected in SNP Documentation: 1934-1945 ....... 69 
Table 3.2. SNP in General Elections: 1950-1966 ............................................................. 99 
Table 4.1. Use of "Independence" in SNP Manifestos: 1974-1999 ................................ 134 
Table 4.2. Changes in SNP-Offered Processes to Independence .................................... 144 
Table 4.3. SNP General Election Results: 1968-1997 .................................................... 170 
Table 5.1. Use of "Nation" and "Independence" in SNP Manifestos: 1992-2007 .......... 204 
Table 5.2. Election Results: 1999-2007 .......................................................................... 258 
Table 5.3. SNP Membership and Branches: 2003-2007 ................................................. 258 
Table 5.4. 2007 Scottish Elections: Campaign Spending by Party ................................. 264 
Table 6.1. Use of "Nation" & "Independence" in Manifestos and PEBs: 2007-2017 .... 277 
Table 6.2. SNP Saliency in Four U.K. Newspapers: 2005-2017 .................................... 283 
Table 6.3. Saliency of SNP and Labour During General Elections: 2010-2017 ............ 284 
Table 6.4. Saliency of SNP and Tories During General Elections: 2010-2017 .............. 285 
Table 6.5. Election Results: 2008-2017 .......................................................................... 293 
Table 6.6. SNP Spending in Scottish Elections: 2007-2016 ........................................... 294 







LIST OF FIGURES 
Fig. 1.1. Deschouwer’s Integrated Model for Party Lifespan ............................................. 7 
Fig. 1.2. Feedback Loop of Internal Party Development Requirements .......................... 12 
Fig. 2.1. Regionalist Party Platforms on Self-Government .............................................. 44 
Fig. 2.2. Regional-Separatist Party Seats Won ................................................................. 47 
Fig. 2.3. Regional Electoral Results for Most Successful Regional-Separatist Parties .... 49 
Fig. 2.4. National Election Seats Won by Most Successful Regional-Separatist Parties . 50 
Fig. 5.1. SNP, Labour, And Tory Saliency in Four U.K. Newspapers: 1998-2007 ....... 254 
Fig. 5.2. Party Saliency in The Herald: 1998-2007 ........................................................ 255 
Fig. 5.3. Party Saliency in The Scotsman: 1998-2007 .................................................... 256 
Fig. 6.1. References to “Independence” in SNP Manifestos: 1992-2017 ....................... 276 
Fig. 6.2. Party Saliency by Volume in Four U.K. Newspapers: 1998-2017 ................... 282 
Fig. 6.3. Saliency by Party and Volume in Four U.K. Newspapers: 1998-2017 ............ 286 
Fig. 6.4. SNP vs. Lib-Dem Coverage in Four U.K. Newspapers: 2014-2015 ................ 287 
Fig. 6.5. Total Coverage in The Scotsman and The Herald: 1998-2017 ........................ 288 
Fig. 6.6. Saliency by Party and Volume in The Scotsman: 1998-2017 .......................... 289 





LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
AMS ......................................................................................... Additional Members System 
CDC ......................................................................... Democratic Convergence of Catalonia 
E ......................................................................................................... Tjóôvedldi (Republic) 
MOP .................................................................................................. Market-Oriented Party 
NLS ......................................................................................... National Library of Scotland 
NV-A ...................................................... Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliante (New Flemish Alliance) 
PC ...................................................................................................................... Plaid Cymru 
PEB ................................................................................................ Party Election Broadcast 
POP ................................................................................................ Product-Oriented Parties 
PPB ................................................................................................ Party Political Broadcast 
RSP ............................................................................................... Regional Separatist Party 
SNP .................................................................................................. Scottish National Party 
SNRP ........................................................................... Stateless Regional Nationalist Party 
SOP ...................................................................................................... Sales-Oriented Party 










CHAPTER ONE: Introduction 
The Puzzle: From Fringe to Mainstream 
Sitting in his office in Dunoon, Michael Russell laughs as he recalls his first House of 
Commons election in 1987. “I came last. Just. But I came last,” he says with a trace of 
amusement.1  Earlier in the decade, Russell, a member of the Scottish National Party 
(SNP), had lost a local council election too, something else at which he looks back at now 
and chuckles.  During the 1980s, however, the situation was anything but funny as 
Russell’s party fought to survive in any viable form.  “We were so poor we couldn’t do 
anything,” remembered Alex Salmond, the long-time leader of SNP, of his party a few 
decades ago.2  In 1981 the SNP reported a total income of £61, 232 and listed 
membership at 12,617; by 1985, there were even fewer members (12,060) and still fewer 
in 2003 (9,450).  
Yet in 2020, after winning the Scottish election in 2011 and initiating an 
independence referendum (which it lost) in 2014, the SNP is the largest party in Scotland 
with over 125,000 members.  It spent over £1.6 million on the 2017 General Election 
alone. Salmond led the SNP for 20 years, served as the First Minister of Scotland in the 
first SNP-led Scottish government in 2007, sat in the House of Commons for 23 years, 
and resigned from the party in 2018.  Russell led the party’s outreach for long periods of 
time, was elected to multiple terms in the Scottish Parliament, served as the lead minister 
for Scotland in negotiations on Brexit from 2016-2018, and remains active in the party 
 
1 Michael Russell. Personal Interview. 19 July 2017. Dunoon. 




leadership to date, though he recently announced he will not seek re-election as an MSP 
in the 2021 Scottish Parliamentary elections. 
This remarkable growth of the party over just a few decades—and the relative 
stability of that growth over the 2000s—is noteworthy in and of itself for any political 
party let alone one with a separatist or independence agenda operating in a well-
established, powerful, and successful substantive democracy like the U.K.  Founded in 
1934, the SNP was not “new” in the 1980s, but it had essentially spent most of its early 
years (from 1934-1967) without any form of elected representatives at Westminster and 
minimal exposure.  In the 1967 by-election in Hamilton, the SNP gained its first MP via 
Winnie Ewing’s surprising victory.  Between 1967-2014 the SNP generally held between 
one and six seats in the British House of Commons with a brief spike of 11 seats in 
October of 1974.  However, in 2015 the SNP won 56 of 59 Scottish seats in the House of 
Commons followed by 35 in 2017 and 48 in 2019.  The trajectory in Scottish 
Parliamentary elections has been similar with the SNP leading the opposition in the first 
parliaments in 1999 and 2003 before winning the most seats in 2007 (and forming a 
minority government) and then winning the 2011 election outright—a result the 
Additional Members System (in which members of parliament are selected via a mix of 
first-past-the-post results in constituencies and a regional vote meant to reflect 
proportional representation) was supposed to prevent.  Finally, in 2016 the SNP missed 
regaining the majority by two seats and is currently the minority government in Scotland. 
The logical questions are how. How does a political party and its leaders convince 




and outlandish but viable and even desirable?  How does it build itself as an organization 
so that it can afford to campaign, produce outreach, and create informed policy?  Lastly, 
how does a party break not just one but two systems (AMS in Scotland and the 
predominately two-party structure in the U.K.) in fairly quick succession (2011 and 2015, 
respectively)? 
The first part of the answer lies in how changing institutions provide political 
opportunity.  The democratization of European Union elections as well as regional funds 
and policies in Europe provided Stateless Nationalist Regionalist Parties (SNRPs) in the 
member states the resources to exist on more solid political ground. In the case of 
European elections, with lower voter turnouts, smaller parties with devout members often 
perform better in these “second order” elections than in other election cycles. Second, in 
the case of the U.K., devolution and the formation of the Scottish Parliament in 1999 
provided the SNP with far greater political opportunity than ever before: most 
particularly the chance for SNP members to pursue potential careers in politics (much as 
Salmond and Russell have) something that was not likely for many of their predecessors.  
The second portion of the explanation has to do with party development.  Most 
new political parties can find it hard to gain footing as the organization faces both an 
internal process of growth and development as well as a wide range of barriers to entry in 
the existing systems of government, parties, elections, and media.  Among many tasks, 
the party needs to generate revenue, select leadership, attract new members, increase 
exposure to potential voters, post viable candidates, and pay for campaigns.  For party 




well as what tactics to employ.  Which comes first: more members or stronger party 
finances?  What are the least expensive and most far-reaching ways to gain exposure 
among potential voters? Should the party fundraise among bigger donors or among a 
loyal group of activists?  Who to target first: the general public or elites from whom the 
public may take cues?  
Even as the party’s leadership is navigating these various questions, there are also 
decisions to be made about long and short-term priorities.  What is the party’s primary 
identifier or platform?  Is there a specific position on the left-right spectrum or in relation 
to existing parties?  Is there a founding fundamentalism or popular movement? Are there 
aspirations of being a professional-electoral party or mass party?  Then there are also 
considerations of the existing system.  How long it has been entrenched, the nature of the 
party system (multi-party, two-party or single-party), the composition of the legislative 
bodies (unicameral or the defining characteristics of the upper and lower houses in 
bicameral systems), the legislation’s relationship with other branches, the electoral 
system (first-past-the-post or proportional), and the political structure (unitary or federal) 
are just a few of the factors that may impact how a new party could choose to attempt to 
access power. 
The party’s initial origins will affect its potential trajectory, and parties founded 
on ideas generally outside the mainstream or popular opinion certainly face even further 
challenges in convincing voters and existing political elites that they are a viable option 
and a worthy competitor in the political arena.  In the case of SNRPs, the geography of 




to independence, and the conception of nationalism are just a few considerations that also 
shape the party’s potential or end goals beyond what all new parties face.  While a small 
number of nationalist parties are militaristic or violent in their approach in Western 
Europe and Canada, the clear majority advocate a legal or at least peaceful means for 
achieving their goals.  Currently, regionalist parties range in terms of ideology (from 
extreme left to extreme right), the types of regions they represent, and their conceptions 
of nationalism—including the roles of ethnicity, language, and inclusion (Massetti 2011).  
They also range in their demands for greater autonomy: from protectionist to federalist 
(pushing for more autonomy for the region) to full separation or independence (Dandoy 
2010).  With each of these choices, the parties can either widen their potential or shrink 
it, especially depending on the political climate and public opinion. 
Some scholars might be drawn to voter behavior, societal changes, rival party 
decline, or alterations in British nationalism and understandings of identity over time as 
explanations for the specific changes in the Scottish case.  There is a great deal of validity 
in each of those claims on the demand side of the equation; however, this study is 
concerned with the supply side: what the party and its leaders are doing over time. The 
aim is to determine the forms of agency present in the outsider, or fringe, party as it 
evolves into a mainstream institution over time as there is limited literature taking this 
approach. 
Therefore, this dissertation tests a taxonomy of requirements for political party 
development.  The taxonomy analyzes both the process of development and the variation 




consolidation of methods, increasing outreach, persistence, and resource reallocation, 
each have their own range as the party grows. For example, “persistence” will change 
over time: initially persistence means existing as a political party at all, then it can be 
measured by increasing membership numbers and elections contested, and finally 
elections won and consistently strong financial resources. When all five of these factors 
are achieved in this distinct order, then the party’s growth is more likely to become 
entrenched.  When factors are not present or when party structural reforms are reactive 
rather than proactive, then the party is more likely to experience setbacks. To test this 
theory, the case study will be an extreme case—under the premise that has worked for the 
most difficult case could be accessible to new parties with fewer barriers to entry.  Thus, 
this case of the SNP’s decades-long progression to electoral success helps test the theory 
in a substantive democracy wherein the party has achieved remarkable growth and 
success unmatched by its peer parties with similar independence aims both within the 
same state as well as throughout Europe.   
 
Overview of the Argument: A Taxonomy of Requirements for Party Development 
 
Measuring the intervening steps between being a fringe party and a party of power 
requires giving attention to the party as an institution and the individual agency of party 
leaders and their political will to be in contention in the existing system.  The most 
successful cases of fringe party growth and electoral persistence will reflect an 
evolutionary growth process that includes both a degree of adaptability in their messaging 




barriers to success.  Deschouwer (2008) identified thresholds which mark momentous 
and appropriately increasing electoral successes. (See Fig. 1.1.) 
 
Figure 1.1. Deschouwer’s Integrated Model for Party Lifespan (Deschower 2008, 4) 
 
However, his thresholds do not provide insight into how those goals are reached and the 
work required within the party and among its leadership.  Even more crucially, this model 
of party lifespan leaves out the party’s relationship with media—arguably the other key 
institutional relationship that will figure into party growth. 
Besides Deschouwer’s “normal” electoral thresholds, SNRPs face other barriers, 
too.  First, within the nationalist movement itself with regards to activism, ideals, and 
methods for reaching independence, there is a wide range of decisions to be made as 
there is no singular clear blueprint for how a political party can peacefully reach 
independence within a given substantive democracy.  Therefore, there is a lot of variation 
in choices—to be a party or not, to contest elections or not, to accept incremental steps 
toward autonomy or not, and what type of nationalism to assert.  Externally, SNRPs also 
face media bias as independence and nationalism are often presented as backward, 
simplistic, or unrealistic—especially in these established democracies.   Thus, besides the 
incremental approach to governmental institutions via increasing electoral successes, 









own ideas within the party and then seeking to gain exposure and make an entry into the 
system before aiming to increase the volume of its coverage and eventually seeking 
influence on the way the party is presented, or framed (Iyengar 1994), in these arenas. 
These processes are path dependent as each stage builds on the previous era’s elements of 
growth, and the two processes—both electoral and outreach—are interdependent. Finally, 
while some SNRPs simply desire greater autonomy within existing structures or the 
creation of a new level of federal structure, some SNRP’s, often called Regional-
Separatist Parties (RSPs) have a final goal—independence—that would follow upon 
reaching the “governance” threshold (See Figure 1.1).  RSPs, therefore, have another, 
potentially even more challenging final stage of its lifespan: the creation of a separate 
state. 
In the most successful and persistent cases, these lifespan thresholds will be 
crossed in the precise, progressive order—whether an RSP or not. However, RSPs are in 
a more specific set of circumstances—that require more careful consideration of how 
outreach is conducted and in what manner.  Thus, for each threshold to be broken, I 
hypothesize that there is a five-step cyclical feedback loop that requires party leadership 
to learn and build from past losses and victories.  When the five steps are completed in 
the ideal order, then the party will likely gain more from that evolutionary cycle—
potentially breaking thresholds for the long-term.  When the steps are left incomplete or 
are reached out of order, it is likely the gains for the party will be minimal or short-term 
in nature—and may even regress with the need to re-cross a particular threshold.  




especially is important in terms of what “nationalism” entails.  “Who does this nation 
represent?” is the most fundamental question, and scholars have pointed to differences 
among national parties as some have exclusive, narrow and ethnically-based 
understandings of national identities while others espouse a more inclusive, broad, and 
civically-based nationalism.  Ideas, however, also are evolutionary in party development, 
thus there is the possibility of a re-definition of a party’s nationalism over time.  As the 
party grows and its audiences change, the ideals may be the fundamentally the same, but 
the word choices and points of emphasis may evolve as the party wants to continue 
breaking the outlined electoral thresholds and their audiences and electoral aims get 
bigger.  Likewise, terminology or word choice may change with the times—as certain 
words become more demonized, for example the use of “nationalism” during and after 
the Second World War. The final resolution of these issues—if the party chooses to 
soften its rhetoric or broaden its definition of national identity—can contain forms of the 
minority party accommodation to the system in order to gain traction and be effective 
electorally. 
Next, there should be a consolidation of methods or simply the “how to” questions 
like campaigning and communicating ideas.  For RSPs, this step means consideration of 
how independence should be achieved: through the existing system (being an electoral 
party) or not (remaining a social movement) and whether a gradualist approach 
(incremental increases in regional autonomy) is acceptable or not (independence via a 
singular moment).  The question remains of which pathways are to be utilized 




development, these choices will pre-determine the range of tactical options open to 
leaders later in the party’s existence.  For example, if the party chooses to remain more of 
social movement seeking a single big moment of breakthrough to independence, it can 
function outside—or in opposition to—the existing political and electoral systems.  Such 
actors are characterized by Mahoney and Thelen (2009) as “insurrectionists” as they are 
willing to break the existing rules in order achieve their goal of break the institutional 
structure.  Those party leaders will have different aims than a party, characterized by the 
Mahoney and Thelen’s “subversives,” that determines the best path to independence is 
through the electoral process—because that choice will bring with it the need for 
accommodating to the existing political system in order to achieve independence in the 
long term.  When presented with an opportunity like newly decentralized powers, an RSP 
will need to determine whether it will accept gradual gains or whether it is directly 
seeking the final endpoint of independence. Finally, the parties also need to determine 
their approach to campaigning and how to present the concepts and ideas they have 
agreed upon while also maintaining party discipline.  In this sense, their “methods” are 
similar to any other political party in a democracy and are limited by money, resources, 
strategy and targeting as well as timing. 
With both ideas, a pathway to independence and campaigning strategies 
determined, the party’s next stage of development is aimed at increasing exposure to 
spread the word of these ideas and methods.  Early in the development of nascent parties, 
this exposure may be limited to the cheapest and most readily available options, but as 




decisions will be driven by access to existing mainstream media outlets (if the party is 
seeking wider electoral support). Thus, this step in party development will be dependent 
on previous growth.  Like the consolidation of ideals, this step in the evolutionary cycle 
requires continued adaptability as the party’s potential audience—especially in seeking 
attention from competing media outlets or formats—changes with increased party 
membership and increasingly ambitious electoral goals.  And, once again, this process is 
another form of internal accommodation: the minority party, should it choose to work 
within the existing institutional structures, is making accommodations to fit into the 
media system. 
Once the party has established consistent forms of outreach (both in terms of 
campaigning and off-election communication), next they will seek persistence or 
consistency—in outreach, electoral goals, and party membership numbers.  In initial 
stages the electoral version is persistent competition during elections and in later stages 
could mean winning legislative seats or becoming the party of government eventually.  
With regards to outreach, persistence changes as the party’s electoral goals change. At 
first, outreach persistence means establishing any kind of presence in the media.  Then, 
once the party achieves any kind of presence in representation, the party will seek an 
increased volume of coverage—and a regular presence in the news cycle.  Finally, once 
the party plays a larger role politically, it will eventually seek increasing influence on 
media frames and how the party is presented in coverage, including being presented on 
par with the biggest political parties or actors and potentially even election endorsements 




numbers and contributions. 
  Finally, in each round of growth, reflective of the party’s changing aims, there 
will be a reallocation of resources and redesign of organizational structures to prepare 
for the next cycle of growth.  When the reallocation proceeds breaking one of 
Deschouwer’s lifespan thresholds like representation or coalition potential, the party 
stands to gain more as the structures, resources, and finances will be in place to take 
advantage of the change.  However, when that reallocation is in response to change—a 
reactive reallocation as opposed to a proactive one—then the party will not be positioned 
to take advantage of the breakthrough and will likely experience some setbacks. 
 
 
Figure 1.2. Feedback Loop of Internal Party Development Requirements 
 
These requirements for party development can be represented by a feedback loop 
(See Fig. 1.2), as persistent development is neither rapid nor linear—but rather via 
several cycles through these stages as the party builds on previous growth and success 






















This taxonomy of requirements for a fringe party to move to the mainstream 
involves several processes including changing ideas and the growth of the party as an 
institution—all of which was developed from a diverse range of literature on 
institutionalism and institutional change, political parties (including party development, 
niche parties, and regional parties in the EU), the role of the media and marketing, and 
types of nationalism. Both historical and discursive institutionalism as well as ideas about 
evolutionary and incremental institutional change provide the theoretical backbone for 
explaining how an individual party with a somewhat radical position and set of ideas can 
develop into a viable political competitor—especially when provided with political 
opportunity. Because the party’s growth process is not singular but instead linked to other 
institutions, the literature on media as a linkage institution and its effects provides farther 
information about party leaders’ choices in growing the party’s outreach.  The literature 
on parties themselves—including work on party development, niche parties, and the 
growth of regional parties in the EU—provides the most specific background information 
for how parties function at large, how they grow, and how niche and regional parties (and 
the study of them) have changed over time.  Finally, ideas about nationalism, particularly 
types of nationalism, are the departure point for many regional-separatist parties and is 
critical for understanding where the SNP positions itself in relation to other parties often 
grouped with it. 
Previous work on institutionalism, including the role of ideas and discourse, 




institutionalism” is a way in which to explain politics through the consideration of 
substantive ideas and the process through which discourse functions in institutional 
contexts (Schmidt 2009); it is also a way to explain why certain ideas succeed and others 
fail (Schmidt 2008).  Of particular interest for this taxonomy is how independence moved 
from being defined as “radical” to “mainstream” and the coordinative discourse among 
policy actors (Schmidt 2008), particularly party leaders and members, and as the party 
altered its ideas and discourse over time.   Together discursive institutionalism, historical 
institutionalism, and evolutionary approaches to institutional change serve as the 
theoretical background of the overall taxonomy but also heavily influence the notion that 
consolidating ideas is the first key departure point for fringe party growth. 
Alongside the changing ideas and discourse, historical institutionalism often 
begins with an empirical observation, accounts for change over time, and defines 
institutions broadly. The primary purpose of a historical institutionalist approach is to 
solve an observed empirical puzzle by identifying a historical process or even evolution 
which accounts for both continuity and change in “concrete temporal processes” (Thelen 
1999).  Among other factors like ideas, politicians’ preferences under particular 
institutional incentives (Thelen 1999) are considered alongside the role of power in 
institutions and who is favored by certain institutional designs and norms versus which 
groups are disadvantaged (Mahoney and Thelen 2009).  Likewise, how one change can 
affect order in other institutions (Orren and Skowronek 2004) is a central tent to this 
school of thought. By defining “institutions” broadly to mean “formal or informal 




the polity or political economy,” historical institutionalism takes into consideration many 
facets of political realities from the rules of a constitutional order or the standard 
operating procedures of bureaucracy (Hall and Taylor 1996).  Therefore, institutions are 
envisioned as “ideational and material foundations” that can open possibilities for change 
(Thelen 1999, 397).  
Historical institutionalism accounts particularly for gradual institutional change—
and has helped identify types of institutional changes and categories of actors initiating 
change.  In recognizing institutional change as a process, historical institutionalists 
recognize the role of feedback and path dependence (Pierson 2000): continuity often has 
a key role in how institutions evolve.  Except when change is discontinuous, institutional 
change is usually incremental at the margins (North 1990).  Streeck and Thelen (2005) 
identified a range of gradual changes including displacement which is when rules are 
replaced, layering which occurs when new changes are attached to existing rules, drift 
which is when neglect or lack of response yields change, and conversion which is when 
actors exploit ambiguities.  Mahoney and Thelen (2009) then identified four types of 
actors—opportunists, subversives, symbionts, and insurrectionists—who elicit change.  
Among these types of actors, a key variable is the role of compliance, as subversives and 
symbionts will not break rules, but insurrectionists and opportunists will.  While much of 
the case study on the SNP will be aided by understanding displacement, layering, and 
even drift, the actions sometimes taken by SNP leaders do not fit neatly into the four 
types of actors and these four labels of opportunists, subversives, symbionts, and 




inconsistency, has been in its varied approaches to initiating change. 
Another element of historical institutionalist literature is the relationship among 
institutions affected by change.  Pierson (1997) explained that institutions are not 
neutral—and can reproduce elements of power distribution while Hall and Taylor (1996) 
point out that existing power relations influence the creation of new institutions. Meyer 
and Minkoff (2004) conceptualized political opportunity and explained interactions 
between activists and mainstream institutions as one element of creating chances for 
institutional expansion and development.  Together these ideas are important in 
considering how a fringe party can break into institutions—not just of representative 
bodies but also the media.  Given the gradual democratization of the EU Parliamentary 
elections and the opening of the Scottish Parliament in 1999, the creation of a significant 
new institutions figures prominently in an explanation of the SNP’s growth in particular 
and should be considered alongside the prevailing power relations with the UK’s two 
largest parties, the Conservatives and Labour. 
Finally, historical institutionalism offers the idea of institutional evolution—an 
important process for the feedback element of the taxonomy.  Lewis and Steinmo (2012) 
contributed several important elements to this line of inquiry: that evolutions are not 
linear and efficient, that stasis can mask gradual shifts, and the importance of ideas as the 
origin of change. They argue that “ideas perform the same function as mutations in a 
biological system”—meaning that ideas generate variation and hybrid forms of change 
(318).  In other words, one needs discursive institutional approaches to explain the origin 




consider both how marginal change is made during long periods of seeming stasis and 
how discontinuous institutional change happens at critical junctures.   
Specific to political party growth, once the consolidation of ideas is considered, 
the next factor in the taxonomy is the consolidation of methods—which entails 
campaigning, party discipline, and communication.  This step is shaped by literature on 
political parties including work on party development, Levitsky’s (2003) notion of 
strategic flexibility, the agency of party leaders, and changing campaign conditions. 
Deschouwer’s Integrated Party Lifespan Model is helpful in considering how parties 
grow incrementally.  Deschouwer (2008) anticipated that a group must declare itself as 
participating in elections, then it must get the proper authorization from the state before it 
can push to reach the representation threshold (in getting members elected to national 
office).  At that point, the party chooses a particular threshold of relevance—either as 
blackmail potential or as a potential coalition partner before crossing the threshold of 
governance and entering government.  A party which chooses to serve in a “blackmail” 
role has no access to governing—it merely serves as a pressure group as part of the 
opposition; whereas a party that wants to govern eventually may want to prove itself 
worthy by working with other parties in a coalition.  For many RSPs this barrier is the 
hardest to pass—as independence or separatism is often a deal-breaker for the 
mainstream parties with regards to working in partnership with a regional-separatist 
party.  In Deschouwer’s theory, there is no indication of how the party grows, rather the 
focus is on the party’s effectiveness in the electoral system, especially once it reaches the 




Levitsky’s concept of strategic flexibility and Art’s work on the European Far 
Right parties provide part of “how” a party grows by emphasizing party leadership.  
Levitsky (2003), who was writing about the context of labor-based parties in Latin 
America, discussed the importance of “strategic flexibility” which included “leadership 
autonomy” which is the amount of room the party grants the leadership to maneuver.  
This notion is critical in evaluating fringe party growth as party leaders often have 
significant sway over the party’s direction—but can also be challenged by party activists.  
Art (2011) also discussed leadership and flexibility as key to party development. The 
nature of party leadership—in being flexible in its strategy and communicative 
discourse—often makes a difference in terms of the party’s overall success.  Likewise, 
for much of SNP’s history fragmented or factional leadership has prevented development 
(Meguid 2007, Lynch 2013, MacKay 2015)—and the unified leadership since 2008 has 
impacted positively the party’s growth and stability.  Otherwise, a key point that Art 
made is highly relevant here: the parties with more professional leadership—as measured 
by the level of education of party leaders as well as professions they have held outside 
politics —tend to be more successful.  There is significant evidence that the SNP’s 
candidates and membership have grown increasingly professional over time (Mitchell, 
Bennie, and Johns 2011, 60-65)—but more is to be done to show how that translates to 
campaigning, media relations, and governing especially as Katz and Mair (1994) 
discussed how campaigns have gotten more expensive and professionalized. 
After ideas and methods, the third step in the taxonomy is increasing outreach—a 




on ideology and policy as well as how it plans to campaign (a decision often made by 
party leadership), the next step is to increase outreach in order to increase exposure to 
potential voters.  Research in the U.S. context about media saliency and media effects 
(including agenda-setting, framing, and priming) (Iyengar 1994) inform how a fringe 
party, should it desire growth, would first want to increase the volume of its coverage as 
that would increase its exposure and potentially make it more relevant in setting the 
agenda. Lees-Marshment (2014) determined three party types in trying to explain party 
outreach: she identified Product-Oriented Parties (POPs), Sales-Oriented Parties (SOPs) 
and Market-Oriented Parties (MOPs). While POPs are based on political conviction and 
refuse to change their ideas or product, SOPs adopt communication strategies to sell their 
message, and MOPs set out to create demand and are essentially permanently 
campaigning.  She likewise described Labour in 1992 as an SOP and then it acted as a 
MOP in the 1997 election cycle; the implication would seem to be that success in UK 
elections requires parties to have more complex and interactive marketing techniques 
with their target audiences.  Critics of her work raise the question of whether MOPs are 
simply just a form of populism (Coleman 2007).  Regardless, it would seem that 
Deschouwer and Lees-Marshment could be put together with ideas about media coverage 
at large: that in order to reach the thresholds of representation and government in a 
substantive democracy, a party has to be a SOP or MOP in order to find success, as the 
system is heavily dependent on how parties choose to present themselves and their 
general relevance in media coverage.   




progress and entrenchment—in terms of outreach, electoral outcomes, and party 
membership; however, the final requirement for party growth is resource reallocation 
which relies on Levitsky’s ideas about strategic flexibility and organizational approach.  
In identifying aspects of strategic flexibility, Levitsky (2003) pointed to the role of 
leadership renovation, or the ease with which the old guard may be removed and 
reformers can move up the ranks, as well as structural pliability which is how easily the 
party’s structure can be altered to respond to environmental changes. These aspects of 
change—how party leaders are selected and maintained as well as how easily the party 
can reorganize based on changing conditions—are critical factors in considering how a 
political party on the fringe can evolve to the mainstream. 
Aside from the taxonomy at large, the choice to focus on SNRPs in Europe is 
based on a long line of scholarly work specific to the region as there remain questions as 
to why some of these parties have found success but most flounder in obscurity.  The 
literature shows general consensus that European integration encourages sub-national 
mobilization in member states (Jolly 2006, Nagel 2004, Laible 2008) because the EU 
makes smaller states viable (Jolly 2006, Brinegar and Jolly 2005) in terms of economics 
and security while these groups also advocate for EU-supported notions of democracy 
and human rights.  
Keating (1999) warned against a Europe with “state-like features” and a nation-
building project because of what it might mean for reinforcing subnational identities like 
those found in Spain, Belgium, and the UK; two decades later those states have the 




parties have achieved any level of electoral success, and even fewer parties with 
independence platforms have been consistently competitive.   Of the 108 regionalist 
parties that have contested national or regional elections Europe and Canada since 1950, 
about half—49—ran on platforms of complete separation or independence (RSPs) from 
the central state, and only 10 of the those 49 have ever held a seat at both the national and 
regional levels simultaneously.   
While EU integration and a “Europe of the Regions” has supported the existence 
of these parties, integration has not guaranteed electoral success.  Studies seeking 
institutional, economic, and party accommodation explanations of SNRP success—or 
more so the differentiation between success and failure—have contradictory results, 
exclude the elections since 2007 in which several SNRPs achieved historic highs, or do 
not give any form of agency to the minority party and only weigh the impact of the 
majority parties.  Otherwise, academic work has focused on the largest pool of small 
parties—niche parties—and therefore explore why they are limited in success as opposed 
to trying to explain the successful outliers. 
 Most literature on institutions and their impact on fringe parties focus on electoral 
rules and party systems, though a few also consider federal versus unitary structures.  
Even among these studies, RSPs are often not the focus: they are grouped together with 
other niche parties like the Greens or radical right (Barlow 2014, Meguid 2007, Harmel 
and Robertson 1985, Willey 1998).  Additionally, the statistical models do not seem to 
explain the most successful electoral outcomes (Jolly 2006, Sorens 2005), and all of these 




example of contradictions, Duverger’s Law (Duverger 1954) should predict that 
proportional representation will encourage minor party success—yet other work suggests 
that the presence of an ethnic minority will undermine any two-party system and that 
“regionally concentrated groups will likely flourish under more restrictive plurality rules” 
(Meguid 2007, 7 drawing on Rae 1971, Sartori 1986, DeWinter 1998).  Similarly, 
multiple studies (Harmel and Robertson 1985, Willey 1998) suggest that federal systems 
should be friendlier to the growth of niche parties, yet the UK provides strong 
counterexamples and is a devolved unitary system.  All told, Meguid (2007) summarized 
the landscape: “…institutions are unable to account for two key dimensions of the niche 
party story: variation in electoral success across a party’s lifetime and variation in 
electoral success across parties in one country” (p. 10). Thus, institutions alone do not 
seem to predict party development and particularly fail to explain the RSP outliers or 
success stories.  Institutions especially do not explain how those successes are achieved—
until one considers an individual party as having agency in an evolutionary process. 
 The electoral successes of some SNRPs have also been evaluated from two 
economic perspectives.  First, Sorens did a cross-sectional analysis of secession in 
advanced countries that indicated that the presence of a high income (as compared to 
other regions in the state) as well regional language, a recent independence (which he 
defined as since 1648), and big population as well as aspects of location increased 
chances of secession support (Sorens 2005). His model significantly under-predicted the 
SNP’s electoral successes, and this work predated the SNP’s successes over the last 




The second economic perspective emphasized the impact of taxation and the idea 
that a region which is paying more in taxes than it is gaining in benefits will seek greater 
autonomy or even secession. This factor explains some regions, like Catalonia in Spain 
where there is a clear fiscal imbalance. Yet in the Scottish case, the balance of taxation 
and spending has been under dispute as the UK government makes one set of economic 
claims, including that Scotland gets back more than it pays into the system.  On the other 
hand, the SNP, at least since devolution in 1999 if not earlier, makes the opposite point—
saying that Scotland pays out more than it gets back especially in specific areas like 
broadcasting and infrastructure while also not being permitted to spend as much as 
England does on education and health care.   
 All told, these significant studies on niche parties at large, regional parties, or 
separatist parties rarely factor in party development; there is no consideration for how an 
evolving party could gain support for the independence movement through the existing 
electoral system and institutions of government.  Rather, it is “existence” or “emergence” 
of a party—or in Jolly’s case the “conditions for running in national elections” (Jolly 
2006)—that most scholars focus on. Barlow explored the differences between niche 
parties that have experienced electoral success and those who have not.  She emphasized 
political opportunity, indigenous resources, and grievances (Barlow 2014); however, she 
does not explore internal party strategy or development, nor party leadership or 
communication, as key ways parties can take advantage of those opportunities or express 
those grievances.   




regionalist party electoral success; they identified four main criteria: salience of distinct 
regional identity, a separate regional public sphere, a permissive electoral system, and 
electoral volatility (Mazzoleni and Mueller 2017).  While this list of criteria is helpful in 
determining the salience of regional parties in certain parts of Europe (they focus on 
Scotland, Catalonia, Wales, and a handful of others), they are not able to account for 
variation of success within those systems.  For example, those criteria in Scotland and 
Wales are relatively the same, yet the two regional parties, SNP and Plaid Cymru (PC), 
have not achieved electoral success at the same times or to the same extent—suggesting 
there is more to the success story of the SNP itself than the patterns found among parties 
of similar political positioning. 
 Meguid’s work focuses on the ways in which mainstream party accommodation 
impacts the performance of these niche parties, so her work considers a previously 
unaccounted factor in fringe parties’ successes.  However, her explanations do not allow 
for agency on the part of leaders of the minority parties.  For example, she described the 
two major U.K. parties as responding to SNP surges—either by the accommodation of 
SNP interests (such as devolution) or by dismissiveness when the SNP results were 
particularly weak.  However, while this explanation is satisfactory in terms of 
responsiveness and accommodation by the mainstream parties, it does not offer insight 
into the incentives or decisions of the SNP leaders and how their own tactics evolved 
over time—to accommodate to the mainstream systems and norms in route to their own 
electoral and independence goals. 




of SNRPs. Brancati (2008) indicated the conditions under which regional parties could be 
minimalized: “this includes political centralization, fiscal decentralization, concurrent 
presidential and legislative elections, [and] majority or plurality systems.” (p. 158).  
Again, the U.K. is not well explained by this theory.  There is political decentralization, 
fiscal centralization in the U.K. in addition to concurrent presidential and legislative 
elections (through the nature of the parliamentary election cycle also selecting the Prime 
Minister), and a majority system at the highest level of governance. Yet the SNP has 
managed success at all levels of elections.   
More recently, there has been emphasis on how a regional party’s future depends 
mightily on its reputation for competence now that some of them have had a chance to 
govern (Johns, Mitchell, and Carman 2013; Elias and Tronconi 2011).   Some early 
evaluations of these parties’ performances in government have been negative, for 
example leading to more frequent snap elections and shorter government cycles at the 
national level (Brancati 2005).  In terms of effectiveness of SNRPs in being in 
government at the regional level, Elias and Tronconi (2011) commented that these parties 
“have also faced difficulties in ‘delivering the goods’ once in government” (p. 516).  
They go on to describe the SNP’s first experience in regional government as evidence, as 
the party had to “abandon several flagship manifesto pledges (such as income tax for 
local government, and on housing and education) in response to being a minority 
government and to a difficult economic climate” (p. 516).  Yet, the SNP gained a greater 
majority in the following election and have gone on to even more historic seat gains at 




SNP may have only improved in recent years since their increased role in regional 
government.  
Another school of thought in the literature focuses on the theoretical nature of 
nationalism—and there is no question that the strength of the subnational culture 
contributes to the success of nationalist parties. Mastrovito (1993) considered types of 
nationalism in different regions within the same country while Keating and McGarry 
(2001) explained the formation of minority nationalism in the U.K. However, these 
works address identity formation among citizens—as opposed to considering how a 
political party contributes to that formative process through its presentation of national 
identity in campaigns and other party literature.  “Civic nationalism,” or a nationalism 
that is not based on race or ethnicity, has often been used to describe the brand of 
nationalism supported by SNP in recent decades; however, some work, especially by 
Mycock (2012), suggested that the Scots have not fully moved away from an ethnic-form 
of nationalism.  This explanation does not seem to fit much of SNP documentation and 
history since the 1940s let alone more recent Party Election Broadcasts (PEBs) and 
manifestos which reflect people different races, ethnicities, and backgrounds. 
Existing scholarship explains the rise of SNRPs in Europe (via European 
integration) and conditions ripe for such parties, but it does not account in any 
satisfactory way for the evolution of some of these parties from the fringe to the 
mainstream.  This dissertation posits a new taxonomy of requirements of party 




in effort to identify how an independence party can achieve success despite many 
barriers.   
Research Design 
A mixed methods approach will be employed via a quantitative Large-N comparison and 
then a qualitative single extreme case study.  The Large-N comparison will include all 
SNRPs which have contested regional or national elections in Western Europe and 
Canada since 1950 (108 parties in total).  Each party’s platform on self-government 
(ranging from cultural protectionist to federalist to separationist as based on Dandoy 
2010) will be categorized according to its stated position in party manifestos and online 
communications in a given electoral cycle.  Besides establishing the limitations and 
general rarity of sustained electoral success among this party group, the Large-N analysis 
will also identify the RSPs—parties’ with clearly affirmed separatist or independence 
aims—and which of this smaller group have achieved sustained electoral success. 
Once the most successful RSPs are identified, they will be examined together 
with existing explanations for RSP successes and failures.  Then, the most extreme case 
will be given careful consideration on its own to explore the applicability of the 
taxonomy of requirements for party development.  There is reason to be suspect of 
choosing a case based on the dependent variable (in this case RSP sustained electoral 
success), but when trying to explain organizational success in a particularly rare case, 
selection on the dependent variable is best practice (Forgues 2012).  Forgues, who was 
writing about the practice from the perspective of business and economics, stated, 




strategy when one is looking for the causes of an observed event. It is particularly 
interesting when the event of interest is rare, thereby making random sampling 
infeasible” (p. 270).  As the Large-N study of SNRPs will show—electoral success, 
especially sustained success at multiple-levels of governance—is a remarkably rare 
occurrence, having happened only 10 times in the post-WWII era among the parties in 
Western Europe and Canada that advocate for separatism. 
Because testing this theory of party agency and evolution requires attention to 
decision making and incremental steps, process tracing is the most effective research 
method for the single extreme case study.  Aimed at combining “social and institutional 
structure and context,” process tracing involves the careful consideration of “histories, 
archival documents, interview transcripts, and other sources to see whether the causal 
process a theory hypothesizes or implies in a case is in fact the sequence…of the 
intervening variables” (Bennett and Checkel 2015, 3-6).  The goal of process tracing is to 
determine the causal chain between a dependent variable (change over time from fringe 
to successful electoral party) and the intervening independent variables (central ideas, 
methods, exposure, persistence, and resource reallocation).  Further testing of this 
taxonomy will require similar in-depth archival knowledge of successful cases of party 
development from fringe to mainstream and should be able to be broadened beyond the 
specific challenges of separatist parties to fringe or nascent parties at large. 
Case Selection 
Because the hypothesis concerns the success of party development and growth, the 




(Gerring 2008, 217-18)—will be best.  To get to the extreme case value, a process of 
elimination will be conducted on the universe of potential cases. 
First, regional parties will be identified by the same criteria employed by Massetti 
and Schakel (2015), and only parties in Western Europe and Canada will be considered.  
Regional parties, the broadest of the criteria relevant to the potential cases, must be self-
contained political parties that contest elections, present themselves only in a sub-section 
of an existing state, that sub-section is a result of “their explicit objective of defending 
only the identities and interests of their region,” and they must aim for some form of self-
government (p. 6).  The purpose in selecting only Western Europe and Canada is to study 
the states with the largest barriers for entry in the form of the length of the establishment 
of the central state as a substantive democracy and to seek explanations for how new 
parties with radical viewpoints can enter advanced democratic systems.  Ultimately, 
twelve states (Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the U.K.) are represented, as they each 
have at least one SNRP since 1950 that has contested regional or national elections.   
 Second, because of the defined interest in the successful electoral parties, all 
regionalist parties that have contested elections at either the national level since 1950 or 
the regional level since 1970 will be considered—thus eliminating the least 
successful/most fringe cases (parties which have never contested elections at either level).  
These criteria require the creation of a novel dataset—combining the work of Massetti 
and Schakel, which identified 76 regionalist parties in Western Europe and Canada that 




The European Union and the Rise of Regionalist Parties, which included 56 Western 
European regionalist parties that have contested at least one federal election since 1950, 
as well as Jolly’s previous work (2007). All told, the new dataset includes 108 parties, 
some of which are electoral coalitions or predecessors of current or past parties, as well 
as a categorization of each party’s platform as ambiguous, protectionist, federalist, or 
separationist.  These categories are based on Dandoy’s typology (2010) for entho-
regionalist parties and includes changes in party platforms over time (thus some parties 
have different categorizations at different points in party history).  Massetti and Schakel 
categorized the 76 parties in their studies, and this dissertation will include the additional 
parties via current information posted on party web sites.  Finally, the reason for only 
considering parties from the 1950s onward is to provide insight into electoral success 
only since the changes brought about by the Second World War in these states and in the 
modern era—given the impact of WWII both on understandings of nationalism and self-
determination as well as the increased role of campaigning and the media in modern 
democracies. 
 Of the 108, the parties that have advocated for secession or independence at some 
point in their history will be the focus because they have the largest barriers of entry in 
the form of their high demands for total autonomy and separation.  Once those parties 
(RSPs) have been identified on the basis of party platform, then electoral persistence will 
be evaluated based on holding seats at both the national and regional level simultaneously 
for more than one consecutive election cycles.  The simultaneity threshold will help 




elections.  Parties which only contest at regional or only national elections naturally have 
a narrower set of interests to reflect as they do not have to contextualize a singular 
message for elections at different levels of governance.  Thus, RSPs who have to contest 
at both regional and national elections are in fact facing even stronger barriers given the 
changing context of elections.  Additionally, the measure of persistence, as maintaining 
seats in more than one consecutive electoral cycle, eliminates parties with short-term 
election successes as well as short-term election coalitions.  
 After taking all these variables— (1) regionalist parties in substantive 
democracies (2) which advocate a peaceful means to an independence platform (3), and 
have held seats simultaneously at the regional and national levels for more than two 
election cycle (4)—the remaining cases will be considered to find the most extreme value 
as based on electoral results.  Explanations regarding European integration, viability on 
the basis of economics, size of the region, language, and type of nationalism as well as 
devolution or greater federalism will only answer the question of success to a limited 
point.  Thus, after consideration of the universe of cases and narrowing to the most 
successful parties, this dissertation will discuss the limitations of the comparative work 
done so far to explain this success and why it is necessary to look deeply at a single 
party—the most extreme success case—in order to understand better how parties on the 
fringe impact their own growth and progress into mainstream political competitors. 
The case under careful consideration will be the SNP because it is the single most 
successful regionalist party among the universe of cases.  While there have been 




electoral success as has been reached by the SNP—especially since 2007.  While the SNP 
has earned 29% of the vote in Scotland during the last two EU parliamentary election 
cycles, none of the others has reached 20%.  At the national level, the SNP received 50% 
of the region’s vote in the 2015 election and 36.9% in 2017, but none of the other parties 
received over 30% in any given election cycle.  Finally, at the regional level, the SNP 
still has the strongest electoral showings, but the Democratic Convergence of Catalonia 
(CDC) achieved results closer to the SNP than in these other cases, as the SNP earned 
44% and 47% of the vote in the last two regional cycles and the CDC coalition received 
40% in its last election. However, that coalition already deteriorated in 2016 and been 
reformed into a different set of party alliances in Catalonia.  The Catalan case is unique in 
its own way as the coalitions have been shifting for decades—and do not offer a 
consistent context to evaluate a single party’s evolution. 
Even though the definitive weakness of using the SNP as an extreme value case is 
not being able to generalize without conducting similar labor-intensive archival research 
on individual parties and their growth, the SNP provides ample within-case comparisons 
for examining the role of path dependency as an RSP achieves electoral success despite 
the various strong barriers to entry.  Comparisons in Chapter 2 between the SNP and the 
PC, which work within the institutional structures of the state, will serve to show that 
aspects of party agency and development are indeed the two essential factors in 
explaining the difference in the two RSPs’ electoral success.  Finally, the SNP is 
consistently under-explained in statistical models (Jolly 2006, Sorens 2005), suggesting 




The Case of the Scottish National Party (SNP) 
The SNP’s growth from the fringe of politics to a mainstream role in Scotland is 
rich ground for evaluating how an RSP can evolve over time.  In being the extreme-case, 
the SNP can potentially provide a blueprint for other fledgling parties with minority-held 
ideas.  Thus, the process tracing portion of this dissertation will seek to determine if 
Deschouwer’s party lifespan model and this writer’s five-part taxonomy accurately 
explain the stages of growth exhibited by the SNP over time. 
From a broad viewpoint, the SNP does fit Deschouwer’s model as the SNP did 
break each of the established barriers mostly in his order (See Table 1.1). Establishing 
itself as a political party in 1934, the SNP did not fully define itself as an electoral party 
until 1945 when it won a by-election Parliamentary seat for three months in the first post-
WWII election.  However, it would take until the 1967 Hamilton by-election victory 
before the party consistently broke the representation threshold.  Then, from 1967-1999, 
the party consistently held the role of “blackmail” as it could only oppose the mainstream 
parties from a few backbench seats in the U.K. Parliament. However, the willingness of 
party leaders to accept an incremental approach to independence led to the creation of the 
Scottish Parliament in 1999—a breakthrough that would allow the SNP to gain political 
experience in opposition.  Clearly the party moved to a having governing potential when 
the SNP won the most seats in the 2007 Scottish elections and formed a minority 
government.  On the next cycle, the party became the sole party of government in 
Scotland after winning a majority in the 2011 Scottish election.  While the SNP, like all 




certainly have improved once it had the chance to participate regularly at the regional 




















































































































































national level  
Table 1.1. SNP Periods of Growth from Fringe to Mainstream 
While this big-picture process of crashing through barriers in clear and logical 
succession is easy to identify, it is harder to explain how the SNP was able to achieve 
their successes—as well as the causes for its setbacks.  In its infancy, the SNP’s greatest 
challenge was unity—both in terms of what “nationalist” meant and in regard to how to 
achieve independence.  Struggling to attract members and to afford posting candidates in 




media exposure, and often lost election deposits.3  However, the 1967 Hamilton by-
election victory of Winnie Ewing allowed the party to access the seat of government for 
the first time and to learn more about institutional norms and expectations.  During the 
party’s adolescence, from the late 1960s until the creation of the Scottish Parliament in 
1999, the SNP wrestled internally on how to present itself and how to widen its appeal.  
While the party had some increases in media exposure, such as during by-elections, the 
general trend was the pursuit of any kind of coverage.  A slight increase in resources at 
points, also punctuated by times of lean economic backing, allowed the SNP to 
establish—and eventually maintain—a central office which began unifying campaign 
materials and other outreach.  This period saw the party transition from a survival mode 
to one of consistent electoral competitor.  Ultimately, the marginal growth between 1967 
and 1999—which happened in a time of relative stasis as party leaders learned from 
electoral and fundraising victories as well as humiliating losses—positioned the SNP to 
take advantage of the opportunities granted via devolution.   
With the creation of the Scottish Parliament in 1999, the SNP proactively 
organized historic efforts that would change the face of the party.  Forced to field a far 
greater number of candidates than ever before, the SNP was well organized as it trained 
candidates and expanded the party’s influence ahead of the first Scottish elections—
including appearing as a political peer of the major parties in election debates.  Once 
 
3 U.K. electoral law requires a deposit for each candidate in campaigns for the House of Commons; 
the deposit is returned if the candidate reaches a preset percentage of the vote. Until 1985, the fee had 
been £150, and the threshold was 12.5%.  Since 1985, the deposit has £500 while the threshold was 




granted the opportunity to serve as the opposition and shadow cabinet in the Scottish 
government between 1999 and 2003, the SNP transitioned again—this time from a 
competitor to a peer.  The party’s own press releases as well as the press coverage it 
received began to show the formerly amateurish nationalists to be able politicians with 
messages far broader than breaking up the union—including more strategically targeted 
messages against electoral competitors like Scottish Labour. 
Finally, the SNP ascended to its highest electoral ambitions in Scotland with its 
2011 victory in the Scottish elections when it served as the lone party of government.  
This new electoral reality forced changes by those outside the party—both other 
politicians and the media in particular—to recognize the party as a peer of the 
mainstream parties, even if only north of the England-Scotland border.  However, the 
SNP itself changed the most—as it was now running campaigns based on its record in 
government and utilizing professionally raised funding.  In this sense, the SNP finally 
looked like any other successful professional-electoral party—just with the big asterisk 
that it kept pushing for independence.  Once the party was able to prove its 
professionalism to a wider audience, there was greater chance of support for its ideas 
concerning independence—and thus the 2014 independence referendum was held.  The 
SNP’s persistence, even after the loss of that referendum, is another reason to consider 
what contributes to the party’s persistence and electoral successes as the SNP’s most 
historic results at the national level occurred after it lost the independence referendum 
and changed party leadership.  The elections since 2015 have seen the SNP make clear 




By process tracing the party’s growth, one can identify the periods when this 
feedback loop of party growth remained persistent versus when the party’s history does 
not match this hypothesized cycle.  The history of the SNP (Wilson 2009a, 2009b; Lynch 
2013; Sommerville 2013) is marked by historic breakthroughs followed by periods of 
stagnation and regression.  This hypothesis regarding party evolution would suggest that 
the periods of regression are due, at least in part, to the progressive steps either being left 
incomplete or having been completed out of order. Further testing can determine whether 
these stages of growth are universal to the development of any nascent party or are only 
pertinent in the case of a separatist fringe party in Western Europe—or just in the U.K. 
Data for the Large-N analysis required the creation of a new database of 108 
parties and their ideology on self-government, while the process tracing of the case study 
included a large number of historical primary and secondary sources on the SNP. Besides 
the party’s 26 available election manifestos from 1945-present and approximately 20 
Party Political Broadcasts, well over 15,000 pages of political documents, pamphlets and 
leaflets, news coverage, and campaign memorandum were considered (See Appendix H: 
Primary Sources).  Most of these documents are archived at the National Library of 
Scotland (NLS); however, newspaper clippings and other party documents from Donald 
Drysdale’s papers, Sara Bromage’s interviews with Gordon Wilson, Ruth Marr, and 
Brian Wilson, and over 35 hours of audio interviews with party members and leaders by 
Billy Kay as he prepared the BBC Radio Scotland series on “The Cause: A History of 
Scottish Nationalism” were accessed at the Scottish Political Archive at the University of 




the 1930s through the present, Party Annual Conference notes from 1954-1957, 1963, 
1967, 1971, 1975, 1978, 1980-1996, the party constitutions, several boxes of Robert 
McIntyre’s papers (1960-1968), and papers on broadcasting rights (1944).  In addition, 
over 2,100 headquarters news releases from 1960-1969, 1970-1993, and 1995 and over 
4,000 press releases from 1999-2003 were researched. Personal interviews with former 
party leader Alex Salmond, former Party Executive and Scottish Cabinet Member 
Michael Russell, and former party press officer Kevin Pringle were conducted in July 
2017.  These three interviewees were selected due to their first-hand knowledge of the 
SNP’s relations with the media for the period since the 1980s. 
Finally, three detailed historical accounts of the party—two by academics and a 
two-volume history by former party leader Gordon Wilson—as well as political analysis 
regarding the party’s professionalization by Mitchell, Bennie, and Johns on the period 
until 2007 and the party’s recent success in Johns and Mitchells’ Takeover: Explaining 
The Extraordinary Rise of the SNP (2016) were all taken into account along with the 
numerous other academic journal articles on UK politics and the SNP in particular. 
Additional research for party membership numbers, campaign expenditures, and media 
saliency by volume was conducted via prior academic work on party history as well the 
SNP’s official web site (and the history of the party as presented by the Aberdeen 
branch), the UK Electoral Commission, and full-text records on the Proquest News and 
Newspapers database.  Finally, a content analysis of all party manifestos from 1992 
onward was conducted; this process included coding each document for its usage of 




details.).  Over 80% of the material was cross-coded and showed excellent cross-coder 
reliability (98% on indicators of independence and 92% on nation). 
Plan for Dissertation 
This dissertation will be organized into seven chapters, including this first 
introductory chapter. Chapter 2 will include a Large-N study of regionalist parties in 
Canada and Western Europe and will make a more complete case for the SNP as the most 
extreme value case while also identifying where other explanations of SNRP and niche 
party successes have been limited or inconclusive for the strongest electoral performers—
signaling the need for this in-depth process-tracing study of the SNP’s internal evolution 
and growth.  Chapters 3 through 6 will consider each period of SNP growth and 
determine if the periods of the party’s greatest growth and successes match the projected 
five requirements of party growth including the consolidation of ideas, the consolidation 
of methods, increasing exposure, establishing persistence, and reallocating resources.  
Finally, the conclusion will consider what the SNP’s growth means for the future of 
Scotland, the UK, and the EU as well as how this theory can be further tested in other 
contexts and whether the cycle of growth for SNP is potentially replicable for other 







Limits of Existing Explanations for Regional Parties and Independence Platforms  
 After being treated as “revolts, throwbacks, peripheral or niche parties” in a 
variety of work spanning 1983-2008, stateless nationalist and regionalist parties (SNRPs) 
have become permanent fixtures in Europe and have begun to be treated as such in 
academic work (Hepburn 2011,1).  The shift certainly has to do with the increased 
electoral support of several of these parties across states in Europe and Canada, as the 
more successful ones have moved “from niche to ‘normal’” –having expanded their party 
platforms to address other issues as they compete in the “multi-level and multi-
dimensional politics” of Europe (Hepburn 2011, 11-15).  Thus, the purpose here is to 
determine the universe of cases, narrow to the parties with specific independence 
platforms that peacefully call for the formation of a different state, and then determine 
which of those parties have been able to sustain electoral success.  This process of 
narrowing will then afford the chance to look at the most successful regionalist-
separatists parties (RSPs) which have sustained electoral presence while seeking the 
challenging task of undoing the state in which it is running.    
 Once those cases have been established, then the purpose is to explore why these 
individual parties are successful.  Explanations regarding European integration, viability 
on the basis of economics, size of the region, language, and type of nationalism as well as 
devolution or greater federalism will only answer the question of success to a limited 
point.  The role of devolution as an explanation would suggest that the parties in the U.K. 




success.  The other most successful movements towards independence is in Catalonia—
but that movement has been led by a coalition of parties and not led by a single group.  
Thus, after consideration of the universe of cases and narrowing to the most successful 
parties, I will discuss the limitations of the comparative work done so far to explain this 
success and why it is necessary to look deeply at a single party—the most extreme 
success case—in order to understand better how parties on the fringe impact their own 
growth and progress towards becoming mainstream political competitors. 
Defining concepts, case universe, and “success” 
 
Especially when participating in long-standing substantive democracies, regional parties 
that seek independence are positioned against a significant barrier in the form of the 
centralized state; however, these parties are a subset of a larger group of regional parties.  
A broad definition of a “regional” party is a party that functions in one region of a larger 
state, presents candidates in that region, limits where it runs based on that territorial 
claim, and states political objectives “defending” that region (DeWinter and Tursan 
1998), while “entho-regionalist parties” are frequently, and similarly, defined as having 
sub-national territorial borders, a group identity, and stances that “challeng[e] the 
working order” (Muller-Rommel 1998 in Dandoy 2010).  All told, “regionalist parties 
defend the interests of their collective identity groups, with particular emphasis on 
territorial autonomy and capacity goals” (Jolly 2015, 18). 
 Among substantive democracies in western Europe and Canada there are a 
number of parties that could be considered, and these lists are quite fluid as there are any 




dissertation, because of the focus on the successful parties, parties which have posted 
candidates in either regional or state-level elections since 1970 will be considered.  
Massetti and Schakel (2105) listed 76 regionalist parties in their 2016 study on the 
ideologies of regionalist parties.  Their list in another study includes parties that ran in a 
state-level election since 1950 or regional elections since 1970 onward in the EU-15 plus 
Canada and Switzerland. Jolly’s research on regionalist parties in Western Europe 
identified 56 that have competed in at least one state-level election since 1950 (Jolly 
2015), and his prior work also included Initiative for Catalonia (IC) which was added 
here (Jolly 2007).  While some of the included parties are predecessors of other parties on 
the list, together the three studies provide 108 different political parties in these 
substantive democracies that have contested elections—either at the regional or national4 
level—in a specific region of a larger state. (See Appendix B: Regional Parties in 
Western Europe and Canada.)   
 Among these parties, about half (49) have had an independence platform—a 
stated claim of seeking to create a separate and independent state from a fragment within 
an existing state.  The rest of the parties advocate for softer degrees of autonomy.  Using 
Dandoy’s typology for enthno-regionalist parties in Europe, each of the 108 parties have 
been categorized based on the relative strength of the party’s self-government 
commitment: separationist, federalist, protectionist, or ambiguous (Dandoy 2010).  
Separatism is the strongest claim—seeking a separate state.  Then, federalism is a call for 
 
4 Throughout this section, “national,” “federal,” or “national-level” elections or politics refers to the 





increased autonomy while protectionist claims are slightly weaker—and are aimed at 
protecting cultural or existing institutions for the identified group.  Finally, “ambiguous” 
is for periods where the party’s manifestos and other communications (such as its web 
site) do not emphasize any particular self-government claim. Massetti and Shakel utilized 
Dandoy’s typology for the 76 parties in their study, and I have added classifications for 
the 25 parties that they did not include and changed their listing for 11 parties’ ideology 
on self-government.5  Of the 108 parties, 18 have changed their platforms at some point 
in their history (therefore falling into different categories at various points in time).  
Together, 31 parties have been protectionist while 34 parties at some point have called 
for more autonomy or further devolution and were categorized as “federalist” and 49 
parties were classified as “separatist” at some point in its history since the 1950s (See 
Fig. 2.1).   There are a small number of unique parties that fall into different categories.  
For example, seven parties in Northern Ireland wish for a reunited Ireland and one party 
in Belgium has called for the region (Wallonia) to be united with France.  While the 
Northern Irish parties are categorized separately (“Irish unification”), Walloon Rally is 
categorized as protectionist in the 1960s and then federalist from the 1970s onward. 
Additionally, there are two parties which run on platforms solely for protecting cultural 
aspects of nationalism (Swedish People’s Party in Finland and Parítu Asturianista in 
Spain) within a region and thus are categorized as “protectionist” but there is a valid 
argument that their form of protectionism is unique in comparison to similarly 
 
5 In each case, I “upgraded” the classification—in 9 cases to “separationist” and in two cases to 
“federalist” from protectionist. These changes are shown in italics in the Appendix and are based on 




categorized parties like Aldace d’abord (Alsace Frist, ADA) in France or Schleswig 
Party, SLE in Denmark that protect both cultural and political interests. 
  
Fig. 2.1. Regionalist Party Platforms on Self-Government	
 These 108 parties reflect a wide range of electoral success,6 and the least 
successful—or smallest fringe regional parties—are under-represented.  The least 
successful parties, 31 in total in this dataset, have never held seats at the federal level or 
regional level (or the data is unavailable).  However, this number could be even if higher 
if all regional parties of any size or level of influence were included.  This combined 
dataset includes only parties that have posted candidates at the regional or federal 
levels—there are other much smaller fringe parties in Europe that only contest at the 
municipal or local level or function as small social movements.  Additionally, other 
parties have declined over time but are still on this list.  For example, the Schleswig Party 
last won federal level representation in 1960, but it has only contested elections at the 
municipal level since 1973.  Other parties which are in this dataset, such as Vlaams Blok 
 
6 See Appendix B “Electoral Results for strongest regional parties in Belgium, Spain, and the U.K.” 
for election results at the European, National, and regional level.  These parties are not all necessarily 












in Belgium, have been re-formulated into a new party (Vlaams Belang) or folded from 
one name—such as the Trentino Tyrolean People’s Party (PTTT)—into a bigger party, 
the Trentino Tyrolean Autonomist Party (PATT).  Even more common, especially in the 
multi-party systems in Spain and Italy, parties have been restructured several times over 
as new coalitions are formed.  For example, in Catalonia, the Catalan European 
Democratic Party (PDeCAT) was recently formed in 2016 following the folding the of 
Convergence and Union (CiU), which had been a coalition itself—that had formed from 
the Democratic Pact for Catalonia (PDC) and the Democratic Union of Catalonia (UDC).  
Finally, some “parties” on this list—such as Canarian Independence Groupings (CC) or 
the Bloc Québécois (BQ)— are coalitions of regional-level parties that function to 
consolidate the group’s common protection of the region’s interests in national-level 
politics.  Of the parties listed, seven parties have only held seats at the national level 
while 34 have held seats only at the regional level and 33 others, since 1970, have 
managed to hold seats in both levels of government. 
 Of the 49 with any “separatist” claims in its history, even fewer have experienced 
any form of electoral success—let alone sustained presence in elections—at the regional 
and national levels.  Of the parties with a “separatist” classification, 14 never held seats at 
either the national or regional level and two parties held seats only at the national level 
(Bloc Québécois is a coalition that only runs in federal elections in Canada and the 
Scottish Labour Party (SCLP, 1976-1981) won a seat in the U.K. Parliament in 1979).  
Otherwise, 16 other parties have won regional seats, and 17 parties have won seats at 




Of these 17 which have successfully seated representatives at both the national 
and regional level, there is a range of success as well.  Two parties won a national seat 
just once. The Union del Pueblo Canario (Union of Canarian People, UP) which was an 
eight-year long electoral coalition that won a seat in the 1979 Spanish elections, and 
Aralar (AR) in Basque, Spain held one seat as part of a coalition in the Spanish 
Parliament and four seats in the Navarre Assembly in the early 2000s but otherwise has 
held no seats.  Others have had electoral success at the regional and national levels but 
not necessarily while also advocating for independence.  For example, Lega Nord had a 
period in the late 1990s where it ran more forcibly on its independence platform, but it 
has softened its stance in subsequent years and has not held seats at both levels while also 
maintaining a clearly separatist agenda.7  Similarly, the Galician Nationalist Bloc (BNG) 
was only separationist from 1970s-1986 and did not challenge the national elections then.  
Finally, two electoral coalitions have experienced success at the national levels. 
Convergència i Unió, (Convergence and Union, CiU) which united Democratic 
Convergence of Catalonia (CDC) and the Democratic Union of Catalonia (UDC) in 
Catalonia -split on basis of disagreements about independence and was only more clearly 
separationist after 2014—shortly after which the coalition dissolved.8  Likewise, Nafarroa 
Bai (Yes to Navarre, NB), a coalition of Basque parties that existed from 2003-2011, held 
seats in both the Navarre Parliament and the Cortes General (Spain’s lower house) for 
 
7 Since Matteo Salvini rose as party leader in 2013, Lega Nord has been renamed Lega.  It no longer 
supports a secessionist platform but remains anti-immigrant and hard-right. 
8 Massetti and Schakel categorize CiU as “Federalist (1970s-1998 and 2002-2007); Ambiguous (1998-




two election cycles before dissolving.   
 
Fig. 2.2. Regional-Separationist Party Seats Won 
Discounting these one-time parties, dissolved voting coalitions, and the parties which 
have been separatist at some point but not while winning national and regional 
representation, there are just 10 parties9 that have won seats at both the national and 
regional level since 1950 while actively advocating for separatism, and only seven of 
those parties currently exist.  Additionally, only five of the existing parties have been able 
to sustain an electoral presence—which is measured as having simultaneous 
representation at the national and regional level for two or more election cycles while 
advocating for separatism. (See Table 2.1). Both Volksunie (VU) and Herri Batasuna 
(HB) have folded in recent years.  Volksunie did not meet the measure of persistence 
because it only held a secessionist position in the 1990s—when it did manage to hold 
both regional and federal seats before folding in 2001.  HB is an outlier from the outset, 
as it was not necessarily like these others in regard to seeking a peaceful resolution to 
 












autonomy interests.  Thus, as a party, it did not take seats it won—except at the local 
level—and was dissolved by the Spanish Supreme Court in 2001 for its association with 
terrorism. 
Region, State Party Existence Persistence? 
Flanders, Belgium Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie (New Flemish Alliance, NV-A) 2001- Y 
Flanders, Belgium Vlaams Belang (Flemish Interest, VB)  (previously Vlaams Blok, VB) 2004- Y 
Flanders, Belgium Volksunie (People’s Union, VU) 1954-2001 N 
Faroe Islands, 
Denmark Tjóôvedldi (Republic, E) 1948- Y 
Bavaria, Germany Bayernpartei (Bavarian Party, BP) 1946- N 
Sardinia, Italy Partido Sardo d’Azione (Sardinian Action Party, PSdAz) 1921- N 
Basque, Spain Herri Batasuana (United People, HB) 1979-2001 Y 
Catalonia, Spain Ezquerra Republicana de Catalunya (Republican Left in Catalonia, ERC) 1931- N 
Scotland, U.K. Scottish National Party (SNP) 1934- Y 
Wales, U.K. Plaid Cymru (Party of Wales, PC) 1925- Y 
Table 2.1. Regional-Separatist Parties at National and Regional Elections 
 
The Republican Left in Catalonia (ERC), Bayernpartei (Bavarian Party, BP) and 
Partido Sardo d’Azione (Sardinian Action Party, PSdAz) fail to meet the persistence 
measures.  ERC was only clearly separationist from 1989-1996 (Massetti and Schakel 
2016, 71)—thus only lasting two election cycles with the stronger call for sovereignty. In 
the case of BP, the party did hold 17 seats in the German bundestag in 1949 and won 
seats as part of a coalition in 1953, but it has not had national seats since.  At the regional 
level, BP won 17.9% in 1950 and has not held seats at the regional level since 1962.  In 
2012, the party did earn 2.1% of vote in regional elections—its highest level since 1966.  




coalitions.  Hepburn’s work (2009) explains the inconsistencies in this particular case—
much of which as to do with NOT organizing at different levels of government. 
Thus, five truly regional-separatist parties have, since 1950, managed to win seats 
at both the national and regional level in two or more consecutive election cycles. These 
parties are the New Flemish Alliance (N-VA) and Flemish Interest (VB) in Belgium, 
Tjóôvedldi (“Republic,” E) in Denmark, and the SNP and Plaid Cymru in the U.K.  Of 
these five, the SNP is the most successful electorally at the regional and national levels.  
(See Fig. 2.3 and 2.4.) At the regional level, SNP has reached 30% or higher in three 
successive election cycles.  Only two other parties have ever even crossed the 30% 
mark—the N-VA in its 2014 election and Plaid in 1999, the first regional election ever 
held in the U.K.   
 

























































































At the national level, the numbers are less easy to compare, especially since a party like 
Tjóôvedldi only contests the two seats that represent the Faroe Islands.  In Belgium, the 
Flemish language group has 88 seats while Scotland has 59 seats in the U.K. Parliament 
and Wales, 40.  However, again, the SNP exceeds the results of the other parties having 
twice earned more than 30% of the vote in the region during a national election. (See 
Appendix C for more national election results.) 
 
Fig. 2.4. National Election Seats Won by Most Successful Regional-Separatist Parties 
 
 
Explanations of Five Most Successful Cases 
The basis for this study departs from the literature which shows a general 
consensus that European integration encourages sub-national mobilization in member 
states (Jolly 2006, Nagel 2004, Laible 2008); therefore, despite including parties from 
Canada and Switzerland in the list of 108 parties, the 10 most electorally successful 
regionalist-separatist parties are, or were, all in the EU.  Certainly, part of this result is 
due to Quebec’s parties choosing to organize through separate organizations at the 
national and regional level, but a large factor is also that the EU makes smaller states 
viable (Jolly 2006) in terms of economics and security while also advocating for 
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(across western Europe) as integration in the EU has deepened (Jolly 2015).  Laible wrote 
about the cases of Scottish National Party and the Flemish Vlaams Belang as she 
explored how the EU creates more political space for nationalists and how nationalism 
has—and has not—evolved in Europe.  Her two cases were the most electorally 
successful in Europe at the time, so underlying her work is the idea that these successful 
parties are made more successful with the increased exposure via the EU (Laible 2008).  
For all five parties with sustained electoral support, these explanations are applicable. 
Art’s theory on party development does explain some of the success of all five 
parties. In his theory, which is based on Far-Right parties, the issue was whether parties 
were met by suppression or permissiveness from the existing government (Art 2011).  
The exact same concern is not at play in the case of many of the secessionist parties—
instead the question is whether the national government is willing to devolve powers or 
consider legal secession. In all three cases—Belgium, Denmark, and the U.K.—
decentralization has provided at least temporary solutions to the demands for 
independence, and in both Denmark and the U.K. permission has been granted to hold 
independence referendums (Scotland in 2014 and the Faroe Islands in 2017—though the 
latter has yet to be held).  While, the final threshold of independence remains unrealized 
in all these cases, the parties have been met with limited permissiveness especially in 
Catalonia. 
Only in the past six to eight years have scholars acknowledged the importance of 
multi-level governance as grounds for SNRP increasing success; and in this study, this 




measured by winning seats at multiple levels of government.  While some authors argue 
that multiple levels of government increase these parties’ policy influence and can help 
them maximize voter support (Elias and Tronconi 2011, 513; Brancati 2008), in fact 
multi-level elections also create even greater challenges to these smaller political parties, 
as they have to engage resources—and audiences—in entirely different contexts.  The 
phrase “multi-level governance” was first defined by Marks (1993) as “a system of 
continuous negotiation among nested governments at several territorial tiers” (p. 392).  It 
is under this premise that this study considers parties that have organized at multiple 
levels as having broken even more important barriers to success—as each audience 
requires a different set of skills as well as candidates.  Thus, when the parties in Quebec, 
Catalonia, and Basque choose to align in coalitions at the national (and European level 
for the Spanish regions), there is less pressure on an individual organization to develop 
multiple levels of communication and strategy.  It is this diversity of demands on the 
Belgian, Danish, and U.K. parties that sets them apart in the context of regionalist-
separatist parties that are successful, as they face the challenges of organizing at different 
levels of elections. 
Other explanations for the success and viability of regionalist parties include 
multivariate regression analyses, and they have explained the Belgian and Danish cases 
well but have under-predicted both Scotland and Wales. In his review of the literature 
and his own analysis, Jolly (2006) considered the origin of support (meaning the 
demographics of those voting for the regional parties), the variable of language 




(meaning the region’s unemployment or tax rate versus the rest of the state), and the role 
of integration (p. 41-76). Previously, Sorens (2005) did a cross-sectional analysis of 
secession in advanced countries that indicated that the presence of a regional language, a 
recent independence (since 1648), high income, and big population as well as aspects of 
location (especially falling into one existing state—unlike the Basque case, for example) 
indicate increased chances of secession support.  Sorens’s study under-predicted Scotland 
and Wales—but fit both the Belgian cases and Denmark well. “…It appears,” Sorens 
wrote, well before the SNP’s recent historic victories, “that Welsh and even Scottish 
nationalists should be congratulated for achieving electoral success well beyond what 
base conditions seem to support” (p. 321).   
 Alternatively, institutional explanations of conditions that should impact the 
relative strength of an ethno-regionalist parties at large would again seem to support the 
Danish and Flemish case but do not adequately account for the Scottish and Welsh cases.  
Several factors can minimize regionalist party influence: “presidentialism, majority 
systems, and election concurrency” (Brancati 2008, 158) as well as unitary systems 
(Harmel and Robertson 1985; Willey 1998).  None of the three countries in consideration 
have presidential systems. In Belgium, there are proportional representation rules at all 
levels of government, it is a federal state, and generally there is not election concurrency.  
Their European and regional elections are held together but usually the federal is 
separate—except in the case of 2014 when all three levels were held at the same time.  
During that 2014 “super” election cycle, the N-VA no longer “emphasize[d] the end of 




on the other hand, is unitary, sometimes has concurrent elections, and is proportional.  
However, the Faroe Islands has a far different relationship with Denmark than these other 
regions have back to their central state. The Faroe Islands have been self-governing since 
1948 and is treated as a “third country” by the EU (Adler-Nissen 2014); the islands, via 
The Takeover Act of 2005, now have been granted unilateral legislative and 
administrative powers except on issues of the Constitution, the Supreme Court, foreign, 
security and defense policy and monetary and currency matters.10  So while Denmark 
itself is a unitary state, the Faroe Islands do not function as part of that highly centralized 
system, and the islands’ parliament has more jurisdiction than the regional parliaments of 
the U.K., for example.  Therefore, Faroe does function outside a unitary system, has non-
concurrent elections to its legislature and the Danish parliament, and utilizes a 
proportional system.  Finally, the U.K., like both Flanders and the Faroe Islands, does not 
have concurrent elections but does have a majority system at the U.K. level.  Both PC 
and the SNP seem to defy most of these factors as well. 
Otherwise, some of these parties have seen improved electoral results since 2008, 
and the popular press connects these trends to the economic crises that began the same 
year.  However, there is little evidence of any broader such pattern: most SNRPs have not 
experienced significant or consistent long-term improvements in their electoral success. 
Some argue that the more recent electoral successes of some SNRPs are the result of the 
impact of the economic crises in Europe that started with the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers and the resulting banking crisis in the UK in September 2008. The argument is 
 




that the economic crisis led to greater desire for local governance.  Brubaker explored 
economic nationalism or protectionism and found that economic distress does not 
automatically intensify this closing in, but “…crisis certainly does provide important 
rhetorical resources for those who seek to advance nationalist or enthopolitical agenda” 
(Brubaker 2011,108).  Atanasiu made a similar assertion that “neo-nationalists promote 
their policies reasoning the economic crisis, promising lower taxes and better 
environmental and energetic policies” (Atanasiu 2013, 44).  Yet, even with this 
advantage, Atanasiu’s study concluded, “…we consider the possibility for any region 
being part of an EU state to get the independence remains low” (p. 45). 
The main difficulty with this argument is that there is no uniform increase in the 
electoral success of SNRPs since 2007 in Europe.  Rather, the record is inconsistent.  The 
SNP and NV-A are the only cases where the party has been increasingly successful at 
every level of election since the first signs of economic distress. (See Appendix B for 
electoral results of an even wider range of successful SNRPs in Europe—which contains 
parties that have softer claims than independence.) 
Thus, it would seem that European integration, multi-level governance, 
permissive national governments, and lack of presidentialism helps all five parties; 
however, while the Belgian and Danish cases are well explained by statistical analysis of 
the viability of regional parties as well as the presence of non-current elections and 
proportional systems, the cases in the U.K. continue to be inadequately elucidated as the 





A comparison of Scotland and Wales 
If electoral results were solely determined by institutional structures, then given that Plaid 
Cymru (PC) and the Scottish National Party (SNP) exist in the same system, one would 
expect them to have similar electoral outcomes. After all, they both post candidates in all 
levels of elections and even were granted regional assemblies in the same year (1999).  
Yet, while both parties are under-predicted by statistical models and inadequately 
explained by institutional factors, the SNP has been vastly more successful in elections at 
both the national and regional level and was even granted the opportunity to hold an 
independence referendum.  There appear to be a number of explanations on why SNP 
have outperformed Plaid in particular—and they all seem to imply a path dependent 
scenario that starts with a more economically viable region for secession in Scotland 
from which the SNP was able to build stronger party structure and resources in order to 
take full advantage of the political opportunity granted by devolution.   
 While the viability studies of regionalist or secessionist parties do under-predict 
both Scotland and Wales, the factors measured by Sorens’s account for some portion of 
the gap in success between the SNP and PC.  Sorens included language distinctiveness, 
recent history of independence, high population, and high income as factors that would 
favor secessionism.  While Wales—and the PC—have stronger emphasis on language 
distinctiveness (Fusaro 1979; Barlow 2014), it seems to have weakened their position in 
terms of voter support—which is the opposite of Sorens’s findings (2005).  The other 
indicators in this study would predict Scotland over Wales in terms of conditions for a 




Wales (1536), a larger population (5.5 million in Scotland; 3.3 million in Wales), and 
higher GDP per capita (£28, 900 in Scotland; £21,900 in Wales). While these indicators 
seem to indicate that the SNP is already naturally ahead of the PC, secession can only 
happen if those pressing for it are well organized and have resources to advocate for their 
position.  At the first round of devolved elections for the regional parliaments, PC 
outperformed the SNP—suggesting even greater change over time between the way the 
two parties have evolved. 
 Other comparative studies, as early as the 1970s electoral spikes for both PC and 
SNP, indicate further advantages for the SNP including greater separation from the 
English and Welsh on policy areas, a stronger sense of identity, and stronger party 
structure, unity, and resources (Fusaro 1979).  Starting with the Act of Union in 1707, 
Scotland was granted the right to maintain its own separate legal system—an opportunity 
that was not granted to Wales.  Fusaro argued that this separation, along with education 
essentially being left to the Scots to decide for themselves, granted the Scottish a clearer 
distinction from England than was permitted to Wales in its process of being incorporated 
into the British state. Writing after the SNP won 30% of the Scottish vote in the October 
1979 U.K. election and PC recorded 11% in Wales, Fusaro noted that the “nationalist 
spirit has been slower to develop in Wales”—and, he mused, partially because it was 
incorporated for longer and the English had actively worked at the exclusion of Welsh 
language (p. 365).  As further evidence, Fusaro considered the SNP’s 1974 manifesto 
which “assume[d] that the reader takes for granted the existence of the nation of 




serving as a “teacher” and trying to convince the people of Wales that they are indeed a 
separate national identity.  This difficulty—or divide—was especially evident in the form 
of party resources, as 26 of 36 PC candidates lost deposits during 1970s elections while 
the SNP lost none11 (p. 369-70).  Likewise, there remained in the 1970s “disagreement 
between the more militant and moderate forces” within the Plaid Cymru concerning the 
language policy (p. 383) while the SNP had been able to quell those debates for at least a 
decade (See Chapter 3).   
Given the “head start” of the region’s viability and the growth of party resources 
as early as the 1970s, the divide between SNP and PC only continued when both parties 
were presented with opportunity to participate at the regional level with passage of 
devolution in 1999.  Devolution has been found to increase civil society, foster a common 
regional identity, and help construct and consolidate regional elite (Guibernau 2006, 70-
71). However, when devolution first occurred in 1999, while the SNP was “uniquely able 
to mobilize the party into action by co-opting the broad, cross-cutting network of support 
…and the wide distribution of grievances across Scotland” (Barlow 2014, 46) the PC was 
not as well positioned—yet outperformed the SNP at the polls.  Scholars go back to the 
issue of language distinctiveness as well as economic indicators and party resources 
(Barlow 2014) for explanations of why there may have been more of a ceiling on Plaid’s 
growth. 
Yet, both SNP and PC have experienced governing at the regional level; however, 
 
11 When candidates fail to meet a particular percentage of the vote, the party loses its election deposit.  




again, the degree of success (which is partially a result of this entirely path dependent 
process) reflected a significant difference in experiences for SNP and PC—with SNP 
gaining an even greater comparative advantage since 2007.  While they both have 
conducted similar reforms to centralize the party and yet maintain some form of 
institutional legacy (McAngus-2016a) in order to participate at both the regional and state 
levels of elections, the significant difference was in entering regional government in 2007 
with two different contexts.  PC had its first experience as part of a governing coalition 
while the SNP was the lone, albeit minority, party of government.  These conditions 
meant that Plaid took on ministerial portfolios as junior partner in coalition and there was 
disagreement within the party about the pursuit of party’s primary goals versus looking 
competent in government (McAngus-2016b). Meanwhile, the SNP did not have to choose 
and was able to govern alone.  This opportunity for SNP meant further chances to show 
both competency in government and pursuit of independence—without having to 
compromise one over the other. 
Mitchell, Bennie, and Johns documented the details of the SNP’s growth up to 
this 2007 breakthrough in their book The Scottish National Party: Transition to Power. 
Published in 2012, their work does not include the 2011 Scottish election (when the SNP 
won sole control of the parliament) or the 2014 referendum.   However, they do trace the 
projection of the party as it transitioned from an Amateur-Activist party to an Electoral-
Professional organization since devolution in 1999.  They document the changes in 
leadership and membership with regards to professions and the amount of money the 




political party.  However, their discussion is not focused on the party’s strategy on 
communicating its ideas on independence. They document members’ views on policies, 
but they do not trace the evolution of the SNP’s external communications—which 
certainly contributes to the party’s growing popularity. 
From the beginning (1535 for Wales and 1707 for Scotland), there were 
advantages reaped by the Scottish over the Welsh in terms of forging identity and 
remaining distinct from England.  Then, other factors such as socioeconomic and 
demographic indicators, further strengthened the case for Scottish independence as 
compared to the Welsh. Given these comparative advantages, the SNP organized with 
greater efficiency and effectiveness—and outpaced the success of the Welsh nationalists 
at almost every juncture.  While they both experienced electoral spikes in the 1970s, the 
SNP spike was higher. When devolution was achieved in 1999, the SNP was bigger, 
wealthier, and more organized than the PC to take advantage of the opportunity—
eventually resulting in both parties getting into regional government in 2007. However, 
the SNP, having gained the opportunity to govern alone while the PC were in a coalition, 
was able to gain not only policy outcomes but also the chance to hold the independence 
referendum. 
This upward trajectory of the SNP was not a linear process, but the path 
dependency of each stage of growth is unquestionable and more information is needed to 
know how the party has cycled through these stages of growth.  By tracing the process of 
party’s internal evolution through the lenses of both historical institutionalism and 




party’s membership professionalization—and provide a more complete answer as to how 
a political party can alter the course of its own trajectory by positioning itself to take full 
advantage of political opportunities granted. All that is needed is more careful 
consideration of the party’s agency: how the leaders, in both internal and external 
communications, utilized precise language in presenting the case for independence as 
they sought wider appeal and had to overcome existing biases among the public and 
political elite against independence as a concept.  The party willingly entered a cyclical 
process of consolidating ideas, methods, and resources as the organization grew from its 






 SNP’s Political Infancy—The Fringe Party Stage (1930s-1967) 
 
While voter behavior in the UK between the 1930s and 1960s would mostly remain based 
on class identity, other aspects of politics in the United Kingdom would undergo several 
substantive changes.  After WWII, the emergence of Collective Consensus and programs 
like the National Health Service, stemming from the post-war Beveridge report, would 
reshape the social welfare system throughout the country. Outwardly, the UK participated 
in the founding of the United Nations but remained reluctant to join European 
integration—not joining the EEC until 1973.  Finally, technological changes in this 
period saw the emergence of television, though radio remained an impactful medium 
through much of the period. 
 The SNP was founded a few years prior to the outbreak of World War II.  As with 
many political parties, the origins of the SNP and decisions made in its early stages set 
the party on a path dependent course.  While these initial choices did not mean the party’s 
development to its current prominence was inevitable, the eventual decisions to form an 
independence party aimed at electoral success and based on a new nationalism—separate 
from a strict ethnic and language-based policy—gave the party more options moving 
forward. Likewise, each of these decisions did have alternate routes, but party leaders, 
sometimes via debates settled by people defecting the party, made these choices based on 
both belief and information known about the political climate. Thus, it can be said that 
the aspects of the SNP’s first phases of development that most affected its future can best 





When the SNP was founded out of a small social movement and several iterations 
of political parties in 1934, a key ideological point had already emerged: a notion of 
separation from ethnic nationalism.  There was a Gaelic nationalist movement, which 
functioned as “a cultural organization comprised of Gaelic romantics” (Lynch 2013, 37), 
but the founding of the SNP was in part an effort to detach from both the singular 
understanding of nationalism and from violence and extremism—such as had been 
associated with Sinn Féin. And by the mid-1930s, the SNP produced minimal results in 
elections (as they got some votes but never won any seats) and was defined by minimal 
membership (Lynch 2013, 24).   
 While the period from 1934-1967 saw limited electoral success, the party as an 
organization was undergoing an important growth process.  In order to be in position to 
contest—let alone win—the historic 1967 Hamilton by-election, the SNP twice 
underwent the process of consolidation (of ideas and then methods) before seeking 
greater outreach and minimal electoral persistence and then re-structuring the party in 
preparation for greater consistency in electoral contests and the political life of Scotland.  
During the first evolutionary cycle (1934-1948), the SNP cleared the declaration and 
authorization thresholds but was mired by a lack of resources to reach out in any 
meaningful volume.  The second cycle (1948-1967) was successful in consolidating ideas 
and methods regarding independence and in pressuring for access to broadcasting, but the 
SNP was not able to centralize campaigning.  A breakthrough in access to political 




the spike in interest following that broadcast.  Finally, the party reached the 
representation threshold in 1967 and reactively restructured in order to meet the demands 
of having a sitting parliamentarian.  At no point in either of these cycles did the SNP 
reach any level of persistence—at least not beyond existing as a party, challenging 
increasing numbers of seats, and trying to lose fewer deposits.  Thus, based on the 
taxonomy of requirements for party development, the SNP after 1967 should have 
solidified a basic electoral presence and consistent representation, but since it still lacked 
centralized campaigns, clear party structure beyond the branch system, and limited 
resources, it remained relatively small in its overall impact on Scottish or UK politics. 
While there are a handful of other factors such as the short-term decline of the 
other major parties and the accommodation of SNP policies and ideas by those parties 
that impacted SNP growth in this long period of relative political infancy, ultimately, the 
party’s own agency in an evolutionary process—of coming to agreement on ideas 
regarding  nationalism and the methods needed to pursue “self-government” or 
“independence,” pressuring the media for greater coverage, increasing its vote share in 
by-elections, and reforming party structures—was also responsible for its breaking 
through the representation threshold. 
First Evolutionary Cycle: 1934-1948 
The first cycle through these stages was from the 1930s to 1948—marking the 
party’s founding through its first major change in party structure (in the form of limits on 
membership).  During this period, there was an incredibly short-lived breakthrough into 




months later.  The taxonomy of requirements of party development hypothesized that the 
party needs to consolidate ideas and then methods, increase exposure and then create 
persistence before reallocating resources or making structural changes. In this period 
between 1934-1948, the SNP did take these steps in precise order; however, as a 
relatively new party just making its way through its first growth cycle, the gains were 
limited, and it was unable to achieve much in the way of outreach or any form of 
persistence beyond just existing.  However, there were aspects of consolidation—what 
type of nationalism the party would support (consolidated in 1945), whether it would 
contest elections (consolidated in 1947), and organizational rules limiting membership 
(suggested in 1943; enforced by 1948)—that built the foundation for the longer-term 
cycle from 1948-1967 when the SNP would break the representation threshold for the 
long-term.   
Consolidation of Ideas 
Between the early 1930s and 1948, there was much debate about the form of 
Scottish nationalism—and what that nationalism entailed.  Starting in 1920 with the Scots 
National League and other organizations, there were debates presented in print—such as 
William Gilles “Some Arguments for Scottish Independence” which was published by 
the Scots National League. In a 23-page booklet, Gilles presented what is now labelled 
“old nationalism.” He argued that Scotsmen were generally unaware that they had been a 
sovereign, independent state for centuries until 1707 and even advocated, in bold print, 
that “We who inherit the blood and bear the names of our ancestors have no power, no 




(Gilles 1923, 10).  His other points included claims against the English (saddled Scotland 
with debt, had imperialistic tendencies, and were immigrating into Scotland and 
damaging “the entire fabric of Scottish nationality” (16)).  These views were echoed by 
the National Party of Scotland (1928-1934), which was formed out of the Scots National 
League and two other small groups, in a 1928 pamphlet entitled “For the Future” in 
which the NPS advocated control of immigration.  The pamphlet declared that the 
Conservatives and Liberals have allowed “the proportion of Aliens in Scotland” to be 
exceeded only by immigration to the U.S. and that 10% of the population was no longer 
Scottish-born.12 
The SNP was born in 1934 out of a merger between this National Party of 
Scotland and the Scottish Party (which existed 1932-1934); therefore, due to the merger, 
there were remaining conflicts over ideology.  According to the 1979 work by 
McAllister, the merger in 1934 “purged 1/5 of its membership who believed in 
uncompromising political independence and who were influenced by the aims and 
methods of Sinn Féin” (McAllister 1979, 9).  However, this purge did not create 
complete unity, as one of the more telling events of the lack of ideological clarity in the 
party’s early years was when Kevin McDowall (a former Scottish Party member now part 
of the SNP) wrote in the press that it was more important to maintain the empire than for 
Scotland to be independent (Lynch 2013, 51).  The party’s first constitution, written in 
1935, identified the primary aim of the party as self-government: government that would 
be “limited only by such agreements as will be freely entered into with other nations in 
 




order to further international co-operation and world peace”13—which would seem to 
suggest self-government and independence were one in the same. 
While the party’s 1935 constitution said little else about ideology and was mostly 
about institutional structure of the organization, there were still limited signs of unity of 
thought by party’s 1939 national conference and the publication of George Malcolm 
Thomson’s The Kingdom of Scotland Restored in the same year.  The 1939 national 
conference drafted a resolution that protested against the government not upholding the 
League of Nations and departing from collective security; the resolution asserted that the 
government’s intentions were not about national defense but instead “imperial 
supremacy” and presented Scotland as “victim of gross neglect and misgovernment” 
(Lynch 2013, 57).  This resolution—following some conferment with Plaid Cymru—
would lead some factions within SNP to resist conscription.  Yet, at the same time, 
Thomson’s ideals reflected a shift in ideology, though it was just the introduction to 
notions of “new” nationalism for the SNP at large.    
In his book, Thomson (1939) described the national party as suffering from 
“infantile disorders appropriate to its age” (p. 5) and split between old and new 
nationalism (a divide which would persist through the mid 1940s). According to 
Thomson, the “old” version of nationalism was purely political and “sprang from the 
democratic fervor inspiring the various national awakenings of the nineteenth century and 
which, in Scotland, owed much to the example of Ireland” (p. 6), while “new” 
 





nationalism was not about a conquered nation, does not need or have an enemy, and is a 
“self-critical nationalism” (p. 8).  He wrote about Scots being “profoundly dissatisfied” 
with industrial decline and the loss of a nation—and that Scots bore the primary 
responsibility.  In modern scholarship, Thomson’s “old” nationalism is often 
characterized as “ethno-nationalism” while his understanding of “new” nationalism is 
along the lines of “civic nationalism.”  Finally, he argued that Scotland had a role to play 
in Europe—an important notion that will resurface later in party history—and that 
currently the national Party (of 1939) had given no clear image of what Scotland is to 
become (p. 11). 
Between 1940 and 1943 there seemed to be a continued push of the “old” version 
of nationalism in some party publications—despite the unfriendly context for 
“nationalism” and “nationalists” following the rise of Hitler and Mussolini and the 
outbreak of World War II—and then a pull in a different direction, more in line with 
Thomson’s ideas, in other pamphlets (See Table 3.1).  Some members of the party 
membership advocated opposition to conscription in WWII—which eventually led to two 
prominent SNP members attracting negative attention as Arthur Donaldson was detained 
by police and Douglas Young (who was a member of SNP and Labour) went on trial for 
refusal to be conscripted (Lynch 2009, 58).   In line with their actions, two party 
pamphlets, “Our Aim is Freedom” and “Peace and War: The Future of Scotland” 
emphasized freedom for Scotland in the context of reshaping the British commonwealth 
after the war—and emphasized “old” nationalism’s ideals.  The pamphlets included lines 




FREEDOM”14 and that WWII was “not of our making.”15 In both cases, the emphasis 
was on separation between the Scottish and English. 
Document “Old” Nationalism “New” Nationalism 
1935 Constitution   “self-government” 
1939: Annual Conference “imperial supremacy”  
1939: The Kingdom of Scotland 
Restored 
 Not a conquering nation, not 
needing an enemy; 
internationalism 
1940: “Our Aim is Freedom” War “was none of our making”  
1940: “Peace and War: The 
Future of Scotland” 
“When peace comes see that 
Scotland gets what Scotsmen 
have died for: FREEDOM!” 
 
Circa 1940: “Hints for 
Hecklers” 
-why Prof. of Scottish history at 
Edinburgh is English 
-why Scottish troops in most 
dangerous positions 
-internationalism 
-why Scottish revenues not 
published 
-no confidence in government 
1941: “Scotland’s War=time 
Demands to Meet…”/Annual 
Conference 
“all oppressed and conquered” 
peoples 
-failures of government 
-local issues and transfer 
powers for confidence 
May, 1943: Constitution  Self-government 
Aug., 1943: “Wallace Day 
Demonstration” 
 Internationalism 
Nov. 1943: “Vote Scottish!” -William Wallace, “alien 
totalitarianism,” and “English 
feudalism” 
-Nazism, equated with British 
rule, must not have a place in 
Scotland 
  
1945: “Douglas Young…”  Economic argument 
Canada and self-government 
1945: “People of Motherwell 
and Wishaw…” 
 Labour won’t provide housing 
via Westminster 
1945: “Women voters…”  Incompetence: four Scots babies 
die to every three in England 
Post-1945: “Scotland’s 
Decline” 
 -Scotland in decline vs. England  
-Scotland economic argument 
-make your protest and join 
SNP 
Table 3.1. New vs. Old Nationalism Reflected in SNP Documentation: 1934-1945 
 
14 SNP, “Peace and War: The Future of Scotland.” (SNP: Oct. 1940). NLS: 6.2393.   




Yet, a year later, some parts of the leadership attempted to respond to the negative 
publicity and harsher wording, with a pamphlet in 1941, which included a statement from 
the party’s 1941 National Conference, claiming to “re-affirm[ing] the Party’s full support 
of the war effort.” 16  It goes on to accuse the government of being full of traditional party 
loyalists, of having failed in the handling Scotland’s resources—and it would be rectified 
by a “confederal system” after the war.  This pamphlet did not back off on all 
accusations, as one strongly worded portion stated, “The application of English schemes 
to such matters as transport, dock arrangements, food-rationing, agriculture, mining, and 
other important concerns has, in the past, seriously retarded Scotland’s contribution to the 
general effort” and that the transfer of these tasks to Scotland would be economically 
advantageous as well as providing “a renewal of confidence and enthusiasm.”17  This line 
of thinking was more in line with Thompson’s “new” nationalism—as it no longer 
emphasized England as the conqueror and enemy but more so as ineffective in governing 
and meeting the needs of the Scottish people.   
According to Finlay’s work (2009), at the 1942 conference the “moderate 
leadership was ousted by the fundamentalists who demanded a more vigorous policy” (p. 
25)—which would suggest that the “older” form of nationalism (as defined by Thomson) 
and the language which accompanied it had prevailed—at least in the short-term.  The 
publication of November 1943, a pamphlet entitled “Vote Scottish!” started with William 
Wallace and the hope that Scotland might be freed from the alien totalitarianism of this 
 






time—"English feudalism”—and ended on an inflammatory final point: “If you agree 
that Nazism must have no place in Scotland, if you believe that Scotsmen can run 
Scotland better than anybody else…”18 then vote SNP.  The notion that victory over 
Germany did not save Scotland and the rule of the U.K. Parliament was like Nazism was 
a particularly risky position for the 1944 by-election in Kirkcaldy, and it certainly read as 
being more “fundamentalist” and “vigorous.” This content all reflected the SNP 
candidate in Kirkcaldy (Douglas Young—who had been on trial two years prior, in 1942, 
for avoiding conscription) more than the party as a whole as the party organization via 
the branch system was decentralized. After the war and the party’s single-membership 
rule, Young would leave the SNP and remain with the Labour party as an advocate of 
devolution. 
  However, by 1945 and the by-election in Motherwell and Wishaw which the SNP 
would win, there was greater uniformity—and a softening of wording and ideas—in the 
party’s publications, though again pamphlets were more a reflection of the candidate than 
the party as a whole.  All of the 1945 election content in the National Library of 
Scotland’s archives point to a unified approach of criticizing British governing and policy 
outcomes on economy, housing, and health—and not raising issues of ethnicity, 
immigration, or imperialism (See Table 3.1).  There was unity in the pamphleteering as 
themes repeated and overlapped—creating a sense of purpose and clarity—at least in 
terms of what aspect of nationalism would be emphasized. The candidate—Robert 
McIntyre—believed in the electoral process as the best path to self-government.  His 
 




vision, which was in line with Thomson’s model of not needing an enemy and focusing 
on criticism of policy and outcome, dominated the 1945 by-election (and the General 
Election a few months later) as well as significant portions of the SNP messaging ever 
since. However, with limited party development, McIntyre would lose the seat just three 
months later. 
Consolidation of Methods  
 
While this evolutionary cycle would see a limited form of unity in ideas 
surrounding the types of grievances in line with a new nationalism, there was also limited 
unity on whether to be an electoral party or a pressure group—at least until McIntyre 
became the party leader in 1947.  This question of electoral party or protest group was 
just one of two significant methods questions—the second was whether to seek straight 
independence or work through a devolution process.  This lack of clarity in how to gain 
self-government would plague the party for decades—most notably in 1979 but then re-
surfacing on the eve of the creation of the Scottish Parliament in 1999.  However, during 
this first evolutionary cycle there was some progress on the first point—whether to focus 
on elections or protests.  After a split in the party in 1942 over both methodological 
questions, there was unity for the 1944 and 1945 by-elections at least on the first point (to 
contest elections at all); however, even with the first, albeit short, three-month stint across 
the representation threshold, SNP could not find clarity on the second point (whether to 
pursue independence directly or through a gradual devolution process).    
From the party’s beginning in 1935 there remained the question of whether to be 




group” (Finlay-2009, 19), and the split of the party in 1942 led to unity on the notion of 
contesting elections.  This split was between those who emphasized a one-time event in 
achieving independence through the electoral process and others who wanted to do it via 
public pressure. The first option, which amounted to the precursor of the gradualist 
approach later in party history and represents Mahoney and Thelen’s notion of 
“subversives” who work within the system to break it, meant winning all or at least most 
of Scotland’s seats in the Parliament and then withdrawing from the U.K. government to 
create an independent Scotland.  The second group, which represented a more radical 
position as it could potentially mean a shorter timeline and less reliance on traditional 
institutions, like the insurrectionaries Mahoney and Thelen (2009) described, desired the 
formation of a Scottish Parliament as a result of putting pressure on the existing U.K. 
government (p. 23). 
Not surprisingly, in part due to this internal divide, in 1942 “The SNP was badly-
led, electorally ineffective, disorganized and barely functioning in many parts of 
Scotland.” (Lynch 2013, 61).  When Douglas Young (who had been detained by police 
for resisting conscription) was elected party chairman and advocated independence 
through the electoral process, John MacCormick and his followers, who supported acting 
as a pressure group, defected (McAllister 1979).   This split remained unresolved, though, 
and even deepened when Robert McIntyre won the 1945 by-election because he 
supported the electoral method, but R.E. Muirhead, another party leader, wanted to be 
more of a pressure group on a large scale—holding big events to “change the climate of 




conference (Finlay 2009, 26).   
However, the decision to become an electoral party was clear when the party 
mandated that it no longer to allow dual-party memberships; this rule change allowed for 
greater unity within the organization because there were now clear parameters for 
members’ behavior.  First introduced in the 1943 party constitution but not enforced until 
1948, this single-membership clause would force activists to resolve disputes internally—
rather than individuals operating in a number of nationalist organizations and potentially 
dividing the SNP on its aims and methods.  Still facing challenges by some party 
members in terms of their extremism, or at least lack of support for “new nationalism,” 
the SNP censured C.M. Greive in July, 1945 for making anti-English comments at an 
election meeting—reflecting the usefulness of single membership in helping police party 
activists and pushing fundamentalists out to other organizations.  Secondly, it was this 
rule change that led to both Young and Muirhead leaving the party by 1950 (Lynch 
2013)—further allowing for clear consolidation behind McIntyre as an electoral party in 
support of new nationalism and independence via separating from the U.K. Parliament 
after winning most of Scotland’s seats in a general election. 
Exposure, Persistence, and Reallocation 
 
With limited unity of ideas beyond a broad conceptualization of new nationalism or on 
methods beyond choosing to contest elections, there was limited outreach, persistence, or 
resources from 1934-1948.  For the most part, once the party determined that its future 
lay in elections, the chief concerns became outreach and persistence.  In terms of 




membership—and the goals of the party in terms of strategic planning for growth in party 
documentation from 1946.  
 The limited documentation of the SNP in this period did not reveal, yet, party 
pressure for broadcasting abilities, in part because the existing archives are mostly 
campaign materials as opposed to internal party documents.  However, broadcasting was 
an issue of interest to other groups.  For example, the Saltire Society, a Scottish cultural 
group, objected to the BBC’s lack of attention to Scotland—and their complaints in 1944 
would become part of the grievances voiced by the SNP later in the 1950s and 1960s.  
Publishing their booklet entitled, “Broadcasting: A Policy for Future Development in 
Society,” the Saltire Society saw the opportunity of the BBC charter being up for renewal 
as a moment to object to the under-representation of Scotland in BBC programming as 
well as how Scottish taxes for broadcasting did not come back to Scotland in the form of 
broadcasts. Also, Scottish fees did not secure the best talents—thus resulting in Scottish 
contributions to British programmes—but not singularly Scottish broadcasts.19 
 Instead of supporting the Saltire Society on these points, SNP outreach in this 
period consisted mostly of pamphleteering, and the largest production of this content 
happened in 1947 prior to the full enforcement of singular membership reform—in 1948.  
Despite a general election being in 1945, the SNP’s largest output of pamphlets in this 
period occurred in 1947. Impacted by WWII, the SNP barely functioned at all in the war 
years.  It could not contest elections because of lack of funds (Lynch-2013, 60).  Archie 
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Lamont, who was in charge of SNP publications between 1944-45, paid for two 
pamphlets (one on the Jacobites and one on the 1745 rebellion) that sold very few copies 
(Lynch-2013,76) as the pamphlets were both long and erudite—making a historical case 
for the validity of independence but not exactly the makings of common policy content or 
election campaign materials.  For the 1945 general election, with limited resources, the 
SNP lost deposits—thus leaving the party £208 in debt (Lynch 2013, 72) with little 
economic resources for further printing. Yet, despite all these conditions, the party put 
out 136,000 pieces of propaganda in 1947—which still pales to the 2.7 million Scots that 
voted in the 1950 general election (Lynch 2013, 75). 
 To discuss SNP persistence in this period is to look at seats contested and deposits 
lost; in short, with limited unity and resources, there was little electoral persistence 
gained. Between 1935-1938, the party contested 12 seats and lost 7 deposits (Lynch 
2013, 54) before contesting strongly, though losing, the Argyll by-election in 1940. The 
party would not contest another election until 1944.  Then after a good result in 1944 
(41.3% or 6,521 votes) in the Kirkcaldy by-election, the party broke through the 
representation threshold with a victory in the 1945 Motherwell and Wishaw by-election, 
which was the result of a wartime truce which essentially let the SNP win the seat.  
However, three months later at the 1945 General Election, SNP results would be 
disastrous—with the SNP contesting 8 seats and losing six deposits.  The next four by-
elections they contested between 1946 and 1948 would also all see lost deposits.  
 Facing this lack of persistence, the SNP created The Way to Self-Government in 




membership and financial resources—ahead of the 1950 general elections.  The main 
goals were to contest 40 seats in 1950 (Lynch 2013, 73), but mostly it was a blueprint 
meant to launch the SNP into its next evolutionary phase with a primary focus on funds 
and outreach.   
 In total, the gains made between 1934-1948 were marginal but significant for a 
period that seemed marked mostly by stasis.  In the mid-1930s, “faced with the 
ideological bickering, poor electoral performance and dwindling membership…the party 
had conceded that members could belong to other political parties” (Finlay 2009, 24).  By 
1948 having broken, if only briefly, the representation threshold and mediated ideological 
bickering about types of nationalism, the party narrowed membership to singularity—
thus creating a singular, well-defined party in terms of membership. As evidenced from 
party pamphlets and the censoring of Grieve, the party had consolidated ideas around the 
1945 election.  Even though the 1945 by-election result was temporary, the notion of 
being an electoral party stuck (as it seemed more realistic than ever before), and party 
outreach and resources were aimed at gaining better election results—as they would be 
going forward.  After a spike in outreach in 1947, the party officially restructured its 
membership by instituting the singular membership rule in 1948—thus stetting the party 
on a clearer path: with the aim of greater persistence in future elections as based on an 
internal agreement on civic nationalism over ethnic forms. Thus, the first cycle contained 
all five elements of the taxonomy of requirements for political party growth but the 





Second Evolutionary Cycle: 1948-1967 
For the second evolutionary cycle, the SNP depended upon the gains of the first cycle—
namely unity of ideas on Thomson’s new nationalism and the agreement to contest 
elections. With a greater sense of singular purpose (as well as the limitation of exclusive 
membership to the party), the SNP was able to move on to other concerns while also 
relying on those established ideals when faced with occasional challenges from more 
extreme members of the party who held views more in line with ethnic nationalism.  
While the party’s publications between 1948-1967 showed ideological unity, the actions 
of some party members in a decentralized party structure showed the need for party 
discipline in order to unify behind civic nationalism entirely (a development which did 
see some progress as some members were expelled, suspended, or censored at points 
between 1948-1955).  Once that task seemed to be accomplished by the mid-1950s (when 
a split from the party that ultimately strengthened it), the main area of growth in the 
second evolutionary cycle was in the area of outreach—as the SNP challenged the 
existing system and ultimately gained some access in the form of the party’s first Party 
Political Broadcast (PPB) and eventually the first Party Election Broadcast (PEB) as well.  
Prior to access, by-election results had begun to improve, and following access, even 
stronger electoral persistence was achieved—incrementally—as the party was able to 
contest a greater number of seats and eventually broke the representation threshold for 
good.  With Winnie Ewing taking her seat in the U.K. Parliament in 1967, the SNP was 
reactionary in meeting the demands of having a seated Parliamentarian. Once those 




institutional norms of the Parliament as well as how to match the overall demands of 
being a small party in opposition. 
On this second evolutionary cycle, the hypothesized requirements for growth 
happened in the order suggested, but some elements were achieved simultaneously.  Ideas 
and methods for reaching independence consolidated in 1955, but campaign methods 
never did get fully organized.  After a decade or more of pressure, the SNP got its big 
breakthrough in outreach in 1965.  The influx of interest in the party led to resource 
reallocation and reorganization—just prior to the party’s 1967 representation 
breakthrough.  Additionally, Wilson led the party’s first significant structural reforms, at 
least at the party’s highest levels, via his 1963 report; however, it would not be until 
March of 1966 that the new structures would actually be adopted. Thus, it would appear 
that in this fringe party period, that methods and ideas were consolidated around the same 
event (the expulsion of the ’55 Group), and then came increased efforts (and results) with 
outreach in 1965 were followed by party re-organization in 1967. 
  Besides the changes to the highest levels of the party’s organization, this period 
of growth ended with a reactive series of reforms in order to accommodate the needs for 
staffing and supporting a sitting parliamentarian.  The reforms that were done 
proactively—to impact the broadcasting efforts and create efficiency at the party’s 
highest levels—helped produce the key breakthroughs in media access and representation 
while the reactionary changes (to the burst of interest following the 1965 PPB and 
especially having someone in parliament in 1967) would leave problems that still plagued 




Consolidation of Ideas 
In 1948, the SNP’s new constitution reflected a party that was internally democratic—but 
certainly not a cadre or mass party.  It was highly decentralized and was “local-
dominated” by its branch system (McAllister 1979). Thus, even though the party’s 
external publications—like its pamphlet “The Scottish National Party: What It Is and 
What It Stands For” published in 1951—reflected clarity in purpose (self-government), 
there were internal documents, like the Party’s Annual National Conference notes, as 
well as individual party members’ actions or speeches, that reflected some struggle 
within the party for ideological dominance.  However, these ethnic nationalist challenges 
subsided with a splinter group leaving in 1955, and in the words of former SNP leader 
Gordon Wilson, created the advantage of “internal peace and settled strategy” (Wilson 
2009, 2).  In short, ideologically, the period from 1948-1967 was relatively unified 
around strengthening the economic argument in favor of independence (while using word 
choices like “self-government”) and determining a “constitutional” method for gaining 
Scottish sovereignty.  While espousing complaints against the predominance of England 
in U.K. politics was regularly part of the party’s communications and narrative, party 
leadership made it clear that these critiques were on practical policy outcomes rather than 
competing cultures or nationalism.  Finally, the theme of “internationalism” which was 
introduced in the first evolutionary cycle evolved into use of other examples from around 
the world of other movements and ideas as the SNP sought solid ideological ground for 
both why and how to separate from the U.K. in the post WWII world order. 




government,” Scotland’s economic potential on its own, and the need to grow the SNP to 
answer to Scottish grievances—all without using the word “independence” specifically.  
Unlike a pamphlet published in 1947 which declared, “only resolute independent political 
action can secure Scotland’s rights as a Nation,”20 none of these documents use the word 
“independence.”  Even in the text of T.H. Gibson’s February 1951 address in Glasgow, 
which was reprinted in a 12-page booklet by the SNP, he referred to nation, state, and the 
restoration of Scottish sovereignty, saying,  “Self-Government for Scotland is in harmony 
with the larger movement in Europe for defending democratic rights and rule of law” and 
“Scotland can make no responsible or effective contribution to international or 
Commonwealth co-operation until she has a Parliament and a Government through which 
her people can speak.”21  Similarly, other shorter pamphlets described Scotland as being 
“overstrained” by England,22 called for local government to get organized to support self-
government,23 and sought to resist Westminster-created programs such as the housing 
program of 1949.24  The economic case, while it varied slightly with each pamphlet, 
suggested that England was “hanging on American aid” and was bankrupt25 while 
Scotland could stand on its own—since it has enough “food, fuel, clothes, and homes—
which [we] are being denied under London’s restrictions.”26  And, finally, the narrative of 
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blaming England as being restrictive and the English-controlled parties as not helping 
appear consistently in this period. 
Additionally, there is slightly more assertion of internationalism.  While in the 
first cycle there was just the use of the word “internationalism,” in the external 
communications, there were several examples after 1948 of the SNP seeking to learn 
from movements abroad as to how to separate in a “constitutional manner” and how to 
organize or create a mass movement.  On the first point, Gibson’s speech put forth the 
idea of plebiscites as being weak and that instead the SNP would seek to win the majority 
of Scottish seats in Parliament and then ask other parties representing Scotland to create a 
“Scottish Constituent Assembly” –either with act of Parliament or just by virtue of 
having been elected.27  Besides the clear point that the idea of SNP winning all the 
Scottish seats seems outlandish even to Gibson, this idea of taking seats—and then 
separating out or calling for a parallel assembly—was at least vaguely reminiscent of the 
French Revolution and the separation from the Estates General by the largest Third Estate 
in order to create the French National Assembly.    The French National Assembly was 
short lived before the radical stages of the revolution took center stage, but this plan 
sounds similar in regard to tactics—and clearly stated a departure from any of the earlier 
debates about a “singular-event” separation from the UK via plebiscite.  More overtly, 
“The Lion Rampart,” a pamphlet aimed at potential SNP supporters living in London, 
encouraged people to “look at [the] Moral Re-armament28 movement [as a] perfect 
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example of what CAN be done by skillfully directed propaganda and organisation.  Scots 
would do well to heed the lesson.”29 The movement was started by an American—again 
an indication of looking abroad for ideas and possibilities in this case on how individuals 
could contribute to creating change. Finally, there are several assertions such as non-
violent resistance and buying Scottish goods30 that echoed aspects of the independence 
movement in India. 
Internal documentation at the Annual Conferences also suggested a degree of 
unity—except leading up to the separation of the 1955 Group.  While there are multiple 
resolutions emphasizing “nonviolence,”31 there was one resolution that stood out from the 
others in this period. Sponsored by the Edinburgh West branch, a resolution was offered 
in 1955 calling for the requirement that all students in Scottish be taught Gaelic.32 Shortly 
thereafter, the “55 Group,” which Lynch described as being isolated geographically in the 
Edinburgh region, would leave the party.  The group also published an anti-English 
leaflet The English: Are They Human?” (Lynch 2013, 90) which eventually led to the 
group being expelled later in 1955. The Annual Conference notes the following year list 
10 expulsions and resignations.  There was a clear shift in the Conference notes 
following—in 1957 and 1963—of moving towards concern about outward appearances 
rather than inward ideological divides.  Making it clear that the “party was quick to dump 
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extremists and those who promoted violent means” (Finlay 2009, 27)—essentially 
closing the chapter on that debate and moving on to questions of how to contest elections 
and what messages about self-government should be central to the party’s 
communications. 
Consolidation of Methods 
Having consolidated the method of contesting for independence as an electoral party as a 
result of the first evolutionary cycle, this second cycle included some decision making 
about how to seek independence via a “constitutional method” and how to maintain party 
discipline when the party organization was decentralized.  There was not yet a systematic 
consolidation of method concerning campaigning and how to win seats—and this 
inconsistency of methods had the strongest impact on the second cycle as the party had 
trouble contesting seats let alone winning elections. 
  From 1955 through 1967, the party line was consistently that the method to 
reaching independence was by winning the majority of Scottish seats at Westminster and 
then asking the members of other parties to join in making a Scottish Parliament.  There 
was the realistic understanding that winning all the Scottish seats was unlikely, and so 
this method was the best possible way to achieve self-government while honoring 
existing constitutional norms.  In the previous era, there had been less consistency on this 
issue—especially since there were even wider range of choices when the SNP had not yet 
self-identified as an electoral party. Publications from 1948 onward (See Appendix D.) 
clearly indicated a path forward via the strengthening of the party, winning seats, and 




 In addition to this decision, the other “method” concern in this second cycle was 
party discipline—in terms of not tolerating ethnic-based extremism—and as stated 
earlier, this aspect was made possible based on the 1948 enactment of singular 
membership.  Because the party had effective organization (Finlay 2009, 27) by the 
1950s, there was enough structure in place to suspend six branches and expel 16 
members for their involvement in the 55 Group (Lynch 2013, 90).  The minimal 
centralization of the party between its origins in the 1930s and the 1950s helped in part to 
alleviate the situation—as the group was led mostly by younger members isolated in 
smaller branches in Edinburgh.  They were dissatisfied with the pace of change, but they 
also had taken positions—writing an anti-English pamphlet and emphasizing Gaelic as 
part of a narrower expression of nationalism—that the SNP had already moved past in the 
previous generation.  
 Once the 55 Group had been removed, focus did shift to how to contest elections, 
but there was limited understanding how to do so.  Gibson’s address at 1956 Annual 
National Conference reflected the mood of the organization: 
It must, however, within itself, present a united front, organise itself more 
than ever before, consolidate its gains as it advances, and energetically go 
all out to contest both parliamentary and local authority elections.  The 
greatest sense of loyalty to the party, its objects and policies, and to its 
duly elected officials, councils, and committees, whether national, area or 
branch, must remain inherent in its members if we are to proceed as 
quickly as we all desire.  I am convinced that nothing can now destroy the 
National Party as a main political force in Scotland, and that now it can 
only be impeded temporarily even from within through distractions from 
its objects, policy and work 33 
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However, aside from this assertion that the SNP needed to stay unified and contest 
elections, there was not yet a well-developed strategy for how to grow the party.  The 
Way to Self-Government, the last significant strategy publication, printed in 1946, failed 
in its ambitions for the 1950 general election.  Gibson, in 1956, had also cited the need 
for more propaganda, public meetings, canvassing, distribution of literature, greater effort 
to obtain money, and more participation in local authority elections but “above all” in 
parliamentary elections.34 However, “There was no grand scheme” (Wilson 2009, 5) as to 
how to do all those tasks without greater financial resources. Although Wilson was 
talking specifically about campaigning efforts in 1957, the truth held through the end of 
the 1960s.   Ian Macdonald took up National Organiser in the 1960s and would travel 
with leaflets and business reply cards. He would hold meetings, hope for support, and 
check back—then repeat the process if the group folded.  The efforts were so limited and 
sporadic that in 1963 Billy Wolfe proposed an alliance with the Liberal Party in order to 
support a Scottish government, but that proposal died internally (Wilson 2009, 9-10).  In 
short, efforts to determine a true strategy for party growth would not consolidate until the 
party made significant changes in 1966 based on Gordon Wilson’s 1963 proposal.  Only 
after that restructuring would the party register its second and longer-lasting 
representation threshold breakthrough with the by-election in 1967.  
 
Increase Exposure 
Despite the lack of unified campaigning procedures or materials between 1948-1967, 
there was a concerted effort to gain more access to free media exposure—especially in 
 




television and radio broadcasting.  Somerville described the SNP as becoming 
“embroiled, even fixated” with this issue as the party engaged in a number of strategies 
(Somerville 2013).  Given the financial constraints of the party as well as the professional 
experience of several SNP members, this strategy—of seeking access to what was 
supposed to be freely available—was well-calculated.  The party’s professionalism 
starting with candidates in the early 1930s being listed along with the degrees they had 
earned35 was in evidence as David Rollo, an electrical engineer; Wilson, who was 
experienced on radio; and Arthur Donaldson, a former journalist, all combined their 
expertise to pressure the various authorities in media via illegal radio broadcasts, public 
demonstrations, and other avenues of appeal.  The end result of the combination of their 
“insurrectionist” (Mahoney and Thelen-2009) approach of breaking rules in order to 
break the overall system and consistently appealing through existing institutions was the 
SNP’s gaining access through its first Party Political Broadcast (PPB)36 in 1965.  This 
single moment of exposure—which was the product of at least a decade of SNP 
pressuring and increased support at by-elections—would change the party forever.  The 
SNP’s first PPB generated an immediate public response and short period of growth in 
party membership—both which required the SNP to react and restructure some aspects of 
its operations.  However, this 1965 event was also not the end of the journey, either, as 
institutional barriers precluded the SNP from being treated as peers, as they were still 
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very much a minor party.  There were promises of greater exposure once the party 
actually had MPs—thus creating a convergence of the party’s electoral goals, economic 
woes, and desire for increased exposure. 
 The SNP faced a number of institutional barriers—both de jure and de facto—in 
its efforts to be granted a PPB, as the major parties and the BBC held veto power over the 
SNP’s access to broadcasting.  For example, in 1950 the number of candidates needed to 
qualify for a PPB was raised from 20 to 50—meaning that a party had to post candidates 
in 50 constituencies37 in order to be granted broadcasting time by the BBC.  When the 
Welsh party, Plaid Cymru, protested because there were only 36 seats allotted for Wales, 
the BBC began to back off and was going to grant the smaller parties broadcast time.  
However, before it was formally granted or accessed, in 1956, the Postmaster General 
issued a ban on all broadcasts except Tory, Liberal, and Labour.38 Then in 1957, the BBC 
declared it would only broadcast PPBs nationally and not regionally.39  Beyond these 
stated policies and laws, which prevented SNP broadcasts, there were also long-standing 
biases, somewhat disguised under the guise of duty or purpose, to overcome.  For 
example, Ian Jacob of the BBC, in responding to SNP complaints in a letter, stated, “…it 
is not part of the BBC’s duty or purpose to stimulate interest in the small parties or any 
other minority.”40   
 Even with the arrival of Scottish Television (STV) in 1957, the SNP did not 
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necessarily get all it hoped for. Besides complaints about the broadcasting being mostly 
British and American content, the SNP also was dismayed not to be included in the 
political discussions on air.  Additionally, they were told that they could not buy ads on 
the channel because they were a political party (Sommerville 2013,106).  While they 
were not enough of a political party to get access to party or election broadcasting via the 
BBC and other broadcasters, they were too much of a political entity to purchase similar 
rights from the regional station.   
 Finally, the SNP continually faced issues with access in the form of finding 
printers or even, once granted the rights to a PBB, the necessary equipment or expertise.  
At the 1955 Annual Conference, T.H. Gibson reported to the group that there was 
“considerable difficulty” in finding someone to frame their pamphlets.41 In 1965, once 
granted the rights to a PBB, the SNP found that there were continued barriers—such as 
the absence of independent film makers in Scotland at that time (Wilson 2009, 16), but 
prior to 1967, the SNP had no impact on the parliamentary committee on broadcasting 
and often lack critical information from its decisions—such as broadcasting times and 
other practical factors.   
However, by Wilson’s account, “the principal barrier to Scottish political 
broadcasting was the reluctance of the Westminster parties to give up their control” 
(Wilson 2009, 16).  It took the SNP significant amounts of time and resources to 
determine who was making decisions—only to find out that the party did not have access 
to those institutions.   For example, the Committee on Party Political Broadcasting 
 




(which consisted of the Lord President of the Council for Prime Minister, the Leaders of 
the opposition parties, the Chief Whips of all the parties, and the broadcasters) met 
infrequently, usually just prior to elections, and was not accessible to non-parliamentary 
parties.  This committee would become quite helpful to SNP’s broadcasting goals once it 
did have parliamentarians (Wilson 2009, 16).   
As such, the SNP would seek other ways of access; for example, celebrating 
occasional support in the newspapers or seeking personal connections—or signs of 
support—from sitting officials.  For example, the BBC subcommittee of the SNP, at the 
1957 conference, pointed out a two-year old article (from July 1955) from the Glasgow 
Herald that questioned the ban on political broadcasts by smaller parties: 
One may even wonder if it is legal.  If Parliament approved a charter which gave 
the national broadcasting councils power to put on political broadcasts, it is surely 
a matter for parliament to decide whether the power should be taken away.  There 
is something distasteful about the notion that the ‘usual channels’ can get together 
and decide that Parliament did not really intend to do what it did.42 
 
Likewise, the committee sighted interest in trying to work with Lord Balfour, who had 
been the chair of the Royal Commission on Scottish Affairs previously and now was 
Chairman of the Scottish BBC Council and Scottish Governor of the BBC.  The SNP 
believed that he had recognized previously “the role of Scotland as a nation”43 and might 
be a potential ally in the battle for broadcasting access. 
In the absence of support for broadcasting, the SNP continued to produce its own 
outreach through pamphlets, press statements, and, most creatively, through pirated radio 
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broadcasts.  On paper, the SNP continued to be connected to The Scots Independent, a 
newspaper which the party had supported from its founding in 1930 as a platform for all 
nationalist interests in Scotland until 1955 when it was incorporated as a private 
venture—but was still funded in large part by individual SNP leaders.  The circulation of 
the paper was seen by some in the party as a way to build prestige abroad44—and thus 
apply more pressure at home.  Besides the monthly paper (which was weekly until 
1954),45 the party also attempted to create outreach through pamphlets and press 
statements.  
The Annual Conference notes suggest that creating pamphlets and distributing 
them was a fairly challenging and unsuccessful task. While this campaigning method was 
slowly beginning to dwindle in influence (Wilson 2009) with the rise of television, 
without the broadcasting rights and access, the SNP was left to a paper process and radio.  
In 1954, the Publications Committee reported making three press statements and having 
had one contact with the BBC for getting on one programme.  It had a £100 budget and 
produced a few leaflets: a welcome leaflet (20,000) for the queen’s visit, 20,000 copies of 
“leaflet 5” (on the aims of party), and 1,000 copies of “100 Home Rule Questions.”46 
They also attempted to create a Scottish Newsletter “to offset the relative lack of new 
pamphlets and leaflets,” but there had been “difficulties to publish each month” as the 
printer changed once and the editor three times in one year.  There was also an attempt to 
create a Scottish National Diary—of which 2,000 copies had been made, but the 
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“branches interest [was] not strong.”  All told there was a plan to make a centralized 
Publications Bank—to ease financial strain on party funds and to make it possible for all 
branches to access up-to-date literature. However, in 1955 only 5 of 80 branches used 
it.47  The 1955 publications report was not much better as Gibson commented that, “The 
Publications Committee envisaged the publication of numerous leaflets and pamphlets, 
but regrettably, these could not be fully accomplished.”48  The 1956 report was a little 
more encouraging—with 15 press statements cited—but there was only one leaflet and a 
reprint of the party’s constitution.  Otherwise, it reflected a failure of the newsletter and 
added a proposal to produce pamphlets that are not dated but are on “fundamental 
subjects”49 so that they do not go to waste. 
The significant shift occurred between the end of 1956 and 1957—when SNP 
leaders took matters into their own hands and shifted to “insurrectionist” approaches by 
pirating broadcasting.  A small group of nationalists, not necessarily representing the 
SNP directly, tapped into a BBC television broadcast in November 1956 and asked 
viewers to stay tuned for the first pirated broadcast of Radio Free Scotland.  The 
broadcast only reached some parts of central Scotland, but it did receive attention both 
from listeners and other media outlets.  Then, in December 1956, the SNP’s National 
Council decided to back the station. The process involved in this endeavor required the 
skill set of Rollo, an SNP member who helped build the first transmitter and had made up 
pay for the SNP’s Office Secretary out of his own pocket.  Rollo, according to Wilson, 
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had “a capacity, as they say now, to think outside the box” (Wilson 2009, 2).  A second 
transmitter was built, the station utilized a mobile van and a boat (three miles off the 
coast so it was in international waters) in order to avoid detection by authorities, and the 
coverage eventually increased to reach urban centers (Sommerville 2013, 105-106). 
By the 1957 Annual Conference, it was reported that over 100 broadcasts on 
behalf of the SNP had aired on Radio Free Scotland, there were increased press 
statements, and interest from a wider range of print newspapers.  The report on 
communications in 1957 reflected that “Coverage varied but was generally has been 
good.”50  At that point, the publications also increased as £316 were spent on leaflets and 
the party took in £198 for the sale of some pamphlets,51 a significant increase over the 
£100 budget just three years prior.  
Then, in 1960, Gordon Wilson took over Radio Free Scotland, and he moved the 
broadcast to every Thursday at the same time to increase stability.  According to 
Sommerville (2013), he also modernized and professionalize the production (p.148).  The 
broadcasts came to include nationalist propaganda and advertising but also some “non-
nationalist elements to appeal to a larger audience base” (p. 148). There were audience 
surveys and responsiveness (like moving times to avoid repeating BBC science 
programs).  Eventually, the whole operation took up office at the SNP St. Andrews office 
and purchased a bigger transmitter, so authorities could not jam it as easily. Technically, 
it was still independent of SNP, but it was clearly run by SNP.  The whole endeavor 
 





captured the interest of other media outlets—at home and abroad—and the authorities 
chose not to prosecute it because that would have brought more attention to it 
(Sommerville 2013).  
Besides the paper trail and pirating broadcasting, the SNP simultaneously looked 
to ally with Plaid Cymru and other groups to pressure the authorities.  In 1955, Plaid was 
allowed political party broadcasts via the Broadcasting Council for Wales, as Plaid only 
has 36 constituencies in Wales—and could therefore never reach the 50-constituency 
threshold but had passed the original 20 district threshold.  However, both the 
Government and Opposition opposed it, so the Postmaster General, Dr. Charles Hill, 
repealed the allowance. In his letter, he called into question the interpretation of Article 
12 (4) (a) of the BBC Charter—which appeared to allow the Broadcasting Councils the 
right to permit ‘regional’ political broadcasts.  If the Welsh Council went ahead, any 
party could be eligible for two 15-minute broadcasts annually (for “just” £450).  Thus, 
“He consequently directed the BBC to refrain from transmitting so called ‘controversial’ 
party political broadcasts, as he termed it, by smaller parties other than those agreed to by 
the main political parties.” (Somerville 2013, 101). Both parties (SNP and Plaid) objected 
and then the Glasgow Herald also questioned the situation in its editorial page.   
The combined efforts continued when SNP joined with other parties at a public 
rally in Trafalgar Square in spring, 1956.  The group included Plaid, Common Wealth (a 
socialist organization), and the Independent Labour Party (ILP).  The rationale was that 
the issue (the broadcasting ban) and the parties themselves both got more attention than 




Liberal MP Jo Grimond to raise the question in Parliament (Sommerville-2013, 103-4).  
Unfortunately, that particular question would mostly fall on deaf ears, as it was not in the 
major parties’ interest to let smaller parties broadcast.  Even as late as 1963, Rollo 
reported at the SNP’s Annual Conference that:  
The Government is able to bypass our requests and will probably continue to do 
so until we are much stronger and can contest the majority of seats in Scotland 
and have received greater support from the public.  In fact their attitude may not 
change until we return a member to Parliament.52 
 
Thus far, the party’s greatest success was winning 23% of the vote in a 1962 by-election, 
so Rollo’s lament seemed clairvoyant, as the party would achieve significant 
breakthroughs in both broadcast and electoral results in short order. 
At a meeting in the Lake District in 1964, Plaid officials informed the SNP that 
Liberal MP Russell Johnston for Inverness had lodged a parliamentary question on 
broadcasting (Wilson 2009, 16).  SNP, despite Johnston occupying a Scottish seat in 
Parliament, was told this information by Plaid—they did not know it themselves. They 
were challenged to contest 15 constituencies in the 1964 general election.  In doing so, 
they lost 12 of 15 deposits, but the next year, in 1965, the SNP was granted 5 minutes of 
radio and 5 minutes of television broadcasting per year.  The SNP had gambled by 
contesting the seats, and likely the major parties suspected that they would not reach the 
challenge or might possibly bankrupt themselves.  
SNP leaders understood immediately the significance of this allotment and set 
about the production tasks in a proactive manner; there was ample evidence of the party’s 
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understanding of how critical this breakthrough would be.  First, there were six different 
sets of revisions for the September 1965 broadcast,53 and the SNP had to choose between 
the BBC and STV for a producer. While the SNP found the resources to hire an STV 
studio for the purposes of teaching representatives on air techniques (Sommerville 2013), 
they ultimately chose to work with the BBC for their first broadcast.  The PPB cost 
£500—which given the previous year the entire party income was under £5,000 and the 
overdraft in 1965 was £2,272—meant that expenditures on this project were a “act of 
faith” (Wilson 2009, 30). Likewise, the party’s National Executive Committee 
confidently anticipated sharp increases in enquiries and membership as a result of the 
exposure—they aimed to add 4,000 people (Wilson 2009).  They had fly posters 
advertising the television broadcast and awards put in place for the branches which 
expanded the most. Afterwards, The Times reported that the SNP broadcast was far better 
than the PC one (Sommerville 2013, 150) even though the Welsh broadcast reached 85% 
of households in Wales54 while the SNP one reached just 25% of potential Scottish 
voters. 
While this momentous breakthrough did not mean the SNP’s broadcasting battles 
were over, it did lead to three critical changes.  First, the party was able to increase 
outreach. No amount of pamphleteering (that was affordable) would have reached one in 
four Scottish residents—as the PPB reportedly had.  Secondly, now that the party had 
accessed the right to both PEBs and PPBs, it gained more access to institutions which 
 
53 SNP, “BBC and ITV access.” 29 Sept. 1965. BBC and ITV access: Robert McIntyre’s papers, 1960-
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oversaw the BBC and other broadcasters—even if not as members of some committees, 
the SNP could petition for attendance rights. The years of campaigning for access had 
also taught party leaders about the need to be persistent—so by 1967 there was a seven-
letter long exchange between Wilson and STV questioning the bias shown in recent 
broadcasts.55 However, even in these exchanges there continued to be the ringing theme 
about who held the power: “We have explained on a number of occasions to you…that 
when the SNP has representation, we will include you.”56   
An important threshold—being included in broadcasting at all—had been crossed, 
but there remained plenty of reasonable complaints by the SNP in 1965 and onward.  Just 
stemming from the 1965 broadcast, there were complaints filed by the SNP about the 
timing of the broadcast (earlier in the evening than the major parties so as to miss their 
main target audience), the main parties’ domination of talk shows, the lack of access in 
parts of Scotland (no BBC 1 in Shetland or Dumfries but BBC 2 access in the south of 
Scotland), and a call to be broadcast throughout the country rather than just in Scotland 
(Sommerville 2013).  Finally, now aware of the institutional guidelines, in 1965 an SNP 
internal memorandum sought representation on the Committee of Party Political 
Broadcasting—which was the body responsible for deciding times of broadcasts.  The 
memo argued that as participants they should know what was happening; it would save 
time (the SNP was otherwise chasing down information), and it solved the mystery of 
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how time was allocated (Sommerville 2103, 152).  However, the Government and 
broadcasting authorities were not willing, so SNP kept using Radio Free Scotland until 
the 1970s when more television space finally became available. 
The fight for broadcasting in this period is one of veto points, the choice of the 
SNP leaders to take a new insurrectionist approach, and the power of institutions in 
relation to one another.  The SNP (and PC) had to emphasize the need for broadcasting 
access, and in doing so, they got forms of accommodation from the power holders.  
However, it was ultimately up to them to take advantage of the opening. The SNP’s 
approach to the broadcast (with multiple drafts and far less emphasis on just the leader 
talking into the camera on the television broadcast) proved to be a significant difference-
maker in SNP fortunes as the party expanded in the weeks following the broadcast. 
Persistence 
As Rollo had lamented in 1963, there was simply no electoral persistence between 1948 
and 1967, though there were occasional signs of growth and improvement.  Overall, the 
main theme was that the SNP did not have enough resources to contest seats—and not 
enough support to maintain deposits even when competing. 
The rise to 15 contests in 1964, though with 12 lost deposits, was due to the 
challenge placed to the SNP to reach 15 contests in order to get a PPB.  Following that 
exposure, the party contested a record 23 seats in 1966, and even more significantly, held 
on to 13 deposits by winning over 12.5% of the vote in those 13 constituencies—
suggesting the gamble to run in 15 contests in 1964 in order to get the broadcasting rights 




targeting strategies (which mostly meant actually having active members and potential 
candidates who could campaign) that enabled the party to gain more electoral support 
beyond the two constituencies (Perth and East Perthshire (1) as well as Kinross and West 
Perthshire (2)) in which it had performed solidly since the 1950s.  Faced with limited 
resources and the desire to contest more, in 1957 an Election Fund was established: it 
provided a central fund (as opposed to being at the branch level) that both provided 
candidates with deposits and collected back the ones that were not lost.57  This small 
decision helped curb costs to the branches and was the first important decision for 
centralizing campaigning—something that would not happen either ideologically or 
practically until the period following 1967. 
Election Seats Contested Election Deposits 
February, 1950  3 seats Lost all 3 deposits  
October, 1951 2 seats Lost 1 deposit (ex. Perth and E. Perthshire) 
May, 1955 2 seats Lost 1 deposit (ex. Perth and E. Perthshire) 
October, 1959 5 seats Lost 3 deposits (ex. Perth and E. Perthshire; Kinross And W. Perthshire) 
October, 1964 15 seats Lost 12 of 15 deposits (ex. Perth & E. Perthshire; Kinross and W. Perthshire; West Lothian) 
March, 1966 23 seats Lost 10 deposits 
Table 3.2. SNP in General Elections: 1950-1966 
While the conclusion that “SNP electoral performance was dismal throughout the 
1950s and 1960s” (Finlay 2009, 27) is a fair assessment, there were individual 
performances that indicated the chance for success.  For example, in the 1961 Glasgow 
 





Bridgeton by-election, it was “the first time that the SNP had fought a by-election 
systematically and effectively, yet to put matters in perspective, at its conclusion, only 
10% of the constituency had been canvassed” (Wilson 2009, 3).  Then, in the by-election 
in West Lothian in 1962 (June) with Billy Wolfe as the candidate, the SNP got 23.3% of 
the vote and finished 2nd to Labour.  While there were these small signs of hope in the 
electoral outcomes of this period, they were merely glimmers as the improvement was 
measured by not losing deposits and actually putting up candidates.  It would not be until 
the next evolutionary cycle that the SNP would regularly contest all the Scottish seats in 
the U.K. Parliament.  While the strong results of 120,000 total votes in the 1966 general 
election, finishing third with 28.3% of the vote in a March 1967 by-election in Glasgow 
Pollok, and strong 1967 local elections did suggest momentum in the right direction, the 
SNP was not exactly predicting victory in the 1967 by-election. 
Resource Allocation 
 
Generally, the SNP had “no cohesive party organisation prior to the 1960s” (McAllister 
1979, 6): limited financial resources, a highly decentralized system of organization 
among the branches, and limited ability to gain exposure or contest elections—all of 
which limited any potential for change in organizational structures. There were marginal 
changes in this period of relative stasis, such as new funding schemes, but mostly the 
party functioned at the branch level and experienced limited growth.  There were gradual 
and proactive structural changes in relation to the growing pressures on the BBC between 
1953-1965 and there were the beginnings of proactive and significant revision of the 




changes would not be implemented for three years. His plans from 1963 meant the party 
could respond quickly to the burst of interest in 1965. Unfortunately, though, the party 
was less prepared for Ewing’s 1967 by-election victory and had to react to those needs—
rather than predicting them.  
 The 1935 party constitution had outlined the national-level structures as well as 
the details of what defined a “branch.”  At the national level, there was a President, a 
Chairman of the National Council, two vice-chairmen, a national secretary, a national 
organizing secretary, and a national treasurer—though more offices could be created as 
deemed necessary at a National Conference.  There would also be a National Council 
which would include national office-bearers, once the party gained representation, and 20 
ordinary council members selected at conference.  Otherwise, branches had to have six 
meetings a year and were responsible for their own debt. The Annual National 
Conference would allow one vote per delegate.  Branches were permitted one delegate 
for every 30 members, two delegates for 30-60 members; and 3 delegates for any branch 
that exceed 60 members plus an additional delegate for every 50 members thereafter. Ten 
branches had to be in attendance in order for the Conference to be convened.58  This 
structure would go untouched until Wilson’s reforms in 1963.  
 Wilson’s 1963 restructuring would only address the national level—the branches 
were left unchanged.  The proposal was made in 1963, approved in 1965 and finally 
implemented in January 1966 at the National Executive Committee meeting (Wilson 
 





2009, 28).  The new structures created Vice Chairman positions including publicity (held 
by Billy Wolfe) and organisation (C. Douglas Drysdale) and also a new “Publicity and 
Development Committee” which gave regular progress reports to the National Executive 
(Sommerville-2013, 124-5).  In addition, there were three main changes: a clear 
definition of the responsibility of party office bearers, greater emphasis on growing 
branches, and a transfer of responsibility for organisation and administration from the 
National Council, an unwieldy body meeting quarterly, to a smaller and more flexible 
executive committee (McAllister 1979).  Wilson himself felt that “The days of 
amateurism were over” (Wilson-2009, 11), as the whole restructuring process was 
outlined in his 115 paragraphs long report and would be maintained as the party’s 
structure for the next forty years.   
Sommerville credited the growth between 1962 and 1964 to the new organization; 
however, it is clear from Wilson’s own account that the reforms were not fully in place 
until 1966-1967.  There were some incremental reforms like including the Organization 
Committee, which supported the work of Ian Macdonald as the National Organizer, 
which were in place prior to the 1966 elections.  This committee (led by Alan Niven) did 
survey each constituency to target efforts more—the first time the party would research 
its audience carefully. While this more careful assessment of constituencies and target 
voters was too late for adaptations in 1964, it impacted 1966—and meant the party was 
beginning to strategize more specifically then it ever had before.  Though it is worth 
noting that this process, too, was gradual, starting with the canvassing done for the 1962 




of new Executive Vice Chairmen, the creation of the PR office and the move to a full-
time secretary—all were enacted in 1966. The final pieces were the Research Office 
position and the Administrative Secretary—which were appointed in 1967. Wilson 
(2009) himself admitted, “What none of us realized was that the new structure would lead 
to a creative explosion within the SNP” (p. 33). 
However, the big leap in membership and the ability to buy a new SNP Office in 
Edinburgh to house the party’s Public Relations Department was all possible because of 
the broadcast breakthrough in 1965, and that breakthrough was the result of a decade 
worth of work and ad hoc committees to address the BBC issue.  First, 1,200 membership 
inquiries were made in the four days following the broadcast (Wilson 2009, 17).  
Additionally, twelve new branches were recognized between December of 1965 and 
February of 1966.  In short, the burst that followed the broadcast led to further increases.  
The party’s annual income in 1965 was £5,000, but they decided to open a press office 
and Rosemary Hall was the party’s “Honorary Public Relations Secretary” (Wilson 2009, 
23). She immediately began to increase output of press releases—in her first four months, 
she released more news to the press than the party had in a year’s work in the late 1950s.  
Additionally, the need to house a PR department was clearly due to the response to the 
broadcast—as there was such an influx of requests.   
However, in this case, the SNP had been proactively preparing for this scenario—
in part through the process of pressuring the BBC and in part due to the NEC’s 
predictions about the positive impact of the first broadcast.  The SNP created a public 




order to be prepared when a PPB became permitted. Likewise, there was a BBC 
Committee in 1957 which complained in its report at the 1957 Annual Conference about 
the BBC not hiring enough Scots, that the coverage was “parochial,” often included 
“whisky, haggis, and bagpipes,” and had limited discussion of Home Rule (except on 
quiz shows).  Additionally, the report suggested, it was the responsibility of the BBC to 
educate the public without bias—and that in the periods between elections there should 
be “more and not less opportunity for political debate.”59   
All of this experience laid the groundwork for Sir Harry Pilkington’s 1960 
Committee on Broadcasting.  The 1960 Committee report would pick up on the same 
themes as the 1957 BBC report, and, after outlining the barriers created by the Postmaster 
General and the 1952 Royal Charter of the BBC, suggested that the criteria be lowered 
for broadcasting access.60  While Pilkington had supplied the legal elements—and 
answered some of the questions about institutional structures that would elude party 
leadership, the previous committees had provided pointed talking points and analysis 
regarding content and desirable outcomes.  Pilkington’s committee gave its report in June 
1962, stating that Scotland should be allowed its own Party Political Broadcasts (PPB), 
that the Scottish Broadcasting Council should exercise more authority over BBC 
television service in Scotland, and that it should become more representative of the 
people in Scotland (Sommerville 2013,147).  Sommerville credited the establishment of 
the SNP’s Committee on Broadcasting in 1960, the growth of the SNP (as membership 
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now rivaled the Liberal Party—which had access to broadcasting as part of the British 
Liberal Party), and “the decade-long campaign had helped” (p. 147-148) for the 1965 
broadcasting breakthrough. 
The 1965 PPB would be a sharp turning point for the outreach efforts of the SNP.  
The event itself was news—and the party prepared carefully for the broadcast but 
actually underestimated its impact on membership and party growth.  The PPB reached 
an estimated audience base of one and a quarter million (so about one in four people in 
Scotland saw it based on the BBC ratings) (Wilson 2009, 17), and a large volume of 
enquiries instantly flooded in within 24 hours of the broadcast as the party received 
upward of 500 letters from the public (Sommerville 2013, 150).  Additionally, there was 
further exposure in the press (the Glasgow Herald and Times featured stories)—which 
meant parts of Wolfe’s message were reiterated in other national and local newspapers 
(Sommerville 2013).  The BBC would then screen 30 minutes of the Annual Conference 
in 1966.  The SNP had targeted a 4,000-person increase, but at the December National 
Council McIntyre reported an uptick of 5,000 (Wilson 2009, 18). 
With the addition of so many new members, there was much work to be done in 
terms of creating unity on the party’s social and economic policies while also training 
potential candidates.  As a result, the party created, reactively, a Director of Internal 
Training in order to prepare candidates on talking points regarding independence as well 
as on how to appear on television and radio (Wilson 2009, 31).   
Following the consolidation of ideas and methods in 1955, a concurrent and 




followed by the 1963-1966 re-organization by Wilson, the SNP experienced two 
important breakthroughs. First, the party was permitted its first PPB in 1965 and then, 
even more importantly, the SNP won the 1967 Hamilton by-election.  From 1967 
onward, the SNP would break the representation threshold permanently and move to 
position itself in opposition—or in Deschouwer’s thresholds—as a blackmail party.  
Thus, all the elements of the taxonomy were present in this second evolutionary cycle. 
However, the order of occurrence only mattered in that ideas, methods, outreach, and 
marginal forms of persistence and party restructuring all were present prior to the 
electoral breakthrough. 
Breakthrough and Impact:  the Ewing victory in 1967 
 
When Winnie Ewing won the 1967 by-election in Hamilton, the process for seating a 
parliamentarian was somewhat unknown to the SNP, though was aided by McIntyre’s 
limited experience in 1945. Wilson had to contact the Serjeant-at-Arms of the House of 
Commons in order to organize Ewing’s oath of office. Parliamentarians need two 
sponsors—one sponsor was relatively easy to identify as Plaid Cymru had Gwynfor 
Evans in Commons.  However, the second sponsor was “lucky” as Highland Liberal MP 
Alasdair MacKenzie agreed to be the second (Wilson 2009, 39)—another key moment of 
major party accommodation.  This procedure would be the first of many as the SNP 
learned the institutional norms of Commons in addition to the challenges of having just a 
single seat. 
While the 1965 PPB had launched the party onto the legal airwaves, the “Victory 




before.” (Sommerville 2013, 170).  The party was inundated with television requests and 
press coverage opportunities: thousands of enquiries overwhelmed the staff in Edinburgh 
and Glasgow (Wilson 2009, 38).  Ewing was asked to have her own column in The Daily 
Record, and she was regularly featured in the Scottish Daily Express and News of the 
World while also being invited to take part in parliamentary broadcasts from which the 
SNP has been excluded in the past due to not having parliamentarians.  Lucky for the 
SNP, “Ewing’s photogenic appeal, her charisma in front of camera and her skills of 
debate earned her so much coverage that in fact the Party’s National Executive requested 
she reduce her television appearances for fear of ‘over exposure’” (Sommerville 2013, 
170).  In her first month in Parliament, Ewing “answered 2,000 letters, made 33 
broadcasts on radio and television, gave 400 press interviews, spoke in Parliament, dealt 
with Hamilton constituents’ problems, addressed six rallies, opened or chaired a variety 
of functions and asked 61 questions” (Wilson 2009, 39).  In short, her first month in 
Westminster produced more press interactions and outreach than years’ worth of work 
had produced throughout the party’s first 33 years of existence. Again, as part of 
Commons’ institutional norms, Ewing’s privileges afforded her own research assistant—
another new resource for the SNP and for the new Parliamentarian as well.  Her questions 
posed in Parliament resulted in the “Black Book on Scotland,” a compilation of 
information gained from her questions—it was produced by the party’s newly minted 
Research Officer, Donald Bain, and its publication rights were purchased by the Scottish 




 Besides media coverage, increased access to institutions, and garnering more 
complete information on topics concerning Scotland, Ewing’s by-election victory also 
impacted another burst of party growth—both literally and in terms of mindset.  By 1968, 
the party estimated it had 120,000 people in 500 branches (McAllister 1979) up from 
21,000 in December 1965 (Sommerville 2013, 153). All told, there was an “explosion in 
SNP morale, membership and media coverage in the wake of Hamilton thrust the SNP 
from its fringe status in Scottish politics into the mainstream where it has remained, with 
varying degrees of support, ever since” (Sommerville 2013, 171).  And, perhaps most 
importantly, her victory “altered the mindset of the party” (Wilson 2009, 43) as it was 
now clear that winning seats was possible—making aims at independence still distant but 
also more realistic than ever in party history. 
 Finally, Sommerville, Lynch, Wilson and others all credit Ewing’s own personal 
qualities as a key to her success in this role—and in projecting the party forward; this role 
of individual leaders with particular skills being in the right place at the right time is hard 
to factor, but it is also worth noting in the party’s critical moments of growth.  Besides 
her photogenic appeal, she also had been a solicitor in the Glasgow Sheriff Court—a 
position which Wilson claimed prepared her for the “constant hostility and abuse, mainly 
from Labour MPs, whenever she rose to speak” (Wilson 2009, 40).  She maintained a 
grueling schedule—in London during the week and then returning to Scotland for the 
weekend and engaging in as many rallies as possible. Her work ethic and simple 





Other Factors: Short-term Decline and Accommodation 
There is little evidence of the decline of the major parties as influencing SNP 
growth in this period.  In the 1945 by-election, the SNP won 11,417 votes (51.4%) to 
Labour’s 10,800 as the Conservative Party did not post a candidate. Certainly, that 
election did not tell the story of major party decline; more so, it was the last war-time 
election.  Three months later, the SNP would garner 8,022 votes in the constituency, 
which amounted to 26.7% of the vote—a telling indicator of the increase in voter turnout 
between the two elections.  Then, in the 1967 by-election, SNP was not taking seats from 
a declining Conservative Party—but rather from the Labour Party—and in areas “in its 
own heartland” (Lynch 2013, 121). 
As has been documented in other work, the 1967 victory was aided by the 
unpopular Labour government, “alienation from the British system of government,” and 
the professionalism of the SNP at the time (Mitchell-2012, 22 citing Webb and Hall-
1978, Brand-1978, and Harvie-2004).   However, to these explanations needs to be added 
this burst of exposure that was unprecedented in terms of the volume of Scottish 
households it reached: whether those households voted SNP or not is not as critical as the 
fact that the SNP was allowed to broadcast and therefore could be seen by those voters 
for the first time as being an option. 
Additionally, there is legitimacy to the notion of Meguid’s points about 
accommodation by the mainstream parties.  The decision to allow the smaller parties 
access to PPBs in 1965 was a turning point—and it only occurred because the 




likely calculated that the fringe parties would either not be able to afford the costs or 
would embarrass themselves—and they, Labour and Tory alike, could appear to be 
accommodating greater democracy. Their calculations in allowing this access were 
misguided as they underestimated the gains made by SNP—as the 1967 by-election 
victory was a direct result of increasing exposure and popularity—all of which was only 
made possible by the PPB.  However, the mainstream parties were correct in that the SNP 
would not create significant challenge to them as a direct result of this decision. Those 






Marginal Growth Within the SNP 1967-1999 
 
While the next period of SNP development covers over three decades (1967-
1999), the relevant aspects of the political climate in the UK are thematic: Europe, 
economics, Thatcherism, and devolution.  The UK would join the European Community 
in 1973, backed by a referendum on membership in 1975, and then would sign the 
Maastricht Treaty—but with ant opt out on the social program which included the 
creation of the Euro. In between 1973 and 1992, the other defining feature of UK 
experience in Europe was the increasing democratization of the European Parliament, as 
that development, a case of layering in institutional changes, allowed Winnie Ewing to 
continue figuring into Scottish politics as she served a MEP for the Islands and Highlands 
from 1979-1999.   
Economically, the period was one of considerable ups and downs: relative growth 
at the end of the 1960s, economic stagnation and recession in the 1970s, a period of 
relative recovery and then two more recessions in 1981 and the early 1990s. The 
economic situation for the UK hit a low in 1976 when a loan had to be sought from the 
International Monetary Fund.  The rise of Thatcher meant a shift in economic priorities as 
monetarism and privatization in addition to significant social funding cuts guided 
government decisions under her leadership. The country faced a recession in 1981 but 
was recovering well by 1986 before another recession hit in the early 1990s when the EU 
left the Exchange Rate Mechanism which had tied the pound sterling to EU exchange 




it would continue to do into the early 2000s. 
 UK politics of the period were defined by Labor governments under Harold 
Wilson (1964-1970; 1974-1976), James Callaghan (1976-1979), and Tony Blair (1997-
2007) as well as Conservative governments under Edward Heath (1970-1974), Margaret 
Thatcher (1979-1990), and John Major (1990-1997).  For the SNP, the Labour 
administrations frequently made constitutional reform in the shape of devolution a topic 
of discussion (and eventual policy), whereas the Conservative governments by and large 
were not supported by Scots and presented the party with limited roles in opposition.  Of 
these Prime Ministers, Thatcher and Blair had the strongest degrees of impact on the SNP 
as Thatcher was strongly opposed in Scotland and allowed the SNP to begin framing the 
Conservatives as anti-Scottish while Blair ultimately allowed devolution. 
At the start of this period, Ewing had won her seat in the House of Commons in 
the 1967 by-election; however, the party was not properly prepared to hold a 
Parliamentary seat (Mitchell 2009, 34).  It would be equally unprepared for its electoral 
spike of 11 seats in October of 1974—showing in both cases that unified institutional 
responses to discontinuous changes are difficult to establish.  The challenges faced by the 
1974 rise in SNP MPs provided important lessons for the party on the role of 
communications and the need for greater party unity and discipline—which would 
eventually inform key decisions as the party prepared for the 1999 Scottish elections. 
 The SNP’s progress over the course of three decades was in part explained by 
path dependence and the entrenchment of changes made prior to 1967. Most important 




understanding of national identity, the breakthrough in broadcasting access in 1965, and 
the party’s branch-based organization.  While arguments about larger party 
accommodation, exogenous events, and major party decline can explain some aspects of 
the SNP’s rise in the late 1990s, those explanations are far more limited than 
consideration of the party’s own long-term evolution.  
First, the party had to reconsider its ideas and discourse on nationalism due to the 
changing conditions: namely supporting the European Union while simultaneously 
seeking independence from the United Kingdom.  Scottish-ness, citizenship and historical 
claims to statehood had to be reconciled with international intentions in Europe alongside 
grievances against both England the U.K. system in terms of policy and political 
outcomes.  Additionally, there were tensions to be resolved on how to get 
independence—either via a direct route or through a more gradual approach and 
devolution—as well as how to maintain party discipline and campaign as a more unified 
political entity.  Once those ideas and methods could take some form of consensus within 
the party leadership, then the party could improve its outreach.  The focus soon shifted to 
a modernization of resource allocation as the party focused on “the Challenge of the 
Nineties” and fundraising beyond one-time donations from members. Put together, these 
facets positioned the party well going into the 1997 devolution referendum—and 
beyond—as the SNP prepared for Scottish elections even prior to the referendum results 





Consolidation of Ideas 
For the period between 1967 and 1999, the role of ideas and discourse played 
significantly into the way the SNP functioned as well as the policies it pursued.  The first 
key area of concern regarded nationalism and identity: who were citizens and how to 
reconcile historical claims, a protective language policy, and notions of the “other” with 
inclusion and internationalism.  Second, there were conflicts in rhetoric and dialogue, 
most notably how to distinguish among the terms independence, separatism, and self-
government as the party sought to maintain its fundamental aim yet appeal to a wider 
audience of potential voters.  Finally, the party was somewhat forced to reconcile more 
specifically how it would identify in relation to the two major parties on the left-right 
spectrum in UK politics.  All three debates (nationalism, independence, and party 
ideology) would be decades-long and became even more essential once the party 
achieved its electoral spike in 1974, as the increased media coverage and exposure 
required the party to sharpen its messages—as well as its ideology on a left-right 
spectrum—while also orienting itself with new institutional realities.  The lack of 
persistence at this point in party history was due to splits in the party over these ideas as 
well as the appropriate pathway to independence.  Ultimately, these internal debates, 
which included the creation of party factions and members’ expulsions in the early 1980s, 
finally resulted in a consensus—or at least a coherent, singular message that emerged 
around 1987. These approaches would be solidified in preparation for the 1997 General 
Election when the unity in party campaign efforts, messaging, and even internal 




messaging on these points that the SNP maintains today. 
Nationalism and Identity 
In Leith’s 2006 work, he traced the changes in SNP ideas surrounding identity 
based on manifestos from the 1970s through 1997 and found that during the 1970s the 
issue of independence was at the forefront—and SNP presented positive images of 
Scotland as independent and negative ones as a “province” of England; however, “there 
was no attempt to define Scottishness in purely ethnic/exclusive terms….no real distinct 
sense of Scottishness” (p. 86).  By the 1980s, inclusive nationalism had been the stated 
position for decades, and though the English were presented as the “other” and Scotland 
as a historic nation in 1983, the former idea was downplayed in 1987 and replaced by 
attacks on the “British system”—including attacks on conservatives as “anti-Scottish” 
plus a reduction of historical appeals.  However, Leith’s work was limited to eight SNP 
manifestos from 1970-2005, and in not considering both the reprinted version of the 1974 
manifesto (which was produced in 1976 with substantial revisions) as well as other SNP 
pamphlets, National Conference notes, and press statements, Leith missed part of the 
story.  In fact, the tension between these ideas—particularly identifying citizenship 
broadly yet establishing a historical nationalism while also emphasizing internationalism 
and yet expressing grievances against the English—was resolved via a long evolutionary 
process.  The ideas—of a broadly defined civic nationalism, the role of language, history, 
and culture, and relationships with England and Europe—were all introduced into 
different levels of party discussions as early as the 1960s, but they were not 





 To submit that there was no attempt to define Scottish citizenship prior to the 
1980s is simply not true: it is more accurate to say that the idea of citizenship was central 
to party content in the 1960s and around the 1974 electoral spike, but the issue was less 
central to the party while it was struggling in the 1980s. Citizenship then returned to party 
documentation around 1987 when the topic would retain its place in the SNP’s dialogue 
thereafter. 
 There are several examples of pre-1980s engagement with defining notions of 
citizenship.  In the SNP’s first PPB in 1965, at least one version of the script stated that 
the SNP was “…a modern and radical party representing all kinds of people throughout 
Scotland.”1  Likewise, in a 1976 pamphlet (which presented an edited version of the 
party’s 1974 manifesto), the idea of a broad national identity was articulated with greater 
clarity. It read, “The SNP stands for all the people of Scotland. No matter where you or 
your forebears were born, if your home is in Scotland and you identify with our aims and 
outlook, the Scottish National Party will welcome your support.”2 The sentiment was also 
echoed in the party’s 1978 “Return to Nationhood” document which stated directly that 
citizenship would include anyone who is a permanent resident, born in Scotland, has a 
parent born in Scotland, or anyone else the Scottish Parliament deems a citizen.3 
However, what is correct is that these expressions were broad and ill-defined; 
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they seemed to be buried after the 1970s—only to be revisited in the 1980s and more 
specifically articulated and emphasized by the late 1990s.  There is dearth of any mention 
of citizenship or who is Scottish in the archives between the 1976 reprint and the 1983 
proposal for a Scottish constitution in which the declaration is made that “The right to 
Scottish citizenship for all those resident in Scotland upon independence, or born (or with 
a parent born) in Scotland, and to such others as the Scottish Parliament may decide.”4 
Then at the 1987 Annual Conference held in Dundee, in a session co-chaired by Wilson 
and Salmond, resolution 18, proposed by the Falkirk branch, called for the conference to  
encourage the contribution being made to Scottish society by the Asian Scots 
community, which like the Italian, Jewish, and Polish communities, is now an 
integral and accepted part of modern Scotland. …Conference declares that, to 
promote greater understanding and cooperation, an SNP Government will 
establish a Scottish Ethnic Minorities Research Unit to examine the distinctive 
needs and problems facing Asian Scots with regards to jobs, housing, and 
education.5   
 
And though other branches moved to amend the specific groups to read “ethnic 
minorities,” there was clearly an indication of the need to be more specifically inclusive.  
However, party materials or formal programs would not farther reflect these 
sentiments until the 1990s.  The 1992 manifesto, “Independence in Europe: Make It 
Happen Now,” included a message from Sean Connery and used terms like 
“multiculturalism” while being inclusive—addressing all people who live in Scotland 
(which ironically, Connery himself did not).  The 1992 manifesto went on to describe 
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Scottish people in far more idealistic and descriptive terms including “skilled and 
dynamic” and “confident, open people” and then stated clearly that “The right of Scottish 
citizenship to everyone resident in Scotland, everyone born in Scotland, and such other 
persons as the Parliament of Scotland may prescribe.”6  Finally, the 1992 manifesto also 
made no small statement about inclusion and ethnicity: “As far as racism is concerned, 
the SNP utterly reject any discrimination on racial or ethnic grounds. The Bill of Rights 
will outlaw such discrimination. The presence in Scotland of people from diverse origins 
is a source of enrichment for Scottish society.”7 
However, while the 1992 manifesto was so clear on these points, the 1992 PEB 
was not about identity at all—but rather about London, economics, and looking to be 
independent in Europe.8  In the same time frame (1992-1993), media attention regarding 
Settler Watch and Scottish Watch, two groups that opposed English immigration to 
Scotland and included some SNP members (Lynch 2013, 225), led party leadership both 
to expel members from the SNP and to create New Scots for Independence as well as 
Asians for Independence (in 1995).  The 1997 manifesto would make the strongest 
statement of all, likely as a response to the negative attention in 1992, as Salmond’s 
opening words emphasized, “A Scotland that doesn’t ask where you’ve come from, but 
where are we going all together.”9 The PEB from that election cycle echoed the same 
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concepts as it emphasized inclusivity, courage to be independent, and love for one 
another—as opposed to prejudice and violence10--perhaps also nod toward the growing 
British Nationalist Party (BNP) in the south which did profess a more ethnic and narrow 
definition of nationalism.   
Historical Claims and Language Protection Yet Inclusion 
Besides defining who is Scottish, the SNP also sought to resolve an existing 
tension between the desire for an inclusive understanding of identity and yet a historical 
claim to nationhood. In addition to establishing a historical narrative of what has already 
happened, this notion of a historical or cultural nationalism also required emphasis on 
language, history, and culture (usually in the form of arts and education) without being 
exclusive.  Likewise, there was the continued challenge of how to be inclusive—and 
forward looking—while also establishing the “other.”  In this period from 1967-1999, the 
SNP narrative shifted to “the system.” While grievances regarding Westminster had 
emerged at various points in party history, the prevalence of system of government versus 
national identities in party grievances made for a far more cohesive overall position for 
the SNP by the late 1990s—wherein the party could emphasize this civic nationalism and 
align it with the need for self-government and a change in the system (which was to be 
blamed for what was not working). 
Claiming a historical narrative is difficult for a political party that is trying to be 
appealing without being mundane.  Going as far back as Lamont’s two long, erudite 
 






historical pamphlets published in the 1940s, the SNP struggled to find a balance between 
engaging the greater public and yet making an intellectual and historical claim to 
nationhood and independence.   In the party’s 1978 booklet, “Return to Nationhood,” the 
historical narrative was presented in a somewhat truncated form as this publication was 
meant to set out “A summary of the ideology of Scotland’s right to independence, the 
guiding principles of the Scottish National Party and an outline for its programme for 
self-government.”11  In the section on “The Need for Self-Government,” the historical 
claim included an ownership of a particular culture (“as venerable as that of any other 
European nation”) with a long in history (with “roots of Celtic civilization”) of peace 
(“never as an aggressor nation”) and democracy (as, according to English historian G.M. 
Trevelyan, “ the Scottish people lay the seeds of modern Western democracy”).12  
Additionally, the claims to historical nationhood included Scottish contributions to the 
Renaissance, Reformation, and Enlightenment, and the general notion that “The 
contributions of Scots to the progress of humanity include a vast range.”13   
This same booklet also established the viability of Scottish independence—and 
the need for self-government—based on this specific historical narrative. Although the 
booklet mentioned both William Wallace and the Union of 1707, the bulk of the claims 
regard impacts since WWI—with statements about the strength of the Scottish economy, 
education system, and local government (as comparted to England) prior to the war.  
Then the “unprecedented changes” in the economic structure of the U.K. after the WWI 
 






meant that taxes were raised without Scottish influence and a drain of Scottish talent 
(economic, academic, and cultural) resulted.  Making such claims allow a heroic 
narrative of the founding of the SNP—as “long-sighted” Scots sought to create home 
rule, and their failure brought about the birth of the SNP.  Then, since WWII, the 
situation in Scotland has gotten even worse (citing unemployment, taxes not spent on 
Scotland), and so there is “nothing to lose by choosing to become self-governing 
again.”14 
 The trouble with historical narrative and nationalism is that the story line can 
serve reminders of who was present and who was not, and for much of this period, SNP 
publications attempted to make a historical claim to the return of a nation—which 
somehow included all the new groups represented in modern Scottish society.  In the 
1970s, prior to Thatcher’s rise and during the SNP’s spike (11 seats in October 1974), 
SNP messaging focused on an assumption, rather than a stated case, on why Scotland 
needed independence.  The 1974 party manifesto, “SNP and You,” argued that education 
used to be good…but now (in the 1970s) there was not enough Scottish history and 
culture taught and there was a need for strengthening national identity through the arts.15 
It also raised the question of whether to be poor Scots or rich Brits.  However, by 1976, 
in a re-written document that took for granted the 1974 electoral outcome, the party set 
forth to illustrate “some of the exciting possibilities in choosing the full responsibilities of 
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Scottish nationhood16  as “this booklet assumes that the reader takes for granted the 
existence of the nation of Scotland.”17  These claims were “rooted in the historical fact of 
Scottish nationhood, and in the rights of nations as accepted in the Charter of the United 
Nations, and, of course, it accepts as an uninterrupted foundation, the law of Scotland as 
it currently stands.”18  In short, given the 1974 election, there was no need to continue the 
discussion of whether a Scottish nation exists—rather it was time to focus on how to 
achieve independence. Even the 1977 local election campaign content called for the 
“Scottish people to determine their own destiny.”19 
The protection and promotion of Gaelic has often surfaced as part of this 
historical claim (though 2011 census reported that just 1.1% of Scots over the age of one 
speak Gaelic). For a short period, party publications included Gaelic versions or sections 
before it disappeared from the 1997 manifesto.  However, the notion of protecting and 
promoting Gaelic remained part of the dialogue through the 1990s—including in 1997—
and little changed in this regard.  In the 1965 PEB script, Wolfe’s lines included, “My 
party stands for the practical encouragement of Scottish culture in its many forms and in 
both of our languages.”20   Protection of the language and inclusion of it in broadcasting 
and other venues remained a permanent fixture of SNP claims.  In her 1979 European 
Election campaign, Winnie Ewing promised further work protecting Gaelic usage.21  
Similar protection themes were reflected in February of 1981 when Donald Stewart, an 
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SNP MP from the Western Isles, accused Westminster of ‘gross disrespect’ of Gaelic 
speakers” and described Douglas Hogg, English MP from Grantham, and his colleagues 
as “show[ing] the same disregard for Scotland as the bullyboys of Russia show for ethnic 
minority groups in the USSR.”22  Almost two weeks later, Jim Fairlie, SNP Vice-Chair 
on Policy, gave a branch talk on protecting Gaelic so it can be spoken in court and used 
in broadcasts as well as a series of Scottish heritage publications.  He called for Scots to 
have access to English, Scots, and Gaelic.23  Similar ideas were reflected at the party’s 
Annual National Conference that spring when student nationalists moved for greater 
protection and use of Gaelic and one resolution continued to emphasize the need for 
Gaelic broadcasting.24  The support of Gaelic-language broadcasting was persistent 
through the end of the period, appearing in a 1983 publication,25 the 1987-1989 Annual 
Conferences,26 the 1994 manifesto for European elections,27 and the 1997 General 
Election manifesto.28 For a brief period, Gaelic was included in SNP publications—as 
part of the 1982 Annual National Conference notes were published in Gaelic,29 the SNP 
Whip’s Office of Parliament utilized a heading which was in Gaelic,30 and the 1988 
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opening message for the national conference was reprinted in Gaelic.31 In 1990 and 1991 
the opening messages appeared in both Gaelic and Scots.32  However, the manifestos did 
not include the variation in language—suggesting this emphasis was placed more on 
internal documents rather than on external ones intended for a broader audience after 
1991. 
“The Other” Yet Internationalism 
 In addition to language in broadcasting and education reflecting Scottish culture, 
the notion of what is Scottish and what is not was brought into focus by the successive 
elections of Thatcher—since Scotland voted decisively for Labour. This political scenario 
actually allowed the SNP to focus its understanding on what is Scottish and what is not—
as the period began with a loose understanding and then sharpened as “Scottish interests” 
were not protected in the Westminster system.  The effects of the 1983 and 1987 
elections were two-fold.  First, they provided the SNP with electoral evidence of how 
Scotland is different from England. Second, the SNP was able to establish the electoral 
and governing system of Westminster as grievance all of its own—to be paired with the 
Tory financial cuts.  Thatcher’s victories and governments permitted the SNP to equate 
its own grievances with widespread Scottish interests in a manner that went beyond 
identity-based differences between north and south and was clearly evident on an 
electoral map.  This framework continues to serve the SNP’s interests well into the 21st 
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For much of the period between 1967-1999, the accusations concerning England 
had to do with economics as well as exploitation, discrimination, and provincialism—
before turning to a notion of the “system” being to blame.  The 1974 manifesto asked, 
“Do you wish to be “Rich Scots” or “Poor British?” and professed that “With England’s 
present bankruptcy, you face disaster.”33  Leith (2006) also pointed to themes of Scotland 
as an “exploited province” and “extremism in England.”  These types of themes are 
reflected in party papers as well, as the 1981 football match between England and 
Scotland was to be held in Wembley Stadium in London and the English Football 
Association did not make tickets available to Scottish fans. The SNP filed an injunction 
and sent out a press release stating:  
Scotland and the Scots can be discriminated against without any recourse to legal 
protection.  ….in the view of the English establishment, Scotland is not a separate 
nation.  Now apparently, we can be discriminated against in a way which the 
establishment would never dare do other non-English sections of the population.  
The result will now so anger the Scots (sic) that the England Scotland match is 
liable to have more violence, not less.34 
 
However, there would be a shift in 1983—away from just an “English” establishment 
problem to one of the “British political system,” as the SNP’s 1983 manifesto suggested 
both that the “The British political system offers Scotland no hope of improvement” and 
“The British system has failed Scotland.”35  Following the re-election of Thatcher, the 
SNP was even more adamant in its claims, stating in its manifesto for the 1984 European 
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Election: “Let’s send more truly Scottish voices to this forum—where members actually 
listen!”36  Then, when Thatcher was re-elected again, in 1987, Wilson stated at the 
Annual National Conference:  
The Election has already demonstrated that Scotland is a colony rather than a 
partner, it will be easier for us to persuade the Scots that it is time the ‘monstrous’ 
rule of the English in Scotland is ended.  We must be positive in putting the 
benefits of independence within the European Community to our people.  Anti-
Thatcherism by itself is a blind alley.  It is the system that is at fault and it is that 
we shall have to hammer relentlessly.  Independence is Scotland’s only way out 
of the despair and hopelessness of provincialism.37 
 
This notion of Scotland “As an appendage to London”38 and “little Englanders led by 
Mrs. Thatcher”39 would continue in SNP dialogue for the remainder of Thatcher’s time in 
office. 
The election of Thatcher and the Tories over Scottish votes to the contrary in 
addition to a lack of effectiveness of Labour in opposition provided the SNP with ample 
evidence of differences between England and Scotland, and it also provided the SNP with 
an even clearer “other”—the Tories especially but also the Westminster parties as a 
whole.  The shift began with claims in the 1988 local elections when SNP propaganda 
stated: “The party contests all local elections with the view that its councillors—who put 
Scotland and the Scottish people first—are likely to be more effective, and more caring 
than councillors from other parties.”40  And: “This vision can only be realized by the 
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Scottish National Party itself because the only party that makes Scotland its priority IS 
the Scottish National Party.”41  By the time Major was Prime Minister, the SNP narrative 
was well-practiced, as stated by Salmond in the opening minutes of the 1996 SNP Special 
Conference: 
Scotland needs freedom: freedom from poverty, from homelessness, from 
unemployment, from the effects of declining service and Tory cuts, and from the 
Union itself.  Only with real political power can Scotland tackle its problems and 
use the talents and resources of its people and their country to greatest benefit of 
all.42   
 
Salmond was able to equate freedom and economic growth with independence while 
creating distance from the Conservatives, who at this point could be framed as “anti-
Scottish,” and with whom the SNP also disagreed over how much to participate in 
Europe. 
Identifying the “other” by blaming England and the British system stood 
somewhat in contrast with the SNP’s desire to identify Scotland with a broad worldview 
and “internationalism.”  While there is academic work condemning the SNP for shifting 
its position on the European Economic Community (EEC) from one of opposition to one 
of support, the reality is that the SNP had long been emphasizing “internationalism”—
dating back to 1939 and The Kingdom of Scotland Restored which described new 
nationalism as not needing an enemy and being internationalist in nature.43 
There were a couple of early indicators of SNP interest in the EEC—some of 
which dated well back into the 1950s.  However, in this period, the first moment was in 
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1966, the SNP National Council resolved that Scotland be treated separately in 
considering EEC membership—they wanted the regions each to vote separately in order 
to increase Scottish influence on policy in the EEC.44  Scholarship has often suggested a 
disinterest by Scottish MPs at large toward the EEC in its infancy. Devenney (2008) 
noted that “For much of the 1960s, most Scottish MPs were rather uninterested in the 
EEC issue and made little to no effort to participate in the wider debate over British 
membership” (p. 322).  However, he went on to site a rise of parliamentary questions 
about the EEC from Labour MPs from Scotland (about Scottish interests and resistance to 
the EEC)— after Ewing had taken her seat in 1967.  The timing would suggest that their 
questions were actually a result of the pressure placed by the SNP’s position and Ewing’s 
new presence in Parliament—not a sudden inclination by Scottish Labour MPs toward 
EEC debating.    
Into the 1970s and onward, the SNP consistently sought entry into the “councils 
of the world”45 as the 1976 reprint of the manifesto emphasized the need for a working 
partnership with England, free movement, joint services in U.K. (on defense) until 
Scotland creates its own, membership in NATO, negotiation of Scottish membership in 
the Common Market, Scottish seats on the Council of Ministers, increased representation 
in the European parliament, a trade agreement like Norway’s and Sweden’s, a 
referendum on Scottish membership in the Common Market, and membership in the 
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U.N.46  There were also increasing calls for parity with Denmark with regards to seats in 
the European parliament.47 
So, while most scholarship refers to Jim Sillars 1980 “Independence in Europe” 
and the solidifying of that idea in 1988 (Lynch 2013, 172), there is ample evidence of the 
SNP looking outward long before that position was established—though it is true the 
evidence for that position grew in consensus, detail, and complexity in the 1980s.  The 
party’s 1983 manifesto made clear comparisons to Norway and Austria on points about 
population, unemployment, economic growth and living standards48—all of which 
pointed to the validity and viability of Scottish independence.  At the same time, the 1983 
Annual Conference passed a resolution on the EEC—stating that the “SNP Euro-
Members will play a full and active part in the Community, until Scotland becomes an 
independent country again,” and then, once independent, Scotland will hold its own vote 
on whether to be members or not.49  In terms of the Common Market, the 1984 party 
manifesto for the European Elections made the case clearly and succinctly for the first 
time, stating:  
The Common Market has may critics—but it is here to stay, and it is making more 
and more of the decisions which affect our lives. We have to live with it—and 
improve it.  It is a body which seeks cooperation rather than conflict amongst, 
European states, unquestionably a desirable aim in itself.  Many of the fears that 
the common Market would become a superstate have been eased by experience.  
Far from becoming a new European despotism where bureaucracy triumphed over 
national rights, the enlarging of the Community in recent years has diluted some 
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of the dangers of centralism.  The bigger it gets, the looser it becomes.50 
 
The argument continued claiming that the United Kingdom Governments, Conservative 
and Labour, had failed to protect Scotland’s interest and industries and only through 
independence could Scotland be represented properly with more members of European 
Parliament and representation in the Council of Ministers and Commission.  A year later 
at the National Annual Conference, resolution 37 would look to the Scandinavian 
countries for inspiration as the SNP “looks forward to an independent Scotland similar to 
the democracies of Scandinavia and of the smaller countries of Europe in their spirit of 
tolerance and belief that political parties of different persuasions have their role to play in 
a healthy democracy.”51  These themes of democracy would be echoed again in 1987 
(wherein the case was also made for contributing to “peace and security”52).  However, 
Wilson would sound words of warning in 1988—voicing the problem of centralism in 
Europe:  
… we should always remember that we are primarily for Scotland’s independence 
as opposed to European centralism as we are to English control.  But Scotland has 
always been a European country and, we should not be tempted to drop Scottish 
internationalism to join the anti-European little Englanders led by Mrs. Thatcher.  
We are enthusiastically for European co-operation as we are opposed to the 
creation of a Euro-superpower.53 
 
Ultimately Sellers would deliver his ideas on “Independence in Europe” in 1989:  his 
articulation of both decentralization (“Europe on a confederal model”) and his tracing of 
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House of Commons speeches dating back to 1972 and 1975 (proving the SNP’s 
adaptability to the new realities in Europe)54 would make the strongest, most articulate, 
and historically-based case yet.  These sentiments were succinctly stated in the party’s 
1989 manifesto: “This manifesto outlines the case to achieve Scottish Independence 
within the European Community and usher in a new beginning for the Scottish people.”55  
However, it is worth noting that this resulting position was decades in the making, and it 
would be maintained for decades as well—as, for example, the 1997 manifesto included a 
sidebar featuring Ewing and a synthesis of these decades worth of positioning on Europe 
and England:  
There is an enormous bank of goodwill towards Scotland in the rest of Europe, 
and we have friends in countries far and wide who would welcome our freedom.  
We are an internationalist people, who look outwards to the rest of the world—in 
contrast to the insular, Little Englander mentality at Westminster.56  
 
The unity of vision—on national identity, historical narrative, and a role in Europe—had 
converged and the SNP was in a position to communicate their message uniformly and 
consistently from the 1997 General Election onward. 
Independence, Separatism, and Self-Government 
 
The SNP’s message on independence also saw a particular evolution in the 1967-1999 
period, both in terminology and the degree of emphasis on independence in a given 
election cycle.  For General Elections, the SNP softened its language on independence 
when it had its record number of seats in Parliament and then gradually built back to 
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emphasizing their independence platform in the 1990s elections.  Meanwhile, the party 
sought to distance itself from “separatism” in favor of “self-government” or 
“independence” while also building a stronger economic case regarding the country’s 
potential as an independent state. 
 In 1974, the SNP Press Office put out a “nationalists glossary” in order to define 
key terms for its Parliamentary candidates and spokespeople.  Besides including 
devolution, federation, confederation, and association of states, the three-page long 
glossary also included sovereignty and independence (the latter would give Scotland the 
former) and most critically, separatism—which was described as being “used by 
opponents.”57 The document had the effect of informing party members of basic 
terminology in effort to gain a united front.  Too often words were being used by 
individual candidates, but they did not necessarily understand the implications of their 
word choices.  At the same time, party external documents, like the 1974  
“SNP&You: Aims & Policy of the Scottish National Party” made it clear that the 
“achievement of a democratic, independent government in Scotland is the SNP’s primary 
aim;” however, there was also the more pressing need to “improve conditions for the 
Scottish people under Westminster rule”58—thus rationalizing why an SNP vote was 
good for both the long-term objective of independence and the shorter-term impact of 
improving political outcomes in Westminster. 
 By 1976, when the party had 11 seated Parliamentarians, the message softened, as 
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the new document ended with a line clearly meant in response to pressures being put on 
the SNP while having more office holders. The most significant change included the 
addition of the line: “The SNP does not stand for ‘the break-up of the UK’ as some of it 
opponents emotionally and wildly claim.”59 However, in the next line, one wonders how 
that is true if the SNP “stands for a new relationship under the Crown, with the other 
nations of the United Kingdom.”60 
These distinctions among independence, separatism, and self-government were 
critical—as the terms were frequently confused or used synonymously.  The local 
election manifesto for 1977 in East Kilbride, where the SNP had taken over the council in 
May of 1975, sought to make the distinction clearer, as it stated:  
This is the independence for which the SNP stand-it is not separatism!  In this 
modern world every country is interdependent, economically speaking, and the 
prosperity of all depends upon mutual co-operation and trade.  Nationalists wish 
to see Scotland break out of provincial isolation within a declining U.K. and 
accept her full responsibilities as an equal member for the international 
community. …Only one thing is missing now. Self- Government.61 
 
However, this distinction—of independence with interdependence—could easily be read 
as semantics.  The problem again arises of why leave the Union if there will always be 
interdependence with these other states anyway?  The SNP tried to answer this question 
with the promise of breaking Scotland from its role as a province into its own position 
internationally (such as the arguments for more representation in the institutions of the 
EU) and by building the case of other states which have similar demographics and are 
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already functioning independently.  
Election Level of Election SNP theme “Independence” 
Feb., 1974  General Election  General Election Manifesto 4* 
Oct., 1974 General Election Scotland’s Future 10 
1979 General and European Return to Nationhood 3* 
1983 General Election Choose Scotland-The Challenge of Independence 20 
1984 European Election SNP—Scotland’s Voice in Europe 10 
1987 General Election Play the Scottish Card 16 
1989 European Election Scotland’s Future: Independence in Europe 27 
1992 General Election Independence in Europe: Make It Happen 33 
1994 European Election SNPower for Change 27 
1997 General Election Yes We Can 81 
1999 European Election Standing Up for Scotland 16 
1999 Scottish Election Enterprise Compassion Democracy 35 
Table 4.1. Use of “Independence” in SNP Manifestos: 1974-1999 *incomplete data 
 
This later argument was evident in the party’s 1983 documents, which stated, “The 
independence we seek is taken for granted by other nations.  The Scottish people have the 
right to self-determination—only by exercising that right will we have control over our 
country’s destiny.”62  The same document, “Choose Scotland—The Challenge of 
Independence,” also included a final word from Donald Stewart, the president of the SNP 
at that point, as he quoted the American Declaration of Independence saying that the SNP 
“declared the advantages of breaking the British connection…[to] reach a fairer and more 
co-operative relationship with our neighbors in these islands.”63   
By 1987, and the re-election of Thatcher again, the SNP would emphasize old 
 





claims about the UK’s injustices, but it would also shift to a far clearer emphasis on 
independence as an opportunity: a form of progressivism with a chance for Scotland to 
reach its potential.  The 1987 manifesto declared that independence “offers Scotland the 
opportunity to create a new society.  It must be a society based on justice, fairness, and 
freedom…[that can] ensure Scotland is protected from the many failings and injustices 
experienced under the UK system.”64  By 1988, the declaration became even clearer: 
“The principal aim of the Scottish National Party is independence for Scotland”65 
and for 1991, the National Executive Committee declared that the “notion of 
independence is the top priority in the upcoming election.”66  Then, in 1997, it coalesced 
into a message that was united this new version (of society and government) with the 
historical claim: “Yet Scotland can be a real and independent nation again.  All we need 
is the assent of the people.”67 
 Throughout this evolution that unified self-government, society, history, and 
independence, there was an equally important process unfolding: the strengthening of the 
economic case for independence.  The process was impacted by the discovery of North 
Sea oil in 1969, as that made the economic implications more salient than ever before; 
however, more importantly, SNP leadership from the 1980s onward actively sought to 
strengthen the case with greater academic attention to economic indicators and 
arguments.    
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 Immediately following the discovery of oil off the coast of Aberdeen, SNP 
leaders sought to improve the independence case through an economic standpoint.  The 
1974 manifesto, which was 20 pages long, included an entire page on oil and how “only 
with self-government” would Scotland get the advantages of the newly discovered oil.68  
From this claim, the SNP moved to broader economic distinctions from England:  
No country is too poor for independence if it wants the dignity of control over its 
own affairs.  Scotland in the past 100 years and more has always been a wealthy 
country but it has been sacrificed in successive waves of demand for commitment 
to somebody else’s interests first for over 150 years…69 
 
And while these accusations against Britain, again, were softened with the 1976 reprint of 
the same manifesto, the sentiment of oil as contributing to opportunity in independence 
continued: “the wealth of the oil and gas fields off the Scottish coast, added to other 
natural resources and assets, offers opportunities for greatly improved living standards to 
the people of Scotland—when they have a Scottish Government.”70 
Once again, Thatcherism helped the SNP improve its claims.  In making case for 
the economic validity of independence, the SNP stressed the differences in growth and 
outcomes in England versus Scotland while also emphasizing the success of smaller 
states abroad who were independent and flourishing by comparison to Scotland’s 
economic indicators.  In 1983 the manifesto declared, “Scotland today is in a state of 
crisis, with our economy decimated by the policies of successive London Governments. 
Unemployment has soared, rising by 130% under this Government and by 90% under its 
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Labour predecessor.”71  As a result of failed U.K. regional policies, “Thousands of Scots 
have been forced to take the well-worn path of emigration in effort to find work.”72  
Thus, by 1983, the only “realistic radical alternative to British economic imperialism”73 
was the SNP.  In 1985, the party composed an insert for its Annual National Conference 
concerning social security expenditures—to show how little was spent on Scotland in 
comparison to Denmark, France, Netherlands, West Germany, Austria, and others.74  
Two years later, the SNP paid for economic work to be done at the University of 
Strathclyde on the impact of the SNP’s proposed budget changes and the potential effects 
of growth in GDP and employment with the creation of a Scottish government.75  Given 
the SNP funded the study and the report itself claims to be “independent,” the results are 
as one would expect—predicting the positive impacts of self-government.   
 In the 1990s this pattern of increasing the economic case would continue, as the 
SNP published its “Best for Scotland” series which included, in addition to a program for 
government, two booklets on the economics: “The Economic Case for Independence” 
and the other “Scotland Pays Her Way.”  These arguments, once again, would be stated 
clearly both in the 1997 party manifesto and PEB.  The 1997 manifesto’s primary 
argument for independence included the economic angle.  The first key point was 
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distinguishing Scotland from London, as Alex Neil’s opening lines stated, “There is a 
better future for Scotland with independence—when we start investing in Scotland 
instead of subsidizing London—and this document proves it.”76 John Swinney continued 
the argument—in the form of the case for optimism in a Scottish run economy: “With 
Independence, we can make Scotland the ‘lion economy’ of Europe—delivering fair tax 
for individuals, and a competitive edge for Scottish business”77  before the final point was 
made about Scotland as a country in comparative context:  
National independence is the normal status for wealthy small nations.  Over 50 
countries have become independent from Britain since 1945 and NONE of them 
have applied to become colonies or dependencies again.  Nearly half of the 
independent nations in the world are smaller than Scotland—25 out of the 35 
most prosperous nations are small nations.78 
  
Again, the 1997 campaign showed a unity of thought on independence, economics, 
belonging in Europe, and identity—themes that were not new to the SNP but were now 
more cohesive in overall messaging. 
 
Party Positioning on the Left-Right Spectrum of U.K. Politics 
 
Another central challenge for SNP between 1967-1999 was how to align on the left-right 
spectrum.  Once the decision was made to participate in all levels (at this point local, 
U.K. and European) of government, a pressing need emerged as the 11 Parliamentarians 
in 1974 suddenly had to perform as a group.  They had difficulty navigating precarious 
policy situations both in terms of voting and speaking with one voice as a group and also 
 






in reconciling how the SNP’s stance on independence meant actually voting with the 
Conservative government at the time.  This situation—and the dismal electoral results of 
1979—led to a lot of questions within the party about voter base and how the party 
should align.  There was even dispute on what the successful election meant, as the MPs 
“were keen to present themselves as the Scottish government in waiting while some 
members of the executive had a different view” (Mitchell 2009, 33)—namely that there 
was still a long way to go to achieve any form of Scottish government.  Additionally, 
there was an issue of strategizing on how to approach the trade unions which resulted in 
internal problems of disagreement over strategy plus a barrier to entry as those unions 
had established relationships with Labour (Lynch 2013, 142). 
This absence of clear policy specifics was evident in the 1974 party manifesto—
which included a “supplement” with position on industry, prices, pensions, poverty, 
housing and economics, public sector capital investment, education, public finance, 
employment and the Common Market—again all mostly touching on economics and not 
necessarily other policy positions.  Some of these topics were not new, as topics like 
poverty and housing had been present in SNP publications since the party’s infancy. 
However, there was a clear intention to provide more clarity.  Unfortunately, though, the 
SNP’s voting record in Parliament would not help their case—as they were often called 
“Tartan Tories” when they sided with Conservatives such as during the 1976 vote in 
Westminster regarding the nationalization of shipbuilding (Lynch 2013, 142). 
 However, the position of the SNP was especially under scrutiny after the failures 




significantly (from 30.4% of the vote in Scotland in October 1974 to 17.3% in 1979). 
Party leaders struggled to interpret the election results as some leaders believed that the 
SNP had won long-time Labour voters and others felt the SNP had stolen Conservative 
votes in 1974.  Some of those with the first viewpoint advocated this movement to the 
left and formed the ’79 Group, while those with the second interpretation hesitated to 
move left as it might mean losing the very voters the SNP had just gained for the first 
time.  Wilson would declare emphatically in 1981 that “Given the current direction of the 
Labour Party to the far left, there is no advantage to the SNP in being identified with 
Marxist socialism or republicanism.”79  Research following the election would suggest 
that the votes were indeed Labour voters who rejected Labour policy—and that the SNP 
ultimately failed to live up to its promises and were abandoned by those voters in 1983 
(Brand, McLean, and Miller 1983, 474). 
While this interpretation of success did matter in determining policy and strategy, 
ultimately it was methodological differences over devolution with the rest of the party 
that would further exacerbate the disputes and eventually led to the expulsion of some of 
the ’79 Group. Namely, the ’79 Group advocated for civil disobedience, akin to Thelen’s 
insurrectionists, while the rest of the party remained firmly entrenched as subversives. In 
terms of ideology, the ’79 Group’s lasting impact was that the party did indeed move to 
the centre-left, but it was at the cost of very public divisions being on display during the 
1983 General Election.   
 





Another case of the tensions in the SNP over where to position ideological in 
reference to the two big parties was the poll tax disputes of 1987.  The poll tax funded 
local governments through equal payments—despite an ability to pay.  The Tories put it 
into effect from Westminster, and Labour had the challenge—where it was the lead party 
in Scotland—of determining how to address the situation. A clearly Tory position, the 
poll tax would only be instituted via Labour enforcement in Scotland.  The SNP pushed 
for non-payment—a position which was complicated for Labour MPs as they were 
elected officials who were more reluctant to be seen as acting illegally or in line with 
“subversive” approaches.  This situation led to the term “feeble fifty” for the Labour 
MPS from Scotland—as they could not actively oppose the Tory policy.  This scenario is 
what ultimately granted the SNP the chance to outflank Labour on the left.  In part due to 
Salmond’s rise as party leader and his own centre-left viewpoints, this notion of a “social 
democratic” party that is centre-left would become entrenched in the SNP verbiage and 
provided the basis for sharper policy positions even in the period post-1999. 
Consolidation of Methods 
 
The period between 1967-1999 presented the SNP with three significant methodological 
challenges. First, and most concretely, the SNP did not have structures in place—neither 
physically nor ideologically—to support the large MP group in 1974.  The physical 
limitations (telephone lines and office space predominately) impacted the party’s 
effectiveness and left the SNP looking particularly amateurish.  Second, the debate 
regarding how to achieve independence still seemed to have a multi-prong set of options 




party—though with slight variations—the SNP faced methodological incoherence on 
issues concerning party discipline and campaigning.  However, all of these issues would, 
like most of the ideological challenges, be resolved and made more coherent by the 1997 
General Election campaign under the leadership of Salmond. 
Practical Limitations 
 
The election of 11 MPs in October 1974—up from 1 seat in 1970 and then 7 in February 
1974, meant a physical and organizational problem: how to keep them all informed, 
sending the same messages, voting the same on legislation, and still maintaining the 
status of the party in Scotland.  The SNP was certainly not used to having that many 
parliamentarians, and it meant a decline in party leader presence in Scotland as parts of 
the party leadership spent all of the work week in London.   
There was no established party hierarchy for who dictated to whom in a given 
policy situation, and there was the continual problem when MPs were put on the spot but 
party communications, especially the broad 1974 manifesto, had given no instructions.  
Additionally, since the MPs were needed full-time in Westminster, the office-bearers and 
others, who were volunteers, had to maintain the profile of the party in Scotland (Lynch 
2013, 145).  Even beyond manning the whole operation, the SNP faced actual 
technological problems—such as having enough phone lines—as well as the lack of 
physical space or time to get the whole parliamentary group together.  Wilson described 
finding a tiny office and sitting back-to-back with another parliamentarian, but not all the 
SNP MPs were able to solidify a working space—let alone an established phone line 




made the SNP look bad and ultimately impacted the following election—as well as which 
direction the party should take.  While some of the physical and communication gaffs 
(see section on resource allocation later in this chapter) were adjusted, the impact would 
be long-lasting as internal weaknesses became more public and externally known. 
Gradualism and Devolution vs. Independence 
 
While the first periods of party evolution (1934-1967) had seen some progress with 
regards to ideas on how to achieve independence, there remained debates about how to 
approach devolution.  There was fear among some party leaders and members that 
attention to devolution would displace independence, and it took until the 1990s for a 
wider group of SNP members and leaders to accept the view of devolution as institutional 
layering—first a establish a parliament and then move on to independence.  The idea of 
MPs establishing a Scottish parliament or assembly remained the predominate proposal 
for how to get to independence. But the notion of negotiation for a parliament was seen 
as too gradual as well as too risky in regard to the how limited the Scottish Parliament’s 
powers may have been.  In both the 1974 manifesto and the 1976 reprint, the process to 
independence was through an SNP majority in a U.K. General Election.80  However, in 
the same year, at the conference in Motherwell, a resolution was created to support 
devolution, as the resolution stated the SNP was “prepared to accept an assembly with 
limited powers as a stepping stone” (Mitchell 2009, 36). Labour had taken this position—
supporting limited devolution—and it was consistently a situation wherein the SNP had 
limited power to negotiate (due to low numbers in Parliament, for example). However, by 
 




the 1990s, SNP gradualists moved to join with Labour for the 1997 devolution 
referendum. 
Years Proposed Process to Independence 
1960s and 1970s MPs leave Commons to create new assembly: either as a majority of Scottish seats or in a coalition with other occupants of Scottish seats  
1979 First time a resolution passed at Conference suggesting devolution as a stepping stone (Conference voted it down) 
1980 Wilson suggests a constitutional convention to decide the constitutional future of Scotland  
1987 Still MPs-based, but the idea of combining with the Welsh or offering to work with a major party in a hung parliament  
1997 Negotiating with SNP MPS but a parallel negotiation in Europe and a follow-up referendum (based on 1996 academic paper on the topic) 
Table 4.2. Changes in SNP-Offered Processes to Independence 
 The SNP interpretation of Labour-sponsored offer in the 1970s, though, was that 
it devolved too few economic powers, gave too much power to the UK-appointed 
Secretary of State for Scotland, and generally gave the assembly too few powers for SNP 
approval; it also included no role in the European Community for Scotland (Lynch 2013, 
155).  The SNP had hoped the proposal would be more in line with the Government of 
Ireland Act from 1920—which listed the powers reserved to Westminster as opposed to 
listing powers granted to the new assembly (Lynch 2013, 155).  As a result, the party 
kept the hardline “independence” stance over devolution: coining phrases like “On to 
Independence” in 1975 and then “Independence or nothing less” in 1977 and 1979 (in 
part as a response to the ’79 Group’s support for gradualism).  Even in 1993, with “Free 
by ’93,” the outward projection was one of wanting a direct path—as opposed to a 
gradual one—to independence.  




eventual referendum (in 1979) by creating more detailed policies of their own ambitions 
on how to create a government and how it would function.  In 1974, the manifesto posed 
the question of what type of parliament it would be, and the SNP design included a 
unicameral legislature elected by proportional representation (in the form of the alternate 
vote system—to reflect “more accurately the way in which the electorate has voted”), on 
a fixed four-year schedule with a written constitution (granting freedom of religion and 
protection against racial discrimination), referendums on any constitutional change, and 
an independent judiciary. 81  These same institutional designs would resonate in SNP 
documents from 1974 through 1997—when the phrase “Bill of Rights” was also added.82   
However, SNP’s answer to the question of how to get this parliament established 
evolved over time—from being a brusque withdraw from Westminster to a more multi-
step process involving multiple levels of negotiation and an additional popular vote (via 
referendum).  First, the idea of an SNP majority in Westminster, which originated as a 
strategy in the 1960s, remained persistent through the 1990s, appearing in every General 
Election manifesto from 1974-1997.  However, the process—once that majority of seats 
was won—did evolve over the time period. In the 1970s, the “Road to Self-Government” 
meant inviting the other MPs from Scotland to join the SNP in an interim government 
that would serve as a transition—supervising the transfer of powers to Scotland and 
preparing a written constitution that would be put to a referendum, after which a general 
election for Scotland would held.83 There was brief discussion in 1978 of the possibility 
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of holding a referendum under the auspices of the United Nations, but that idea got no 
farther than the 1978 Annual Conference.84 Later, the addition was made of the monarchy 
continuing, an 18 and over voting age, and stipulations about delaying legislation (with a 
2/5th majority).85  In 1980, Wilson proposed a ten-minute rule bill at Westminster to 
establish a Scottish Convention which would decide the constitutional future of Scotland: 
devolution, independence, or status quo (Torrance-2009, 167); it was a clear move away 
from fundamentalism of independence via separating from the UK Parliament in an 
abrupt manner. However, the idea was revisited three times before the party finally 
accepted the position in 1983—with the publication of “A Constitution for Scotland,” a 
booklet on the challenges of independence.86  In 1987, there was the addition of allowing 
for an alliance with the Welsh, and the suggestion that if a London party offered support 
for this constitutional convention, then the SNP would back that party in a hung 
parliament.87 Later, in 1995, “the party’s National Executive adopted a dual-path 
approach”—which included both the option of an SNP majority withdrawing from the 
House of Commons and negotiations towards a devolved parliament (Lynch 2013, 214) 
By 1997, the pathway was actually back to the old form—negotiating 
independence with a majority of SNP MPs elected—though this time offered with idea of 
parallel European negotiations and a referendum following these negotiations—to 
approve the “independence statement” in a single simple question.  This entire process 
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was cited as being “brought forward” by a 1996 committee of academics who offered this 
process as a legal pathway based on other independence examples in the world.88 
Additionally, the SNP tied its proposal of voting for the new Parliament—the Additional 
Member System—to its 1997 themes of inclusion and multiculturalism, as the statement 
was added in other documentation that such a system would allow “each party in a 
politically balanced parliament to reflect Scottish society in terms of gender, ethnic origin 
and geographical diversity.”89  Once again, the 1997 messaging tied together all the 
elements of the SNP’s evolved position on everything from identity to methodology in 
time for the General Election in 1997 and the subsequent devolution referendum. 
However, party cohesion in delivering this message was also in an evolutionary process. 
Party Discipline 
 
In the last era of party evolution, party discipline was most frequently about managing 
ethno-nationalist extremism; in the 1967-1999 period, that element of party discipline 
was occasionally still an issue, but the predominate facet of party discipline shifted to 
continuity in positions taken and public statements made—much like all political parties.  
While the cases of extremism were often situations that the press was quick to exploit, it 
is also true that there were legitimate conservative forces seeking to maintain a more 
narrow and fundamentalist understanding of nationalism and identity within the SNP at 
the same time that the ’79 Group was trying to stretch the party to the left, at least in 
terms of appearances.  While the struggle over ideology and messaging exists in to some 
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extent in all political parties, the division over devolution or independence directly 
exacerbated the situation as the SNP sought to manage disputes over both strategy and 
policy—resulting in a great deal of indecision and lack of congruity. 
Even before the divides in the late 1970s, enough negative press on issues 
concerning party members and extremism had led to a February 1975 press statement 
condemning all non-constitutional forms of action taken in the name of Scottish 
independence.90  However, the bigger divisions would arise as the party was threatened 
by the emergence of Siol Nan Gaidheal (SNG), a Celtic romantic and arguably militant 
group, and by the ‘79 Group, which was simply a faction within the party that favored a 
farther left platform on economics as well as a more gradual approach to independence 
via devolution.  Occupying at best the fringes of SNP, SNG posed a lot of problems for 
SNP—beyond its militant actions and vague threats of violence, SNG also presented 
problems with regards to appearance. Such was the case at the annual Bannockburn rally 
in 1980 when their drunk and disorderly behavior was on full display (Lynch 2013, 186). 
The party leadership faced a conundrum—as voting to expel SNG members would also 
make it easier to expel the ’79 Group of which some were members of the same National 
Council making this decision.  However, it took a year for the SNP to examine the SNG’s 
membership and constitution and to ban it formally, perhaps in part because it was 
threatening to party leaders than the immediate threat of the ’79 Group causing a splinter.  
At the Annual Conference in 1981, the resolution was passed stating that the SNP 
 





“deplores the emergence of publicity-seeking factions within the ranks of the Party and 
appeals to adherents of these factions to exercise self-discipline in the interest of party 
unity”91 and then followed with a series of amendments on the importance of party 
discipline.   
However, simply expelling members, some of which were quickly re-admitted to 
the party including future leader Salmond, did not necessarily prove to outsiders that the 
SNP had fully separated itself from the fundamentalist positions.  For example, in 
November 1982, Duncan MacLaren, the SNP’s press officer at that point, penned a letter 
to The Daily Record about their article entitled “Tartan Army Bomb Shock” in Scottish 
National Liberation Army (SNLA) “hotheads” were implied to have been former SNP 
members.  MacLaren requested confirmation on who these people were and proof of SNP 
membership92--neither of which were ever provided. Russell recalled that the party 
lacked credibility: “I used to dread…[the media] establishing shots at party conference of 
old man in kilts.  It was complete kooky and highland and just what maybe the image of 
the SNP would be. …We had to get away from the image to a modern, European 
party.”93  
By the 1990s discussion on party discipline was much more direct—and 
traditional—as it was aimed at unity and clarity for the purpose of campaigning 
successfully.  At the Party Annual Conference in 1991 Alex Salmond made this theme 
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central to his opening message. Besides emphasizing the theme of independence in 
Europe, Salmond also stated:   
One [of the building blocks to success] is self-discipline throughout the Party and 
particularly among our prominent members.  The closer we get to our objective 
the more pressure will be placed on the Scottish National Party.  In Inverness and 
throughout the coming contest we have to demonstrate to ourselves and to 
Scotland that the Scottish National Party now has the character to withstand the 
pressure in order to take full advantage of the awaiting political opportunities.94 
 
His words seemed to recall the lessons of the past especially the aftermath of 1979, as he 
tried to set the party up for future success.  He was only one election cycle away from the 
kind of breakthrough he and the other gradualists sought—when the second devolution 
referendum was set for 1997. 
Campaigning 
Clearly campaigning is a traditional difficulty that all parties have to manage.  And, in the 
case of the SNP, the important evolutionary process of centralizing campaigns began in 
this period and, as has been established at several other points, coalesced around the 1997 
elections.  However, prior to 1997, elections were mostly run by individuals within the 
party, and while the general manifestos provided some speaking points, the reality was 
that individual candidates and their teams (if there was one) formulated the content and 
published materials.   
 Both the 1979 European election and the 1997 General Election saw the SNP in 
good financial form—and therefore provide a good comparison for changes over time in 
campaign methodology as the difference in financial resource was not as significant as it 
 




could be given the change in time periods. Simply looking at printed materials gives a 
clear indication of the changes over time.  The 1979 materials varied in size, format, 
colors, and content, while the 1997 set was uniform in all aspects except the image of the 
candidate on the front of the pamphlet and the name of the constituency. 
A sampling of the 1979 campaign content at the NLS showed that there was not a 
unified set of content or format.  With the exception of a couple of pamphlets, most of the 
candidates’ content was published in different places. Ewing’s was a small hand-sized 
pamphlet with a photo of her, mostly black and white with some yellow, while 
Stevenson’s was about a third as big and is blue and white.  MacGibbon’s was the same 
size but all black and white.  Leslie and Murray’s were each double the size of Ewing’s 
and were purple, black, and white.  Finally, Robert McIntyre’s was an entirely different 
format—large and black, white, and yellow.  They do all include a photo of the 
candidate, but aside from that similarity there is no uniformity. 
In terms of content, Winnie Ewing’s one-page fold out reflected her record (in the 
form of speeches and questions) and then work on fishing, agriculture, whisky, imports, 
nuclear energy, Gaelic, and other topics. It included a section on EEC membership that 
read: “We campaigned against entry and against staying in but a majority of the votes 
cast opted for membership.  Many now regret this.  We say the Scots must ultimately 
decide by Referendum, once a Scottish Government has negotiated our relationship with 
the EEC.” Finally, she was sighted as the “International Figure of Scottish Politics.”95  
Meanwhile, MacGibbon’s content stated: “To go further along the EEC road would 
 




surely be wonton folly.  …The Scottish National Party as a minimum will insist—in the 
European Parliament and in the country—on radical and comprehensive changes in the 
terms and conditions of membership.”96  And then McIntyre sounded the most measured: 
essentially stating that the SNP opposed entry because Scotland’s interests were not being 
safeguarded but “now we must be realists; we are in the Common Market and we must 
see the European elections as an opportunity for us to have more say in what happens to 
us form decisions taken remotely in Brussels.”  He did not use the word independence but 
said that he wanted Scotland to have her say—in the counsels of Europe—especially via 
a “direct voice.”97  Finally, Murray and Leslie read similarly on finances and presented 
Scotland as holding up the UK as it climbed the EEC in the same cartoon they both used 
in their pamphlets.  They also echoed the emerging narrative of smaller states with far 
more representation than Scotland and that independence would give Scotland more 
representation and its own seat on the Council of Ministers.98 
By 1997, on the other hand, everything about the campaign was uniform.  In 
addition to the party’s own manifesto including policy details, there was uniformity 
among pamphlets and messaging across candidates and constituencies.  While the 
passage of time obviously influenced technology available, there was also a change in 
approach that began with the SNP’s disappointment with the 1992 election results.  
Leadership was feeling some frustration as Sillars lashed out at 90-minute patriots, or 
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Scots who only watch football games (Wilson 2014, 22).  The party conducted a formal 
internal Election Review and realized the Party had been unsuccessful, first by failing to 
“defeat the psychology of fear” and then in the phrase “Free by ‘93” becoming a taunt 
used by the other parties and the media to emphasize SNP fundamentalism (Wilson 2014, 
22).  In 1996, ahead of the 1997 election, the SNP sent Allison Hunter, Director of 
Organisation, to the U.S. to monitor campaigning techniques in the U.S. Presidential 
Election (Wilson 2014, 36)—something the SNP wanted to do for a long time but did not 
have the resources.  Hunter’s reports influenced the SNP’s General Election approach.  
Flyers were uniform in color scheme and message, the manifesto tied all the party’s keep 
messages together into a coherent message, and the PEBs, for the first time, utilized 
similar wording and messaging. This centralized approach to campaigning would be a 
critical piece of party growth—as henceforth the discussion surrounding election failures 
would be like the major parties—and not about the lack of resources or inconsistency of 
messaging, both of which had been long-time burdens of the SNP as it grew to maturity. 
Increase Exposure 
 
During the party’s earlier development, the battle for access to broadcasting was marked 
by the SNP’s first PPB in 1965.  With the breakthrough of this exposure threshold, the 
period between 1967-1999 shifted the focus on exposure as the SNP persistently 
emphasized the need for more Scottish-based broadcasting, pushed for more complex 
outreach of its own, and pressed for more coverage by the existing media outlets.  As was 
the case in the first rounds of growth, once again, the SNP’s biggest electoral 




time, in 1992, the party garnered its first newspaper endorsement. While there is reason 
to be skeptical of the endorsement by The Sun, the notion of the SNP on par with the 
mainstream parties was an important message that would be maintained in the pursuit of 
a Scottish Parliament and would provide the necessary groundwork for the SNP to be in a 
position of relative strength headed into the first-ever Scottish elections of 1999. 
Scottish Broadcasting 
 
The SNP’s desire for more Scottish broadcasting was self-serving for the party as 
regional coverage would mean their own party being more relevant.  However, the 
argument took three different angles: one about prejudice against Scotland, one about the 
economics of paying for licenses, and another about the importance of media to national 
culture which included the SNP seeking to protect Scottish-based news outlets from 
closure.  The persistence of this topic would be strong—lasting the full period (1967-
1999) and into further discussions after the Scottish Parliament was formed in 1999.   
 The SNP’s prime grievance about broadcasting regarded prejudice and imbalance. 
In a press release in 1975, William Wolfe complained directly to the media with whom 
he took issue: “The anti-Scottish prejudice displayed by the English-controlled networks 
is illustrated by the fact that ITV game 8 hours’ TV coverage in Scotland to the British 
Labour and Conservative Party Conferences, compared to some 50 minutes for the 
Scottish National Party. 99  There would similar sentiments at the 1988 Annual 
Conference when branches were increasingly upset with Scottish treatment in the media 
 





and passed two specific resolutions (one on the government “attacks on the media” and 
the other on the percentage of allocations by the BBC’s funding that gets back to 
Scotland).100   
 Licenses, coverage, and spending were also common themes among SNP 
grievances about the media.  In terms of licenses, it was a commonly held belief as early 
as the 1970s that “Too many people in Scotland are paying licenses without enjoying a 
proper service in return.”101  The 1981 Annual Conference had a slightly different angle 
for the same issue: “That the Government [should] provide a level of income capable of 
sustaining an adequate public service system; and …the BBC [should] apply that income 
so as to satisfy the indigenous needs of the constituent parts of the UK.”102  Then, when 
the BBC restructured in 1992, an SNP Annual Conference resolution, offered by the 
Stirling St. Ninians Branch, called for expansion of services in Scotland.103 The following 
year’s conference included a more specific call for the expansion of spending by the 
BBC: from 2% to 10% in Scotland—with at least 10% of programming originating in 
Scotland.104 
This last point—about programming based in Scotland—was also a common 
theme along with the importance of broadcasting in relation to culture.  This argument 
was probably the strongest of the three main themes as the SNP voiced that "nothing less 
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than a completely independent broadcasting service is needed in Scotland and in order to 
represent our own interests, values and standards, and to develop the skills and talents of 
our own people.”105 By 1983, the position boiled down to a single sentence: “A healthy, 
free and balanced Media are essential to any nation’s wellbeing, and an SNP Government 
will ensure their development in an independent Scotland.”106 Part of the position was 
also about access for Gaelic speakers in particular as the party responded to a 1989 
Government’s Broadcasting White Paper with a five-point proposal to establish a 
Scottish Broadcasting Corporation that would have full autonomy, provide all three 
languages (English, Scots, and Gaelic) in programming, and change taxation to develop a 
strong independent film and television sector, and also provide a fulltime Gaelic radio 
station. 107  By the 1990s, this language shifted to the need for “the articulation of 
minority interests and cultures”108 and “richness and diversity of Scottish culture and 
programming.”109  
 In addition to these relatively fruitless calls for greater Scottish broadcasting 
autonomy, the SNP also was involved in a few different incidents between 1975 and 
1987 that sought to protect existing Scottish news outlets.  Between February and 
November of 1975 Wolfe and Wilson were both involved in seeking government support 
to keep the Scottish Daily News from closing its doors.  While the communications were 
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in the form of letters and telegrams110—some of which were released to the general 
media, the SNP was trying both to save a Scottish business in terms of jobs and income 
but also with larger aims regarding a Scottish press. Likewise, in 1983, the SNP National 
Council issued an emergency resolution regarding the sale of the Daily Record and The 
Sunday Mail—with Wilson later stating clearly the two papers should be sold separately 
from the rest of the Mirror Group papers that were being sold in block.111  A similar 
sentiment was voiced at the 1987 Annual Conference in a resolution offered by the 
Aberdeen North regarding the Thompson Regional Newspapers (The Scotsman, the Press 
and the Journal) being turned into “English provincial papers;” however, the wording 
was softened in the final resolution, as offered by the Edinburgh Holyrood/St. Giles 
branch, and stated, “Conference believes that the independence and integrity of the 
Scottish titles could best be served by a return of ownership to Scottish control.”112  In 
between these concerns, in February of 1984, the SNP sent a letter to the BBC, and drew 
attention to it in a subsequent press release, complaining that the BBC had not appointed 
a Scottish Political Correspondent113—a position the SNP considered to be critical to its 
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own outreach and salience in the media.  All told, the SNP did seek to protect Scottish 
interests among the media. 
Party Broadcasts 
While pressing for greater Scottish autonomy and the protection of existing 
Scottish voices in the media, the party obviously continued its own outreach in this 
period from 1967-1999, and it got increasingly more complex—not just in terms of 
technology as television broadcasting grew more common and more easily accessible, but 
also in terms of the party’s own approach to television broadcasts in particular.  The 
1980s were marked by the SNP’s own selling of its broadcasts as unique and targeting 
young Scots, while the two General Election broadcasts in the 1990s (1992 and 1997) 
reflected significant changes in the party’s approach—and especially its resources.   
As the party attempted to rebound from the electoral disaster of the 1979 election, 
there was an effort to draw younger people to the party and to make its outreach more 
accessible.  In trying to draw attention to itself, in January 1981 in a new release, the SNP 
touted its own work and advertised the party’s upcoming PBB as a play that was “far 
removed from the usual talking heads” as it included and actors who were “two 
unemployed young Scots” who had drama experience with the Scottish Youth Theatre.114  
And its next production, announced in May of 1981, was entitled “The Westminster 
Marathon,” was made by Mike Alexander who won awards for his film “Long Splint,” 
and featured Joe Mullaney, who was in the last PBB and a BBC serial called ‘Maggie” 
 





well as “a cast of young people drawn from the SNP’s youth wing.”115  Similar tactics 
and language were repeated the next year, too, with the SNP PBB on new jobs being self-
described in a news release as “light years away from the old-hat ‘talking heads’ format 
and is well worth a look-in” as it included actors Jay Smith and Charles Kearney.116 
While these ideas of using actors and not being “talking heads” also permeated 
the 1990s PEBs, the differences between the 1992 and 1997 broadcasts provide 
significant clarity on both the growth of party resources in a short period and the 
increasingly complex use of moving images, soundtracks, and scripts in “selling” the 
party.  The 1992 broadcasts, one five minutes long and one ten minutes long, each 
attempted to go beyond a speech. The five-minute broadcast included politicians and 
children, as the two SNP leaders spoke about the economy, Scottish independence in 
Europe, and Scottish self-assertion of power, they alternated who spoke and each time 
handed the children a puzzle piece. By the end of the broadcast, the two children had put 
together a simple puzzle with the SNP ribbon, and Salmond declared, “The answer is in 
your hands. Only you can solve it” as the camera pans the puzzle the children had 
composed. 117  There is a subtle complexity to the message—that the solution to 
Scotland’s problems is so simple that children can solve them.   
The longer broadcast in 1997 was more humorous as the “fourth wall” was 
broken by a woman who comes onto clean the screen and the voiceover—with a 
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noticeably London accent—declared that is was now “follows a Party Political 
Broadcast…and on the other side of the border, we are getting to watch much better 
programs.”  The woman eventually takes over the broadcast—and walks the viewers 
outside for fresh air to talk about expertise in Scotland.  It is interrupted by a brief 
musical interlude, and the woman continues on about money and the economy before 
returning to the studio where a bit of tape is rewound in order to see a broadcast with 
Sean Connery’s voice about oil revenues and other issues.118  The five-minute 1997 PEB 
opened with David Hayman, a Scottish actor and film producer, recapping that his film 
had been shown two weeks—and the images play in the background of fire, swords 
clashing while Hayman talks about courage and overcoming fear to reach independence.  
The film repeats, “The greatest fight of all is the fight against fear.”119  The images and 
the language are far more complex than the simple, direct camera angles of the 1992 
PEB—which only has a table and the four people in the frame against a bland 
background.  There is more action—dancing, sword-fighting, fire burning, bagpipes, 
clapping—in addition to the voice overs of Hayman and Connery.  And rather than the 
foreboding message of the 1992 broadcast, when Connery talked about oil money being 
taken, instead this entire 1997 broadcast is about a forward vision. There are implications 
of the problems stemming from south of the border—as the idea of hatred and prejudice 
which are alluded to were being voiced by the BNP in the 1997 election (Hay-1997).   
However, these changes seen in 1997 and the complexity of the messaging and 
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images were the product of other attempts to improve outreach. In 1970, Douglas 
Crawford appealed to the National Executive to use a news service in order to improve 
communication speed and cut down on teleprinting, phone costs, and late-night taxis.120  
The party had also tried on several occasions, such as October, 1975121 and again in 
November of 1980 to provide media training for prospective Parliamentary candidates--
especially including television and video training.122   Yet, even with these periodic 
efforts, the reality remained that by the mid-1990s and the introduction of direct mail and 
newer technology, the SNP “was almost a decade behind its competitors” (Lynch 2013, 
175).  Reflecting an approach similar to the detail and long creative process behind the 
PPB of 1965, these new broadcasts were also the product of the improved fundraising 
efforts of the SNP in the 1990s. The quality of the ideas and the presentation of them 
were what led even to academic attention to the SNP’s broadcasts.  At the time, Hay 
wrote, “Whatever the validity of any SNP case for an independent Scotland, their PEB 
campaign provided much to think about” (Hay 1997,475).  A BBC journalist based in 
London, Hay may have been just noticing for the first time—a reflection of the SNP’s 
reach increasing in this period. 
Media Strategy 
Finally, in addition to their push for independent broadcasting and improvement 
in their own outreach, especially in party broadcasts, the SNP also maintained a steady 
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strategy when dealing with the media at large.  The party maintained essentially three 
aims: first to improve the volume of their own coverage and inclusion in political 
programming that would amount to free exposure, second to point out institutional 
advantages the two larger parties maintained in this arena, and third to respond when 
party leaders determined the coverage to be particularly damaging and inaccurate.   
On the first point, in trying to increase the volume of exposure, this strategy had 
been implemented during the fringe period, too, as party leaders had continually pressed 
via letters and other communications for more coverage.  During the 1970s, when the 
SNP had its electoral spike, other parties complained that the SNP was a “media 
confection” that “attracted more media attention than its electoral support warranted” 
(Mitchell 2009, 35).  However, SNP news releases would suggest otherwise.  For the 
October 1974 election, the SNP got two election broadcast spots (and posted 70 
candidates) while the Liberals posted 34 candidates for Scottish MP elections, and yet 
they had been awarded four PEBs—based, of course, in part on their presence throughout 
the U.K. (where they contested 619 total seats) as opposed to just in Scotland.  The SNP 
protested, stating in a 20 September 1974 new release that  
this means…in an election of historic significance for the people of Scotland, they 
will be denied a fair opportunity to hear the views of the most dynamic and 
confident party in Scotland.  I have no doubt that this allocation shows not only 
fear on the part of our opponents but an active anti-Scottish bias.123   
 
Then, after the historic result for the SNP in 1974, SNP Chairman William Wolfe, in 
August of 1975, protested in a letter to Sir Charles Curran, Director General of the BBC, 
 





about SNP’s exclusion from the broadcast on the PM’s emergency statement on the 
economy—while the other parties in Parliament were included.  His accusations included 
that this incident reflected “the same indifference to Scottish needs and interests [that] is 
apparent in the Government’s own economic programme.”124  A similar complaint was 
also directed to the BBC regarding a show being filmed in Aberdeen that concerned the 
Scottish economy that was also not going to include any SNP representation.125  
In these cases, the SNP had valid points of contention as they had 11 seats in 
Parliament and certainly should have been part of the discussion; however, with the 
party’s electoral performance dropping mightily in the 1980s, the grievances shifted to 
internal ones—as a significant problem was getting the press to attend SNP events.  The 
National Executive notes show several occasions between January and February of 1980 
wherein the leadership was concerned about minimal press attention.  In January, the 
party’s Press office, Duncan MacLaren, bemoaned the loss of TV time during a blackout, 
that only The Scotsman had attended a recent party press conference, and the outlook was 
“bleak.”  At the February meeting another note was made regarding poor turnout at a 
press conference.  In January, the suggestion was made to hold the next press conference 
in Glasgow in order to get more attention; by February, party officials were blaming 
themselves and suggested the poor attendance was due to lack of original content.  
Finally, by March, the realization that the election results meant “the media believes it 
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can ignore [us]” had set in and the idea of a weekly party newspaper was suggested (to be 
“like other parties”).126 
In addition to lack of attendance at their own events, the SNP also kept pushing 
back on occasions where they could rightfully claim to be included.  In one lone case in 
1981, SNP MPs Donald Stewart and Gordon Wilson boycotted the chance to be televised 
in debates, and the party released a statement on “the so-called ‘all-party talks.’”  The 
press release went on to claim, “Tonight’s debates are a fraud”127 as the SNP did not 
participate since the powers being discussed for devolution were too limited. However, it 
was more often the case that the SNP felt snubbed from particular broadcast or article.  In 
1982, MacLaren complained to the various Scottish newsrooms about their coverage of 
the Labour by-election win in Kirkcaldy but ignoring the SNP victory in a district 
election the same evening.128  Later in the year in a Letter to the Editor of the Daily 
Record, MacLaren complained about the paper’s coverage of industry in Ravenscraig 
avoiding complete closure as it did “not mention SNP contributions”129 to keeping the 
workers employed.   
For Russell, the goal was to convince people of the SNP’s viability—namely by 
seeking a rise in the opinion polls while simultaneously drawing attention with stunts. He 
cited a “technique” whereby the SNP would determine when the Herald’s Systems 3 poll 
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was being conducted and the party would put most of its resources into media releases for 
the week leading up to it, so they would be more present. He felt, “It was worth a point or 
two maybe more.”130  In the same vein, Russell commented: 
We could easily be cut out.  In a story say about education in Scotland—it would 
run as a Westminster story—since there was no Scottish parliament yet.  It would 
be Labour versus Tory, and we weren’t mentioned.  We have to be in the story. 
We have to be reported. And part of that is making a noise. Part of that is saying 
things important. And part of that is a bit…you get reduced a bit to stunts 
sometimes.  And you have to be careful. If I had a pound for every press event or 
stage photograph I have done with someone dressed as a polar bear, I would be 
quite a wealthy person.131 
 
Besides being left out of coverage when the SNP could have been included or 
gotten more credit, the SNP’s largest challenge in terms of media relations, even after 
being granted the rights to political broadcasts, was challenging the institutional realities 
of the established media and its relationship with the large London based parties.  For 
example, in 1968, Wilson described the relationship with the BBC as “erupting”—as the 
BBC had helped the SNP produce its first broadcasts but suddenly withdrew assistance.  
Wilson stated, “We encountered resistance rather than cooperation” (Wilson 2009, 19), 
and the party scrambled for facilities and film—getting Grampian TV to help with studio 
and tape facilities in either Aberdeen or Edinburgh.132  However, at the time, the larger 
parties were paying to have these broadcasts produced privately, so they did not face the 
same obstacles to production.  Similarly, Wolfe would complain to the Committee on Aid 
to Political Parties that the SNP was frustrated by the use of taxpayer money to assist 
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broadcasts of other parties. His letter to the committee’s secretary was quite strongly 
worded:  
Indeed the idea of such assistance in this connection is repugnant to the party, 
particularly in the British political system in which the major parties’ record of 
allocating political broadcasting time has been one of manipulation in their own 
favour and of gross injustice to small or non-English parties.  Such discrimination, 
which its racialist overtones in broadcasting, would, we suspect, be reflected in 
any scheme for giving public funds to political parties, which was agreed to by 
British parties.133 
 
While this particular letter was sent in 1975, similar sentiments regarding broadcasts and 
allotments was openly discussed at the party’s 1981 Annual Conference. Resolution 51 
filed the grievance that the “apportioning of broadcasting time on radio and 
television…denies the Scottish National Party a fair and further degree of coverage whilst 
allowing the major Unionist Parties almost unlimited time leading up to, and during, a 
parliamentary election.”134 Based on the stated television times for the conference, this 
resolution was possibly made while the media cameras were rolling.   
More often, however, the barriers to media exposure were less de jure and more 
de facto—meaning that most often the SNP was left out of programming out of habits 
born of the traditional voting records as well as the propensity for television broadcasting 
to be out of London and not Scotland-based.  In 1982, Wilson complained about BBC by-
election coverage, sending a telegram to Sir Ian Trethowan, Director General of the BBC, 
asking for enquiry into the unfair coverage on “Question Time” when it comes to 
Glasgow: “It is financial lunacy to import English politicians at the BBC’s expense to 
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pronounce on Scottish problems about which they generally know nothing and care even 
less. …grossly unfair and merely symptomatic of the way we are treated by London.”135 
Similar dialogues were presented about polling in 1982, as Wilson wrote, “London BBC 
hs (sic) hi jckd (sic) the by-election, relegating the Scottish end to a few comments from 
the natives while our masters pontificate on our political future from London”136 and 
again in 1983 as Alan McKinney, the SNP’s Election Director, complained the BBC was 
presenting the election as just being between Thatcher and Foot—leaving the Scottish out 
of it.  Wilson also chimed in at a May press conference stating that the London election 
broadcasting “smacks of metropolitan parochialism” and was “not directed at Scottish 
broadcasting media.”137  
Finally, the SNP, at least on several significant occasions, had to take a hard line 
in responding to adverse media coverage—especially when the party was falsely 
presented as being fundamentalist or violent.  However, unlike in other cases where the 
SNP would advocate its own position, in these cases the tone is different.  Most often, the 
party leaders doing the communication were looking for confirmation or asking for 
consultation before such coverage—and then stating how false the outlet’s claims had 
been. In none of these cases does the political communication coming from the SNP take 
an angry or aggressive tone—which is both purposeful and helpful when trying to 
respond to accusations of fundamentalism.  In 1975, Wolfe wrote a letter to the Director 
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General of BBC regarding the inclusion of footage in a piece entitled “Oil Strike North” 
where a person wearing an SNP badge assaulted an American oil worker. Wolfe was 
clear in stating his anger about the party being presented as pursuing policy by anything 
other than democratic means.  He asked for a special viewing in order to evaluate the 
piece themselves (meaning SNP leaders) in order to establish whom the individual 
was.138 MacLaren responded to a similar situation in 1982 when a front page article in the 
Daily Record about “Tartan Army Bomb Shock” claimed that former SNP members were 
now “SNLA hotheads.”  Like the situation Wolfe faced, MacLaren did not know who the 
individuals were, and he was requesting proof of their SNP membership.139  Two days 
later MacLaren was communicating with Ian Brown of the Daily Express about an article 
entitled “Gael Army Claims We Started Blaze”—which again claimed to be the act of a 
militant wing of the SNP. “Anyone who has any knowledge of the SNP should know 
what balderdash that is,” MacLaren wrote, “A phone call to our headquarters or to 
anyone of our office bearers would have confirmed the statement to be false.”140 
As was the case when the SNP gained broadcasting in 1965 and broke the 
representation threshold for good in 1967, the SNP had another key media breakthrough 
in the early 1990s.  This time, as the result of Salmond’s performance in a radio debate 
and the Labour promise, along with SNP agreement, on devolution, the SNP leaped from 
wanting coverage to being presented on par with the other parties for the first time in the 
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televised age—and possibly for the first time ever.   First, there was the “Great Debate” 
in Edinburgh’s Usher Hall—on radio and not television, but Salmond, with a partisan and 
supportive audience, dominated, and it was widely covered in the press.  Shortly 
thereafter, The Sun, previously a Conservative paper, backed the SNP with the party’s 
first-ever newspaper endorsement (Wilson 2014, 19).  The Sun’s 23 Jan. 1992 article 
read, “We have come to the inescapable conclusion that Scotland’s destiny lies in an 
independent nation within the European Community” (Lynch-2013, 209).  Wilson 
credited the success in the polls as The Scotsman posted an opinion poll that 50% of 
Scots supported independence and only 27% devolution (Lynch 2013, 209) for eventually 
leading to increased television coverage.  Then, in December 1992 a mass rally was held 
with over 25000 people at the Meadows in Edinburgh, and this event was held almost 
with a sole purpose: to “attract media attention across Europe and embarrass the UK 
government for its opposition to Scottish self-government” (Lynch 2013, 213). 
When the (second) devolution referendum was set for 1997, the SNP decided to 
back the efforts alongside Scottish Labour and the Liberal Dems. The SNP would appear 
side-by-side with these other leaders, and Salmond did well to stay positive and not 
exploit issues with Labour (such as its own internal problems including one MP being 
investigated for corruption and another who committed suicide).  Instead—Salmond, with 
equal status, was now a fixture in the television debates on devolution (Lynch 2013, 236-
7). This opportunity, combined with Salmond’s talents as a debater, gave the party new 
standing and popularity.  At the same time, this situation influenced the 1997 General 




PEB on the Asian cable station Zee TV which invited SNP to make a broadcast due to 
increased support within Asian community (Hay 1997, 475).   
The period from 1967-1999 was mostly a time of slow growth for the SNP in 
regard to its media exposure and outreach due to the peaks and valleys in its electoral 
presence. However, increased attention after the 1967 by-election, and then at the 
electoral spike in the 1970s as well as the quicker paces of growth between 1992-1997 
led to significant strengthening of its position—and the SNP was prepared to take 




While the period saw significant evolution on party unity of ideas and methods as well as 
outreach, electoral persistence was still relatively minimal—as the SNP achieved a spike 
of 11 seats in Parliament in 1974 but more frequently seated between one and three 
parliamentarians.  Ultimately, the persistence of the party would shift again after 1997 (as 
the SNP seated 5-6 parliamentarians between 2001-2015).   
Year of Election Seats Contested Vote Percentage Seats Won 
1970 65 of 71 11.4 % [43 lost deposits: £6,450] 1 
Feb., 1974 70 of 71 21.9% 7 
Oct., 1974 71 of 71 30.4% 11 
1979 71 of 71 17.3% 2 
1983 72 of 72 11.8% [54 lost deposits: £8,100] 2 
1987 71 of 72 14% [1 lost deposit] 3 
1992 72 of 72 21.5% [0 lost deposits] 3 
1997 72 of 72 22.1%  [0 lost deposits] 6 





As noted by at least one academic study of the SNP in this period, “It is doubtful whether 
an organization with such an open and competitive leadership, lacking resources to either 
understand public opinion or to mobilize party structures towards a popular strategy, if it 
did, could it sustain the coordinated effort in order to achieve a breakthrough” (Levy-
1986, 248).  And yet, those obstacles—especially of resources—were exactly what the 
SNP tackled in the 1990s in order to position itself for a role in the Scottish 
government—and to break through multiple barriers on the way to running the Scottish 
government in 2007. 
Resource Allocation 
 
While resource allocation and reform ahead of the 1967 election breakthrough was based 
on efficiency at the highest levels of the party, there were no significant changes to the 
branch structure of the SNP, and that would remain the case through the 1990s. However, 
the reforms this time around were mostly focused on fundraising and political 
communication—both within the party and in its outreach.   
 The untouched part of party structure—with power substantially placed in the 
branches—remained a bit of an obstacle for communication into the 1990s. The 
“polyarchical” and branch-dominated structure contributed to vague and “poor 
communications” (Mansbach 1973, 203).  In short, the branches dominated, and the party 
had limited methods for analyzing its election outcomes and potential constituencies.  
Describing the party in the late 60s to the 70s, Mitchell talked about the party relying 
heavily on volunteers and the commitment of activists whose careers were sacrificed as 




party also experienced a decline in the period from 1969-1971 in terms of funding and 
had to cut staff roles—leaving a staff of five full-time party workers (Lynch 2013, 132).  
Then, when the party did seat 11 Parliamentarians in 1974 the full group could not meet 
(with all MPs and the National Executive) because of the varied schedules, lack of 
support staff, and lack of plan to adjust to the new situation.   At times the MPs did not 
get Executive meeting minutes, so they did not know what advice the party leadership 
was dispensing (Lynch 2013, 148-149).  In short, party infrastructure, while streamlined 
in the 1960s so that the National Executive and others were not overextending 
themselves, reflected absolutely no foresight into what needs would have to be addressed 
if the party’s electoral outcomes improved. 
 By the 1990s technology would help cut down on communication times and other 
logistics of trying to work between London and various points in Scotland, but the reality 
was the SNP was still at least a decade behind its competitors with regards to finances 
and technology.  The party purchased—rather than renting—a headquarters in Edinburgh 
in 1975.  The purchase required a loan that needed to be repaid with interest, and the SNP 
would rent out parts of the building until the 1990s when it could afford to occupy the 
whole building again (Lynch 2013, 153-4).  In 1976, based on the election outcome, the 
party spent £70,000 pounds for new headquarters “premises, alterations, redecorations 
and re-equipment” which McIntyre openly spoke about as being of importance—in order 
to have a “real SNP HQ.”141  Yet, just the year before, the party took in £12,736 (Lynch 
 





2013, 140); thus, they were planning to keep increasing income via the branches (which 
was the chief form of income) and still to be able to pay the loans.  The 1976 reprinted 
manifesto even stated directly that “The Scottish National Party depends entirely on its 
members and supporters, as individuals, for its finance. It has no institutional, corporate, 
or sectional source of funds.”142 In short, the party continued to survive on small 
donations and the generous out-of-pocket work of their national officers and other 
volunteers.    
Yet, despite these economic realities, the party kept growing in small ways.  In 
1981, the party purchased its first two Apple “micro-computers” for use by national 
office-bearers143 and also appointed a new “Election Campaign Director” to lead on 
strategy and in the effort to establish a Scottish Parliament.144   The computers allowed 
for greater clarity on membership records as well as faster production of internal 
communications.  The next year they appointed Alan McKinney to be the Director of 
Headquarters and in October of 1982, after several years of putting off the creation of 
such a position, Chris McLean, at just 23 years of age, was hired as the party’s full-time 
research officer.145   
However, the more significant changes would occur in between the mid and late 
1990s, and most of these changes would be possible due to a professionalization of the 
 
142 SNP, “Scotland’s future: S.N.P. Manifesto.” 
143 SNP, HQ News Release: 26 May 1981. Headquarters News Releases 1981-1982. NLS: Acc. 
10754.29. 
144 SNP, HQ News Release: 29 April 1981. Headquarters News Releases 1981-1982. NLS: Acc. 
10754.29. 
145 SNP, HQ Press Release: Aug. 1982. Headquarters News Releases 1981-1982. NLS: Acc. 
10754.29. 




party’s fundraising as well as an emphasis on media and outreach.    As Lynch noted, the 
SNP was doing things in the 1990s that other parties had done in the 1980s” (Lynch-
2013, 218). Specifically, Lynch was referring to campaigning, the use of television, and 
other tactics for communicating more quickly.  For example, Lynch cited the example of 
Labour in 1983—as it overhauled its communications and organizational reforms. 
However, the SNP, “did not really begin similar reforms until the mid-1990s with Mike 
Russell as Chief Executive” (Lynch 2013, 219). 
First, the party had to change its fundraising methods—which, like the branch 
structure, was highly decentralized and focused on small donations, as was proudly 
advertised in the 1976 manifesto. The efforts began with the creation of an internal 
newsletter, Snapshot, which was meant to contribute on its quarterly publication to “The 
Challenge of the Nineties.”  The challenge was aimed at getting party members to pledge 
monthly donations via a standing order so as to provide regular income for the party 
headquarters—as opposed to branches (Lynch 2013, 216). It would be the first time the 
donations would go directly to the central offices, and while the program took money to 
get started and implemented, progress was made.  The party’s income increased from 
£61,232 in 1980 to £185,251 in 1990 (Lynch 2012, 175) to a total income stood of 
£210,624 pounds in 1995 (Wilson 2014, 36).  Likewise, the party, also began to broaden 
its sources of income as “Business for Scotland” was started—and in 1998, businesses 
made £203,494 worth of donations (Lynch 2013, 217) to the SNP.  Despite all this quick 





 After fundraising, the next steps included attention to political communications 
and campaigning.  Gradually, the SNP staffed a larger group at headquarters—as during 
the 1990s it took back over the office space that been rented since the 80s (Lynch 2013, 
219).  Several significant hires contributed to the progress on these fronts—including 
among many, Russell, Wilson, and Pringle.   Russell was appointed Chief Executive, and 
he would manage campaigns and improve political communications. Russell was a 
former film and TV producer, and he immediately improved the visual presentation at 
SNP annual conferences, took on the role of an essentially full-time media spokesperson, 
and focused on speechwriting and troubleshooting during campaigns (Lynch 2013, 217-
218).  Then, in 1994 the SNP appointed an economist at headquarters.  Andrew Wilson, 
an economics and politics graduate from University of Strathclyde would fill that role—
quickly filing three 1995 reports on economics that were well received (Lynch-2013). 
Wilson would eventually become a member of the Scottish Parliament in 1999.  Finally, 
the 1995 National Annual Conference would be the first time Kevin Pringle’s first as the 
party’s press officer.  He was eventually hired as the party’s Communications Manager 
along with “a host of communications staff who were appointed in the late 1990s in 
preparation for the 1999 Scottish election” (Lynch 2013, 231). 
 With Russell, Wilson, Pringle and the emergence of Salmond in the leadership 
role, the SNP focused first on the devolution referendum—and then the 1999 Scottish 
elections.  Even before the referendum outcome, “the SNP was spending heavily, 
employing an economist, refurbishing headquarters, engaging two student assistants or 




and generally putting the national capability on a war footing, including an IT package 
for telephone canvassing that cost 50,000 pounds” (Wilson 2014,48).  In short, the SNP 
prepared in advance for the opportunity 1999 would present. 
This time when the SNP experienced its electoral breakthrough (as the opposition 
party in the 1999 Scottish parliament), the party was more unified, and the practical 
limitations were far less daunting than they had been in the 1970s.  The MSP group was 
financed and organized at the headquarters, which was already in Edinburgh.  While the 
political functions of the party switched from Westminster to Holyrood, the shift was 
important: “The balance had swung. The SNP was now fully a parliamentary party just 
like the others in the UK” (Wilson 2014, 54). This end result was a product of the party 
finally aligning its ideas, methods, and outreach—all while backed by a new funding 
scheme.  The domino effect of unity of ideas and methods (especially regarding 
devolution) and then Salmond’s “Great Debate” performance, the party’s rise in the polls 
and then the success of newly designed fundraising and communications all positioned 
the SNP for its breakthrough at the devolution referendum (when it was presented as the 
first time as a peer of the other major parties) and eventually the first Scottish elections.  
The next period of growth could be focused on lessons and structures of governance.   
Viability of Other Causes: Accommodation, Decline and Exogenous Events 
 
Major party accommodation of SNP interests does well to explain a few short-term 
situations in the 1960s and 1990s.  First, following Ewing’s election, within weeks, a 
treasury official commented that Scottish MPs were now flooding the treasury with 




larger parties accommodating to the presence of the SNP, at least initially, until they 
could determine their own pathways forward to absorb SNP interests. Ted Heath, Tory 
Leader, would make his “Declaration of Perth” in support of devolution and the Royal 
Commission on the Constitution under Lord Crowther was also created. Lord 
Kilbrandon’s reports were released just prior to the SNP’s 1970s surge.  October of 1974 
would be the first time Labour produced a specific Scottish manifesto (Lynch 2013, 137).  
Essentially, accommodation, initially, came in the form of the other parties being forced 
to pay attention to Scotland (Mitchell 2009, 32), which is not a bad result for SNP 
efforts—though it pushed them out of the larger political picture by the emergence of a 
Thatcher majority and eventually drove them to be more specific in defining its left-right 
ideology.   
With the 1970s election of the Conservatives and a promise to consider the 
creation of a Scottish Parliament with Labour having established the Royal Commission, 
self-government did become a serious issue in part due to the major parties looking to 
absorb potential voters in Scotland that desired self-government.  The resulting effect, as 
Meguid’s work predicts, were lean years for the SNP as the major parties seemed to be 
tending to the SNP’s stated interests. By the 1979 election Scottish issues were absent, 
and the SNP lost six seats to Conservatives and three to Labour. However, that 
accommodation of Scottish interests is what gave birth to the next wave of SNP growth 
(via the Scottish Parliament), and it remains the case today that the larger parties cannot 
fully accommodate a party like the SNP so long as it continues to press for independence.   




1974, and then the rise of Thatcher actually helped the SNP case in the long-term. 
Thatcher’s policies hurt the Scottish social services and drew massive derision from the 
Scottish public. However, the bigger impact of Thatcher’s successive terms was that the 
electoral maps strengthened the SNP case that Scotland was—and is—indeed different 
from England.  Having not voted Conservative at all by the 1987 election, and sending 
Labour MPs to Westminster again, the Scottish people were also gradually presented 
with another option in 1992—as the SNP continued to harp on the uselessness of the 
Labour opposition and the continued prices paid (literally) by the Scots under Thatcher. 
Thus, the decline of the Conservatives in Scotland was not really the cause of SNP rise—
so much as the ability of the SNP to frame those elections and outcomes as another 
distinct quality of the Scottish people.  Eventually, the SNP, along with the media and 
others, would equate conservativism with anti-Scottishness, which in the short-term did 
not necessarily garner more votes but had the long-term impact of drawing attention to 
Scottish issues and led to Labour’s accommodation of devolution (which in turn only was 
successful once the SNP actually aligned with those efforts the second time around—in 
1997).   
 Finally, exogenous events, like the discovery of North Sea oil, are also helpful in 
the short-term.  The discovery of oil in Scottish waters did indeed allow the SNP to make 
a stronger case for the economic benefits of independence. Yet, again, though, without 
proper party unity and resources, that economic argument was good for little more than a 
short-term protest vote in 1974.  The economic case for independence remains a topic of 




grew with the addition of a party economist and a focus on economics by a party leader, 
Salmond, who was trained in the discipline.   
 All told, the rise of the SNP by the late 1990s into a position of strength as the 
first Scottish parliamentary elections arose would be limited until the party was able to 
catch up to its peers economically, in terms of governing experience, and in its media 
strategies—all of which would come to fruition in the coming decade due to the 
opportunities presented the SNP with the creation of a Scottish Parliament.  However, the 
period between 1967 and 1999 saw the SNP build a stronger, though still broad, 
ideological identity, to increase its media exposure to being presented on par with the 
biggest parties in the U.K., and to raise its financial standing through the Challenge of the 
Nineties.  Ultimately, the key groundwork from this time period which would impact 
future SNP success was the party’s eventual consensus to understand devolution as an 
example of institutional layering.  While the other parties, and Streeck and Thelen’s 
descriptions, viewed the addition of the Scottish Parliament as displacement—and an end 
point—the SNP viewed it as merely an incremental step.  Holyrood, to the SNP, would 
become an institution for which more powers could continually be sought.  These 
differing mindsets, marginal developmental changes for the party itself, and the SNP’s 
discourse that increasingly equated Scottish interests and the SNP as one in the same 
would lay the groundwork for its future successes in Scottish elections—and eventually 
beyond.   
Though spread over three decades, though not in a clean linear pattern, the SNP’s 




methods, a media breakthrough and increase in exposure, and greater available resources 
all occurred surrounding events in 1997.  While it would be possible to interpret the 
devolution referendum and Salmond’s media presence as a dramatic breakthrough riding 
on the back of his own personal strengths, that interpretation would fail to take into 
account the party’s ever-increasing attention to media relations and campaigning over the 
course of several decades. There is also a similar path dependence to take into account 
based on Salmond’s involvement in the party—including an evolutionary process from 
1987 onward that was buoyed by his leadership and the victory of the gradualists over the 






Internal Accommodation: The SNP and Regional Government Opposition, 1999-
2007 
 
Devolution and the opening of the Scottish Parliament in 1999 meant both new 
opportunities and challenges for the SNP as they sought to contest multi-level elections. 
In terms of opportunity, the SNP was now a central factor in the Scottish politics, and it 
allowed SNP members to consider officeholding as a career which in turn helped grow 
and sustain membership. Likewise, the party was now consistently present in all levels of 
elections and was a regular part of the Scottish media cycle.  At the same time, this 
change to four levels of elections (local, regional, national, and European) meant 
adjusting ideas based on different election contexts especially with regards to 
independence and the path to it while also having to muster candidates for a steady 
stream of elections.  Likewise, there was a need to have party infrastructure in place for 
communications and outreach even as party discipline got more complex with two 
parliamentary groups—one at Westminster and another at Holyrood.  Finally, there was 
the challenge of messaging that had to reconcile pushing for more powers at Holyrood 
while simultaneously advocating for independence. 
 Historians have described the party’s situation in 1999 as “not positive” (Lynch-
2013, 233) as Salmond would step down shortly afterward and John Swinney would take 
over as party leader.  While Salmond’s presence at Westminster never dwindled, and he 
would remain a boisterous party member, Swinney would be seen as a weaker leader due 
to disappointing General Election results, but in fact Swinney’s 2003 reforms would 




change needed to convert the party from an activist-dominated, branch-led, party of 
opposition to a professionalized party of government. Added to successful economic 
growth of party coffers—which would finally be able to compete on equal ground with 
the other mainstream parties by the 2007 regional elections—the growth between 1999 
and 2007 was the final stage of party development. 
Data for this period of party history and growth include 4,246 press releases from 
the period immediately following the creation of the Scottish Parliament (1999-2003), the 
party’s manifestos for each election as well as PEBs from 2001, 2004, and 2007.  The 
earlier PEBs and the party’s Annual Conference notes are not available for the period in 
question, though there is Wilson’s Scotland: The Battle for Independence, 1990-2014.  
Significant secondary sources include historian Lynch’s SNP: The History of the Scottish 
National Party and Mitchell, Bonnie and John’s The Scottish National Party: Transition 
to Power from 2012 that reflected extensive surveys of SNP membership, 
professionalization, and changing structures leading up to 2007. 
 Of the approximately 4,200 press releases, the vast majority concern policy, 
appointments of officials, campaigns, press conferences, or other matters.  These releases 
are not digitalized and are only accessible in paper format at the National Library of 
Scotland.  Approximately 10% of the releases were related to incidents with the media, 
nationalism directly, or institutions. All of the releases were considered by headline and 
then parsed for details if it addressed the media, institutions, or nationalism—in order to 
see how the SNP was presenting itself in these areas.  Without access to the party’s 




leadership intended in its relations outside the party.  Thus, published speeches contained 
in these releases were also included in this study.   
 “Media” was measured as mentioning a media outlet directly, discussing issues 
of news coverage or broadcasting, reflecting an SNP effort to correct a particular story, or 
relaying moments when the SNP gained information from the press that should have been 
provided by government channels.  These did not include the announcement of upcoming 
campaign events or press conferences, manifesto releases, or similar promotional events.  
“Nationalism” was not measured as “Scottish interests” but rather incidents and events 
focused on representations of nationalism—as well as any mention of “nationalist” not in 
the party’s name.  (See Codebook in Appendix F). “Institutions” was measured as present 
in releases that addressed the definition of powers or how new offices were being 
designed or organized; these releases did not include parliamentary debating procedures, 
official government statements, campaign content, or policy debates which were carried 
out in public.   
 Therefore, the 435 releases plus the party’s five manifestos from this period, the 
secondary work of history and political science scholarship, and interviews with the 
party’s key media relations leaders (Alex Salmond, Michael Russell, and Kevin Pringle) 
provided the opportunity to trace the party’s process from small backbench presence in 
Westminster to the party of the opposition in the Scottish Parliament—on to its first 
election victory in Scotland when the SNP led a minority regional government in 2007, 
breaking from the “blackmail” threshold to the “governing” threshold at the regional 




refused to join them in government.  Instead the SNP maintained ambitions to be the 
primary party of government in Scotland—a goal they would reach in 2011. 
 Between 1999 and 2007, the consolidation of ideas for the SNP meant retaining 
the ideas from past iterations of party growth including civic nationalism and 
internationalism.  In this period, nationalism was most present in the party’s messaging in 
areas that covered devolved competencies: sports, education and protection of language 
(both Gaelic and Scots), history, culture and the flying of the Saltire. The party also 
improved the specificity of its policy stances as it gained experience working in 
opposition at Holyrood. In terms of methods, the party continued to campaign with 
limited resources (though there continued to be improvement over time since the 1980s in 
particular), to concern itself with party discipline, and to work through existing 
institutions; however, it had to adjust to dual mandate members and new challenges to 
party discipline. The SNP benefitted from the opportunity of being involved with the 
Scottish Parliament from its origin; therefore, giving the SNP some tactical options for 
establishing parliamentary norms.  Like the last period of party growth, the SNP 
continued to seek greater exposure in the media and were frequent critics of the London-
based media. The new developments between 1999-2007 were the push for the 
devolution of broadcasting to Holyrood and the SNP’s increased press coverage (which 
still was not on par with its political competitors).  While the SNP was persistent in all 
levels of elections at this point, the “Holyrood Gap,” which was the difference between 
SNP electoral results in Scotland versus in General Elections, was born.  Finally, the 




(2003) would be long-lasting and immediately important while funding and campaign 
spending actually did catch up rival parties in 2007.   
All told, these adjustments between 1999 and 2007 could be described as the SNP 
making internal accommodations in order to adjust to the significant change posed by the 
existence of the Scottish Parliament.  Benefitting from the party’s now entrenched vision 
of nationalism as well as its policy position on Europe, the SNP was able to focus on 
adjusting itself to institutional realities of operating at Westminster, Holyrood, Brussels, 
and on local councils.  The change in volume of members holding elected positions 
eventually drove the need for party structure reforms—reforms that, it would turn out, led 
to the party being well-positioned to function in government at Holyrood. 
Consolidation of ideas 
In terms of ideas, nationalism was fairly well defined for the SNP by the 1990s, and 1999 
meant a slight shift in focus on how to reflect that nationalism while being a party in 
opposition. For the most part, nationalism in the SNP’s 1999-2007 period consisted of 
emphasis on a broad civic identity as well as assertion of “Scottish interests” in a variety 
of cultural aspects including sport, language, history, and the use of the flag.  
“Nationalism” is not mentioned in any of the manifestos, though, for example in 1999, 
“nation” appears 9 times and “national” over a dozen times (usually in context of 
“national resources” or various committee names such as National Health Care 
Commission).  There is an increase in 2003—as “nation” is mentioned in context of 
Scotland as a nation on 48 occasions in the 30-page long manifesto including a section 




addressed.  Thus, the term itself—nation, nationalism, or nationalist—does not provide 
insight into the SNP’s vision on the topic; instead, the presence of the representations of 
nationalism—in the forms of sports, culture, history, and language—become more 
important. Additionally, the absence of the term “nationalism” provides insight as well, 
as the party leadership clearly was sure to leave the term out publications due to its 
negative implications dating back to its rise in Second World War.  Similar patterns 
follow in the other party communications of this period as well.  For example, in 2002 the 
SNP joined Plaid Cymru leaders in a march denouncing the nationalism espoused by the 
French National Party.1  As with most aspects of SNP policy in this period, the 
discussions and specifics grew significantly on each of these points over the 1999-2007 
period. 
Sport 
 Due to the competitive and highly visible circumstances of international 
competitions, the SNP emphasized Scottish identity in sport as well as the importance of 
exercise and recreation for the health of local communities.  In the spring of 2000, the 
SNP publicly opposed a Mike Tyson fight to be held in Glasgow.  The SNP called on the 
Scottish Executive to ensure that Tyson not be on Scottish television as “Scotland’s 
international reputation will be tarnished if we allow a convicted rapist to appear in our 
national stadium.”2  The fight was held despite SNP protest (as Glasgow’s city council 
voted overwhelmingly to allow the fight to go on), and the bout wound up lasting just 38 
 
1 SNP, Press Release: 30 April 2002. SNP Press Releases: April to July 2002. NLS: PNR. SNP. 2002. 




seconds—leading to Salmond describing it as a “mismatch and a farce.”3     
While the Tyson fight was a case of trying to protect reputation, the other points 
of emphasis for the SNP in regard to sports were often more about promoting Scotland—
especially as potential hosts for major sporting events.  Almost immediately into the first 
session of the Scottish Parliament the SNP called for cross party work on bringing 
sporting events to Scotland—the implication being both economic and social benefits.  
SNP efforts did attempt to get a Scottish bid to host the 2010 Ryder Cup,4 and the party 
leadership were angered by an English bid put forth by Tony Blair the following fall.5  
Similarly, the SNP pushed for Scotland to host the European soccer championships in 
2008—particular as a juxtaposition to the Tyson event being held at the national park, 
Hampden Stadium. 6  This ambition was even identified specifically in the party’s 2001 
manifesto,7 but the joint bid with Ireland lost out to Switzerland and Austria for the 2008 
event. Later, Scotland did host the Ryder Cup, in 2014, but it has not had a successful bid 
for hosting the “Euros.”  The 2007 manifesto stated the desire to bid for the 2014 
Commonwealth Games, which was hosted in Glasgow, and the 2016 European 
Championships,8 which Scotland did not bid for in the end.  All told, this attention to 
large sporting events was part of a broader SNP approach to showcasing Scotland 
internationally.  There was not always agreement with other parties such as the Tories, 
 
3 SNP, Press Release: 25 June 2000. SNP Press Releases: May to July 2000. NLS: PNR. SNP. 2000. 
4 SNP, Press Release: 3 July 1999. SNP Press Releases: July to Sept. 1999. NLS: PNR. SNP. 1999. 
5 SNP, Press Release: 31 Oct. 2000. SNP Press Releases: Aug. to Oct. 2000. NLS: PNR. SNP. 2000. 
6 SNP, Press Release: 4 June 2000. SNP Press Releases: May to July 2000. NLS: PNR. SNP. 2000. 
7 SNP, “The Heart of the Manifesto.” (Edinburgh: SNP, 2001). 
http://www.politicsresources.net/area/uk/e01/man/snpman01.pdf, p. 17. 





for example, who did not support the Scottish Euro bid—leading Salmond to describe 
them as “anti-Scottish” and “against all things European.”9   
The SNP also has repeatedly tried to draw attention to Scottish athletes’ successes 
as well as the distinction between the British teams versus English or Scottish athletes—
especially during Olympic years and the Commonwealth Games. This issue was not 
present in the manifestos, but it was evident in the press releases especially during the 
2000 Summer Olympic Games, the 2002 Winter Games, and during the Commonwealth 
Games.  However, there was also discussion in between events, such as was the case in 
2001 when the SNP’s Irene McGugan, serving as the Shadow Sports Minister in the 
Scottish Parliament, drew attention to discussions between the British Olympic 
Association and the English Football Association on a British Football team in the 
Olympics—an ideas which she said the “people of Scotland would utterly reject.”10 
Similar issues had arisen in 2000 when the SNP expressed “dismay” that the Scottish 
Sports Minister (Rhona Brankin) was left out of talks regarding 2004 Athens games and 
the prospect of a Scottish national team versus a British one. 11  Later, the SNP would 
review a survey of athletes at the 2000 Summer Games in Sydney—revealing that several 
smaller nations had fewer athletes than Scotland’s 28 Olympians—and therefore 
strengthened their call for a Scottish national team.12  Later that year, in December 2000 
pamphlets were distributed at a soccer match in Falkirk that described New Labour as 
 
9 SNP, Press Release: 1 June 2001. SNP Press Releases: April to July 2001. NLS: PNR. SNP. 2001. 
10 SNP, Press Release: 17 July 2001. SNP Press Releases: April to July 2001. NLS: PNR. SNP. 2001. 
11 SNP, Press Release: 10 Aug. 2000. SNP Press Releases: Aug. to Oct. 2000. NLS: PNR. SNP. 2000. 




looking to dismantle the Scottish team.13 Although the SNP did not take responsibility for 
the flyers, the pamphlets did imply that the SNP was the party protecting Scottish 
sporting interests.  Similar dialogue would occur around the 2002 Winter Olympics as the 
Saltire was banned by British officials, and party leader Swinney would object in a press 
release while also writing the British Olympic Committee directly.14 Over the next few 
days, especially when Scottish skier Alain Baxter won bronze in the slalom—with his 
hair dyed the color of the Saltire—and was threatened with expulsion, there were a series 
of press releases by the SNP upset with the Saltire ban as well as Baxter’s treatment.15 
Later when Baxter was stripped of his medal for using a banned substance, an inactive 
ingredient in the American version of Vicks nasal inhaler, Salmond would still defend 
him, saying the Scottish Parliament should honor him and that he as “treated atrociously” 
in being stripped of his medal.16 That summer, during the Commonwealth Games, a 2 
August 2002 SNP press release led with “Swinney Slates BBC over Commonwealth 
Coverage”—and went on to describe how the BBC ignored the triumph of Scots athletes 
and medal winners, interviewing only English athletes regardless of how they finished.  
“It’s as if the BBC has become the EBC—English Broadcasting Corporation,” Swinney 
quipped in the article.17  This type of complaint combined two of the SNP’s favorite 
targets—the BBC and the lack of support for Scottish athletes. 
 
13 SNP, Press Release: 9 Dec. 2000. SNP Press Releases: Nov. to Dec. 2000. NLS: PNR. SNP. 2000. 
14 SNP, Press Release: 19 Feb. 2002. SNP Press Releases: Jan. to March 2002. NLS: PNR. SNP. 
2002. 
15 SNP, Press Release: 19-23 Feb. 2002. SNP Press Releases: Jan. to March 2002. NLS: PNR. SNP. 
2002. 
16 SNP, Press Release: 24 March 2002. SNP Press Releases: Jan. to March 2002. NLS: PNR. SNP. 
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Finally, on a local and communal level, all of the SNP manifestos from 1999 to 
2007, with the exception of the 2005 General Election document, mentioned the 
importance of sport in the party’s ambitions for both a healthier and more competitive 
Scotland.  Like the other policy areas, this claim got more specific over time as well.  In 
1999 the SNP  manifesto called for the abolition of the Sports Council quango (because it 
spent too much on administration), endorsed a Scottish Institute for Sport—to accelerate 
schools sports, clubs, and facilities.18  While the 2001 manifesto was much less specific 
or lengthy on sport, it did state that sport was an important for “tackling youth crime” and 
cited the need for more activities and funding as well as the creation of Football 
Academies (which the U.K. government had promised in 1999 but still not delivered on 
by 2001).19  In 2003, the focus, while continuing to include the importance of local 
facilities and access, also pointed to the need to promote Scottish golf and not just 
“British” golf tourism,20 and it was more specific about improving physical education in 
schools (making a minimum of two hours per week).21  Then, by 2007, the manifesto 
included three full pages on sport with the same themes about physical education and 
facilities but also adding five days of outdoor education to the primary school schedule, 
exercise as part of prescription schemes, and the creation of more sports training schools 
 
18 SNP, “Scotland’s Party Manifesto for the Scotland’s Parliament 1999 Elections.” (Edinburgh: SNP, 
1999). < http://www.politicsresources.net/area/uk/ass/snp/man99.pdf>, p. 26-7. 
19 SNP, Press Release: 25 July 2000. SNP Press Releases: May to July 2000. NLS: PNR. SNP. 2000. 
20 This idea of Scotland being left out of “British” tourism guides and ads was not new.  On 30 
November 2001 an SNP press release drew attention to the fact that a UK-government produced 
brochure on Harry Potter did not include Scotland at all (when the author, J.K. Rowling is Scottish 
and wrote much of the series in Edinburgh). (30 Nov. 2001. SNP Press Releases: Nov. to Dec. 2001. 
Shelfmark: PNR. SNP. 2001.) 





(based on an existing school in Glasgow.) 22   
Language Policy 
While sport presented a public—or international—platform to engage Scottish 
nationalism, discussions of language, especially Gaelic but also Scots, were national-
level concerns especially in terms of declining Gaelic-speaking populations and how to 
both protect and expand the use of the language.  This topic was one the SNP needed to 
approach carefully—as over-assertion of the minority languages could lead to opponents’ 
accusations of fundamentalism.  Appropriately, Gaelic and Scots advocacy fit into the 
culture portion of SNP manifestos and was often featured in later pages as opposed to be 
being put up front in the documents.  When Russell criticized the Scottish Executive’s 
“National Cultural Strategy” in 2000, he pointed out that the document made no mention 
of Scots language.23 It should also be noted that the SNP’s support of more Gaelic usage 
was explicitly stated not to be at the expense of others, as the 2003 manifesto was 
advertised as being available in English, Gaelic, Cantonese, Punjabi, and Urdu.24  And, as 
early as 1999, the portion of the manifesto on languages stated that the need to promote 
“Asian arts as well as art that arises out of cross cultural experience.”25   Likewise, the 
SNP would draw attention to a diversity of events such Swinney at the central mosque in 
Glasgow or Salmond making an appearance with the “Best Indian Food” restaurant in 
Scotland.26 
 
22 SNP, “SNP: It’s Time—Manifesto 2007,” 41-43. 
23 SNP, Press Release: 16 Aug. 2000. SNP Press Releases: Aug. to Oct. 2000. NLS: PNR. SNP. 2000. 
24 SNP, Press Release: 11 April 2003. SNP Press Releases: Jan. to July 2003. NLS: PNR. SNP. 2003. 
25 SNP, “Scotland’s Party Manifesto for the Scotland’s Parliament 1999 Elections,” 28.	




Like the development of sport policy, the SNP grew more specific in its language 
policy between 1999 and 2007.  In the 1999 manifesto, the SNP advocated for the 
creation of a Gaelic sub-committee, acknowledged a need for English, Scots and Gaelic 
to “co-exist on equal basis in Scotland,” to all be taught in schools, and to be ganted 
“secure status” in the Parliament.27 However, beyond the sub-committee creation very 
little was specific; however, by 2001 more was made clear.   The manifesto declared the 
need for “Gaelic medium (education) where there is reasonable demand”28 and for 
“supporting and reviving the language” as part of creating a “new generation of Gaelic 
speakers.”29  There was also the desire to get recognition of Scots as minority language in 
EU Part II and Part III of the European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages.  
This “Gaelic medium” language would repeat in 2003 and 2007.  In 2003 there was the 
proposition of an improved Gaelic Language Bill and assistance for Gaelic learning 
including second language and adult education30 (so going beyond the primary-level 
previously discussed).  By 2007, with two terms in opposition in the Scottish Parliament, 
the SNP manifesto still referred to Gaelic in primary schools but also referred to a  
“Gaelic teacher strategy,”31 increasing Gaelic usage in broadcasts (“to ensure that it 
brings economic as well as cultural benefits, to the islands in particular”), as well as the 
specific goal: by the 2021 census to return the number of Gaelic speakers to “at least” 
2001 levels while supporting it where spoken and expanding.32  These last goals—an 
 
27 SNP, “Scotland’s Party Manifesto for the Scotland’s Parliament 1999 Elections,” 27. 
28 SNP, “The Heart of the Manifesto,” 8. 
29 Ibid, 18. 
30 SNP, “The Complete Case for Scotland: SNP Release our Potential. /03,” 12. 
31 SNP, “SNP: It’s Time—Manifesto 2007,” 53.	




explicit digital channel for Gaelic and the mention of the census data—are an explicit 
example of how the SNP’s time in opposition sharpened its claims and arguments.  At the 
start of the Scottish Parliament, the interest was simply in more primary-school level 
Gaelic education, by the third term, the focus was precise on numbers, adult education, 
and a specific broadcasting aim.   
Historical Claims 
In addition to how the SNP presented language, there were also poignant 
moments in politics that would help define—or redefine—the nationalists’ claims to 
history or historical elements of identity and unity.  Early in the first term of the Scottish 
Parliament, again as part of the SNP’s desire to be widely appealing, Russell, as the 
Shadow Minister for Culture, Broadcasting, and Gaelic, began calling for the repeal of 
the Act of Settlement—since it was “intended to discriminate against Catholics” and 
would an important “symbol of the Scottish Parliament’s wish for a new, fair and equal 
Scotland.”33  The debate began in the Scottish Parliament in December of 199934 and 
then again in the winter of 200035 before the change would be rejected after a challenge 
in court. (The European Convention on Human Rights ruled that succession to the throne 
is not a human right.).  Eventually the topic was revisited with the Succession to the 
Crown Act of 2013—which actually did meet the SNP’s goals of reversing the block on 
Catholic succession to the throne. 
 
33 SNP, Press Release: 15 Aug. 1999. SNP Press Releases: July to Sept. 1999. NLS: PNR. SNP. 1999. 
34 SNP, Press Release: 13 Dec. 1999. SNP Press Releases: Oct. to Dec. 1999. NLS: PNR. SNP. 1999. 
35 The Act of Settlement was the topic of three press releases between 5-7 December 2000.  SNP Press 




Beyond the monarchy, the SNP would carefully draw attention to topics of 
historical claims in order to prevent opponents’ accusations of fundamentalism.  In 
manifestos there initially are no mentions of any specific historical claims beyond the 
1999 Scottish election manifesto mentioning the role of Scottish history in the 
classroom36 and the 2001 manifesto stating the importance of “production of high quality 
teaching materials on Scottish history, language and literature.”37  Interestingly, however, 
the historical claims would actually get more specific over time.  For example, in 2003, 
the manifesto professed, “Scotland has a long, and internationally renowned, history of 
enterprise, innovation and learning.”38 It also included a section on teaching Scottish 
history—as part of choices in education and declared that Scotland has a “proud history 
of technological and scientific advance(s).”39 Then, by 2007, the claims get more 
specific. First it explains why Scottish history matters in a classroom: “Scottish history, 
culture and heritage will be embedded in school life to provide a Scottish world view.”40  
And then it adds to the idea of historical importance in regard to identity as well as 
tourism: 
We will also do more to promote our distinctive national identity and attract 
tourists on a year-round basis. We will mobilise our national days - St Andrew's 
Day, Hogmanay and Burns Night - for the benefit of the Scottish economy by the 
promotion of a Scottish Winter Festival. As part of this we will make St Andrew's 
Day a full national holiday, celebrating the best of our traditional and 
contemporary culture.41   
 
 
36 SNP, “Scotland’s Party Manifesto for the Scotland’s Parliament 1999 Elections,” 22. 
37 SNP, “The Heart of the Manifesto,” 8. 
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39 Ibid., 13. 
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These statements are carefully crafted—there is nothing about bloodlines or lineage but 
rather holidays and building on the tourist economy. 
While the manifestos grew in specific historical claims and interests, the SNP was 
also working within its role as the opposition to point out issues pertaining to national 
historical claims.  In June of 2000 when the Parthenon Marbles were returned to Greece, 
Russell pointed out that Scotland had recently been given back the Stone of Destiny, and 
that “every piece of the British Museum’s collection need be returned” on the basis of 
taking others’ history.42  While this incident seems the most extreme, most of the other 
cases included the SNP drawing attention to UK lack of interest in Scottish holidays 
(such as only one UK embassy celebrating St. Andrews Day43 or no other party attending 
or supporting Tartan Day in the U.S.44) or the protection of dual identities as was the case 
when a UK loyalty oath was being suggested for incoming immigrants.45 
Arts and Culture 
Like language and history, arts and culture also had been a focus of the SNP in 
trying to define an inclusive, civic Scottish nationalism by way of policy and practice—
and the party’s positions on these topics also got more specific over its time in office.  In 
1999 the manifesto stated that the arts need to “reflect the needs and aspirations of people 
throughout Scotland” and the need to build an Academy of Scottish Traditional Music 
and Dance and a National Theatre for Scotland “when resources and demand permit.”46  
 
42 SNP, Press Release: 6 June 2000. SNP Press Releases: May to July 2000. NLS: PNR. SNP. 2000. 
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The party would emphasize this role for music in particular as it reviewed the first 
National Cultural Strategy in 2000.47  In 2001 the manifesto called for reform of the 
Scottish Arts Council in order to provide direct funding to national companies (and a new 
national theater), to establish a “Scottish Academy” to encourage excellence and increase 
funding for traditional Scottish arts—and the introduction of a Scottish lottery to provide 
money for such causes.48  By the 2003 manifesto an entire page was dedicated to culture 
and arts.  The section was mostly about involving artists in policy making and improving 
the relationships between arts companies and the government, but it also promised more 
arts education in schools and more promotion of culture and heritage in tourist adverts.  It 
was not without editorializing on the worth of Scottish culture, as it stated: “The SNP will 
work to develop and promote our unique and world-renowned culture. That means 
supporting the arts at the grassroots and on a national and international stage, and 
bringing a new impetus to the development of the arts in all corners of the country.”49 
Finally, by 2007 the policy was more streamlined and clearer—with specific emphasis on 
Scotland’s festivals (including Edinburgh’s Fringe Festival but also others), as well as the 
introduction of a tax break up to £15000 on artists’ work that they sell and the desire to 
increase more film expertise in Scotland (based on Irish and American policies).50 
 The final manifesto-worthy topic concerning national identity had to do with the 
internet as the SNP was able to assert that its interests in technology aligned well with 
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specific Scottish qualities an history.  In the 1999 Scottish manifesto the SNP introduced 
the Millennium Project—which was intended to give each Scottish school child an email 
address to be used each day and the building of a Scottish educational web site that 
reflected “the richness of Scottish life, history and culture.”51  In 2001, Kenny McAskill 
launched the “Dot Sco” project—which was aimed at getting Scotland its own internet 
identity so Scots would not have to “go through London.”52  Later that year the party 
manifesto would state that the SNP supported government support of a "dash for digital" 
to establish Scotland as a place in the forefront of technological development.”53  By 
2003 the SNP was already impatient with the Labour and Lib-Dem coalition in the 
Scottish Parliament declaring that it had delivered too little too late for rural access—
something that was already under way in Wales.54  Finally, by 2007, the SNP asserted 
itself in the role of government support, advocating for the launch of a Saltire Prize—
which would promote innovation and technology as the £5 million prize would 
“encourage and harness Scotland’s creative energy…[with the first prize aimed at] 
developing Scotland’s renewable generation capacity.”55 
The Saltire (flag) 
An issue most reflective of national identity included the flying of flags—and the 
Union Jack versus the Scottish Saltire.  This issue was not new to the SNP as party 
documents dating back to the 1950s had advocated for flying the Scottish flag on “purely 
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Scottish holidays like St. Andrews Day, Banockburn Day…as [recognition of] 
distinctively Scottish contribution(s) to British celebration.”56 While Stewart was writing 
in a period with no Scottish Parliament, the issue had more salience as the new 
parliament opened.  However, the SNP did not choose to make this a focal point in 
manifestos—and instead drew attention as needed via press releases. For example, the 
SNP pushed to define the national flag for the Scottish Parliament57 and to allow schools 
to fly the Saltire on St. Andrew’s Day.58 
 Though the general messaging and ideas behind them remained the same from the 
prior era of SNP development, the manifestos and press releases revealed a more specific 
approach to the expression of Scottish identity and nationalism as the SNP grew in its 
role as the opposition party in the Scottish Parliament. While the ideas did not change 
substantially, the specifics of the policy and the pressure points became more focused 
even in the first term of the Scottish Parliament especially in these areas in which the 
Parliament was granted competencies. Unfortunately for the SNP, the actual methods of 
opposing would not be resolved as readily. 
Consolidation of methods 
For the SNP in the period between 1999 and 2007, “methods” switched from the earlier 
questions concerning how to become an electoral presence to how to campaign at 
multiple levels, especially as an independence party in devolved elections, while also 
functioning as the official party in opposition at Holyrood.  There was a new option—a 
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majority at Holyrood—that had to be considered as a pathway to independence.  
Unfortunately, the party itself still remained unresolved, at least until 2003, on exactly 
how it would advocate for independence and what pathway it favored.  When 
campaigning, the party faced new challenges in needing to contextualize its independence 
position and to develop more nuanced and detailed policy positions given the newly 
devolved competencies—while still maintaining and developing positions relevant to 
policy questions in Westminster and Brussels.  Party leaders and officeholders had to 
contend with new institutional realities, most of which spelled more opportunity for the 
SNP.  They sought to establish norms at Holyrood while also looking to simultaneously 
expand the parliament’s power while limiting the executive’s power as it was held by 
their political rivals.  They also aimed to maintain consistent policy positions at 
Westminster and Brussels and to eliminate the redundancies of the Scotland Office. 
Lastly, the SNP had a relatively new but good problem to solve: how to attack Labour 
and the Tories in the Scottish context as now, unlike in Westminster elections, they were 
a realistic contender to be the party of government in Scotland.  On this point, the SNP 
drew attention to divides in Labour between Westminster and Holyrood while 
increasingly the Tories as anti-Scottish. 
Gradualism vs. Independence 
The 1999 election for the Scottish Parliament raised several questions about 
organization, communication, and party function.  On the one hand there was the issue of 
manifestos—and if the party should produce two separate ones: one on independence (to 




improve services and how it would position on other devolved policy areas).  This 
division was logical from a constitutional standpoint but a challenge politically, and in 
the end the SNP produced an independence manifesto too late—which ultimately allowed 
opponents to attack it for lacking one.  Additionally, there remained the internal problem 
of some leaders and members feeling the party had gone soft on independence (Lynch-
2013, 239) as it shifted its focus on governing potential and policy.  Some skeptics within 
the party, including former party leader Gordon Wilson, feared that the support for 
devolution and a Scottish Parliament was simply a career move—that it would allow SNP 
members a more realistic option of serving in public office as a long-term career (Wilson-
2015, 44-45) but at the cost of sacrificing the prominence of the independence platform.   
Wilson, in particular, would object to the party’s new position—and he took the 
internal disputes public with an article in The Sunday Times in January of 2000 when he 
wrote that the party was no longer “radical”—a word that was often used in the 1980s 
and early 1990s by party leadership to describe SNP positions.  Wilson had choice words: 
“in many respects it (the SNP) is undergoing a modernization process alarmingly similar 
to that of new Labour.  …The grassroots membership was not happy to see national 
freedom relegated to 10th place in the Scottish Parliament election” (Wilson-2015, 
quoting his 9 Jan. 2000 article, 60).  At a March 2000 National Council meeting the 
debate was open: whether independence would be achieved via a clear electoral mandate 
or via referendum.  Those, like Wilson, taking the first position argued that the election of 
a majority of SNP parliamentarians—either at Westminster or Holyrood—would mean 




that independence should be put to a referendum.  In the end, the “gradualists” won again 
meaning the support for a referendum outnumbered the “radical” position of immediate 
independence by a vote of 158 to 63 (Wilson-2015, 64).  Then in September of 2000 the 
agenda was set for the for Annual Conference—and included a discussion of a pathway 
to independence via referendum.59 
However, Salmond stepped down as party leader, and the open debate for his 
successor included continued discussions about the relationship between devolution and 
independence.  Swinney essentially campaigned on the position that a Scottish Parliament 
was “only a start” and the need to grow towards independence (Wilson-2015, 69) 
whereas Alex Neil, his chief competitor, advocated the position that independence would 
be achieved through any SNP electoral majority (either at Holyrood or in the Scottish 
seats at Westminster)—and not a referendum. In short, the debate at the National Council 
meeting earlier that year did not end the discussion. 
It would be Swinney’s selection as leader and his 2003 reforms that put to rest 
this question of how independence and devolution fit together. Through a process of 
proposals and internal debates, the party changed it stated aims from “self-government” 
to independence as the newly issued membership cards and amended party constitution 
read:   
2(a) Independence for Scotland; this is the restoration of Scottish national 
sovereignty by restoration of full powers to the Scottish Parliament, so that its 
authority is limited only by the sovereign power of the Scottish people to bind it 
with a written constitution and by such agreements as it may freely enter with 
other nations or states or international organisations for the purpose of furthering 
 




international cooperation, world peace and the protection of the environment. 
(from Lynch-2013, 256-7). 
 
In short, the party now recognized formally, and using language similar to past 
constitutional aims, that the goal of the party remained independence in the form of full 
sovereignty.  While the 2005 manifesto emphasized the positive outcomes of 
independence—such as a bigger voice in Europe—it did not advocate for how 
independence would be achieved.  However, in the opening message of the 2007, the 
path was clearly defined via Salmond’s position and return to leadership: “We are 
working hard to earn the trust and support of the people of Scotland and we will trust 
Scots to take the decision on Scotland’s future in an independence referendum. The 
choice will be yours. That is the fair and democratic way.”60  Given that the 2007 Scottish 
election was the first time the SNP would be running with a clear ambition to be in 
government (featuring Salmond as running for the First Minister of Scotland), the clarity 
of what they would do in terms of independence was important.  This notion of a separate 
independence referendum would be clearly stated hereafter—and was eventually held in 
2014. 
Campaigning 
Adding a new level of elections meant closer attention to how independence 
should be contextualized under specific conditions.  At the local level, manifestos 
emphasized the notion of democracy and internationalism as well as protection of 
language and culture.  At national level the SNP initially blamed England, and later the 
 




UK, for the problems faced by Scotland as a region and Scots as a people.  For European 
elections, the context of independence in Europe continued, though it was not always 
emphasized as much as what the SNP had been able to accomplish in regard to fisheries 
and other EU areas of concern.  Now, in devolved elections, opponents attacked the SNP 
for trying to hide its separatist agenda—as it focused on government and devolved 
powers and tried to show capability at this new level of governance.  In short: 
 This paradox is central to the SNP’s history and development. If it was merely a 
national movement seeking independence, then fighting every election as the 
independence election would make some kind of sense.  However, fighting as a 
political party to win power in the Scottish Parliament necessitated a whole range 
of detailed policies to attract support. (Lynch-2013, 240). 
 
The party had to make room—both ideologically and literally—in campaign materials for 
policy stances and clarity.  In doing so, “independence” and “nation” would gradually be 
on the decline.  Looking comparatively at Scottish Parliamentary campaigns from 1999-
2007, the SNP emphasized independence the most in 2003 and then the least in 2007—
when it was trying to sort out how to present Salmond for First Minister. (See Table 5.1) 
The manifestos got gradually wordier (14,411 words in 1999; 20,232 in 2003 and then 
22,714 in 2007) reflecting that more content was the best way to advertise party positions 
and policies.  Likewise, “nation” was emphasized most in 2003, but it was not as 





Election Pages Word count “nation” independence 







29 10,487 8 30 
First line. “We stand for 
independence.” 
Eight times on first page. 





24 2,697 10 12 
Opening statement (“And we will 
always argue the case for Scottish 
independence.”) 
Average once per 2.4 pages. 
9; back 
cover 




42 14,411 15 35 
Not in table of contents. 
In opening message (“potential of 
independence” and referendum) 
mentions sep. doc on econ case. 






33 20,232 48 37 
Pg. 2 (“and to show why we need the 
powers of independence” and three 
other times); not in Table of Contents 






76 22,714 28 18 
Tof C;  in opening statement about 
referendum 




       
1999 EU 14 n/a n/a 16 “Better off in the UK?” sidebars. Average over 1 per page. covers 
2004 EU 36 5,605 7 18 
On pg 2 (“Discover how independence 
in Europe…) Average 1 per page that 
has text.  
10 
Table 5.1: Use of “Nation” and “Independence” in SNP manifestos: 1999-200761 
 
The presence of these terms and their relative context reveal an internal 
accommodation to the system in which the SNP was operating.  Had the party been 
willing to continue Wilson’s “radical” positioning (which included independence as the 
party’s primary purpose), these elections would have been considerably harder to contest.  
Instead, in adapting to the gradualist position of accepting a referendum as a pathway to 






framed as a democratic process rather than something done abruptly by the party winning 
electoral seats.  In doing so, the SNP ensured that a vote for it in an election did not mean 
an immediate vote for independence.  And while the party’s internal debates and 
manifestos were revealing of this internal accommodation by the party to the system by 
softening its rhetoric, the party’s methods in terms of how it utilized institutions also 
were forms of accommodating its strategies to the system. 
Working within Institutions of Government 
 
Now that the SNP had access to four different levels of government, the party 
made adjustments as it began to work within the newest institution.  By 1999, working at 
the local, Westminster, and European levels had all been in place for decade; therefore, 
the biggest change, was adding the Scottish level of governance—which meant the SNP 
was also present at the start of the institution and could influence the establishment of 
institutional norms.  However, the SNP also needed to post more candidates than ever 
before.  Therefore, the SNP had several decisions to make with regards to its methods 
and institutions: how to work within Holyrood to establish norms and set precedents for 
how the parliament would work in the future; how to deal with the new constitutional 
realities of being split between Holyrood, Westminster, Brussels and local councils, what 
should be done with the now seemingly redundant Scotland Office, and finally how to 
deal with the other parties, especially Labour and the Tories, now that the SNP was 






Scottish Parliament (Holyrood) 
Once seated as the party of opposition in 1999, the SNP was able to challenge 
certain aspects of institutional norms and designs.  For this task, the SNP had to balance 
somewhat conflicting positions. First, the SNP desired as much strength as possible in the 
Scottish Parliament; thus, they almost immediately began drawing attention to the 
flexibility of the devolution agreement as they sought the expansion of parliamentary 
powers even as they continued to support full independence.  The SNP almost 
immediately pushed for the devolution of Scottish broadcasting rights and potential fiscal 
powers (neither of which was included in the devolution agreement).  
 Simultaneously with seeking to expand the institutional powers, the SNP was 
trying to contain the influence and power of the sitting larger parties in power—namely 
Labour.  Thus, the first few years of the Scottish Parliament (1999-2003) saw the SNP 
both making pronouncements about the potential of expanding power at Holyrood while 
also filing grievances to the media regarding the larger parties seeming overuse of power 
and resources—especially by Labour as it sat in the new role of the Scottish Executive.  
Therefore, they questioned cabinet reshufflings, potential cuts to the number of MSPs, 
administrative details of elections, and the overextension of executive influence in certain 
appointments. 
Beyond these moments of institutional questions, the SNP had to function as the 
parliamentary opposition—posing questions, formulating policy positions, participating 
in debates, and writing letters—all considerably typical tasks for a political party but now 




SNP’s first-time officeholders (as were most of its SMPs in 1999).  Lastly, Donald 
Dewar, the First Minister of Scotland, died in October of 2000, shortly after the 
parliament had opened—creating a need for a new FM and a process that would launch 
the SNP into a frenzy surrounding how the new parliament should work and how it was 
missing elements of democracy. 
Within the Scottish Parliament, the SNP was able to both proceed as any party 
would in opposition while also raising institutional questions.  The SNP mainly focused 
on questions to the Scottish executive and policy debates in addition to letter writing 
(particularly to ministers and other officials.). Right from the beginning, Salmond 
prepared his party for its role in opposition, telling the party conference in September 
1999 that he had three goals as the leader: to make sure the executive’s errors do not fall 
on the heads of parliament, to hold the executive accountable, and to work towards an 
independent parliament with full powers.62  With these aims in mind, the SNP 
immediately began demanding speedier responses from the executive on posted 
questions63 and challenging First Minister Donald Dewar on an early executive memo 
that that would “constrain the ability of parliamentary committees to question 
ministers.”64  
 In these nascent years of the Scottish Parliament, issues which were covered by 
devolved powers, such as education, would be the greatest focus: thus, as an example, the 
SNP exerted substantial effort in the media to draw attention to the exam scoring crisis in 
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Scotland in the summer of 2000.  In short, 5,000 students who still needed exam results 
for university acceptances were still waiting results at the end of August—as the 
university terms loomed.  Results were delayed in the first place, beginning on August 
11th but by the 18th, the 5,000 students still had no results.  Between Aug. 18 and 23rd, the 
SNP sent three press releases on the topic (one on the 11th that called for the Education 
Minister, Sam Galbraith, to be sacked due to the incomplete tests results; one that 
established the number of students at 5,000 on the 18th; and one on acceptance rates being 
down 6.6% on 23 August).65  However, after that, there were 11 more releases regarding 
the exams crisis released between the end of August and the end of October.66  Having 
seized upon a failure of leadership and the effectiveness of the Scottish education system, 
the SNP sought to draw significant attention to the need for change.  For the SNP the lead 
voice was Shadow Minister of Education Nicola Sturgeon who started calling for an 
emergency debate in the Scottish Parliament as of 30 August and then a full debate on the 
31st.  When Tony Blair defended Galbraith and said the blame rested with local officials, 
Sturgeon continued to call for Galbraith’s resignation.  Eventually, Salmond sent a letter 
to Galbraith.67 By 25 September, a Scotsman poll found that 53% of those polled wanted 
Galbraith removed;68 then, by the end of October, Russell was commenting to the press 
and mentioned the “former Education Minister.”69  There was no celebration of 
Galbraith’s eventual sacking; merely a move on to other issues. 
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While even fewer press releases focused on institutional practices over time, there 
were a few themes that emerged in moments of particularly high volume of saliency. In 
late November 2001 there was a cabinet reshuffle.  The Scottish Executive, under a 
Labour and Liberal Democrat coalition, decided to split lifelong learning and enterprise 
while getting rid of a Minister for the Highlands and Islands.  On these two points the 
SNP objected (25 Nov. and 29 Nov., respectively), calling the entire reshuffle an attempt 
at “settling scores.”70 
There were similar short considerations with regards to the number of MSPs in 
March of 2002—in preparations from the 2003 Scottish elections—as well as how 
elections in general were managed and timed.  The SNP MPs published a submission to 
the Scotland Office on the number of MSPs and how the numerical and geographical 
arrangements should be passed on to Scottish Parliament.71  Throughout August of 1999, 
there was a fair number of releases concerning the date of the upcoming Hamilton by-
election and the SNP being frustrated with the timing being controlled by Labour—
charging it is an issue of patronage.  Later, in October of 1999, the SNP press releases 
drew attention to 2000 missing votes—and SNP demanding they be counted (even 
though it was already their victory). Finally, in terms of electoral structures, the SNP had 
two main positions. First, they opposed moving local elections to the same time as 
Scottish Parliamentary elections—saying such a change would displace local issues with 
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a national agenda.72 Then, in 2003, after Labour and the Liberal Democrats had won 
control of the Scottish executive again, the SNP called for electoral reforms based on low 
election turnout for the Scottish elections—and desiring proportional representation in 
local elections in 2007 in order to have designs be like the Scottish Parliamentary election 
process.73   
While all these topics—normal opposition and objections to some structural 
elements—were of consideration at points, there was greater attention paid to how 
appointments were made and how to protect devolved powers while also seeking to 
expand them.  In the case of appointments, most of the SNP’s concerns were about 
protecting a democratic process and maintaining objectivity in bodies aimed at watching 
over the executive.  For example, the SNP complained that the Water Industry 
Commissioner position should be appointed by Parliament and not the Executive—since 
its role was to criticize the executive.74 Similarly, Russell commented on the appointment 
of James Boyle as Chairman of the Scottish Arts Council: he welcomed the 
announcement but questioned the process—merely saying it should be more democratic 
to select the role of chairman.75  Later in 2001, Swinney pointed out that the Deputy 
Presiding Officer, a position that is supposed to, according to Swinney, protect 
impartiality, should not be appointed directly by the executive.76  Finally, for a period in 
February of 2002, the SNP was focused on the appointment of independent assessors 
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because the process was not public as First Minister Jack McConnell “only asked 
friends” to fill the role and never posted the jobs fully.77 Likewise, Alex Neil was still 
pushing the issue later in the month—writing a letter of protest that the opposition was 
never asked to submit names for Independent Assessors.78  And, finally, there were also 
calls in 2002, by Fiona Hyslop, for Parliamentary Aides to resign from committees 
because they owe their job to the executive (who had appointed them all) and should be 
neutral.79  
And yet, while trying to challenge expansions of executive power, the SNP was 
also expending energy protecting the powers of the new parliament and establishing law 
as an area of devolved competencies.  In July 2000, Roseanna Cunningham pointed out 
that U.K. Home Secretary Jack Straw announced the new “Hooligan Bill” but failed to 
mention that Scotland has a separate criminal justice system.  She commented, “Both 
Tony Blair and Jack Straw have shown that they simply don’t understand the realities of 
having different criminal justice systems in the UK”80 and should have had Scotland’s 
government involved in process of designing the new bill.  Later, in 2003, at the creation 
of the U.K. Supreme Court, Sturgeon, now Shadow Justice Minister in Scotland, raised 
concerns about the “repatriation” of Scottish justice—that the appeal should be for civil 
cases but not criminal since the criminal code in Scotland is separate from the rest of the 
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Meanwhile, virtually from the opening of the Parliament, the SNP was pushing 
for increased powers and often explicitly stating the expansion of power was a route to 
independence.  In the party’s manifesto for the first Scottish elections in 1999, there was 
one direct mention of how the parliament was limited in power: “By definition,” the 
manifesto read in bolded script, “a devolved Parliament is limited in what it can do.”82 
Other parts of the manifesto mentioned that environmental policy has not fully been 
devolved and that the SNP would seek greater powers for the Parliament for cargo 
licensing and that transport costs in the Highlands and Islands.83  However, nowhere in 
the manifesto does it state directly a call for expanded powers—with that lone exception 
of cargo licensing.  Yet, speaking in early January of 2000, Salmond said his aims were 
“Building the Party, building the Parliament, and building towards Scottish independence 
are the SNP’s welcome tasks in the months ahead.”84  The SNP later in February was 
quick to publicize a BBC Radio Scotland poll that showed “two-thirds” of Scots want the 
Scottish Parliament to have more powers—and that 74% think the Scottish Parliament 
will matter more than Westminster.85  Likewise, Swinney drew attention to comments by 
the leader of the Liberal Democrats, Jim Wallace, who said he expected the Scottish 
Parliament to grow in powers over time.86  Finally, Salmond commented on Gordon 
Brown’s statement that the “Scottish Parliament should be happy with its powers;” 
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Salmond’s press release stated that the Scottish people should decide that issue—and that 
Brown failed to see “that the process of constitutional change and the march towards 
independence in Scotland goes hand in hand with social justice for all.”87   
At the same time there were limited calls for actual expansion of competencies 
(other than broadcasting and fiscal powers which will be addressed) in the party’s 
relations with the press: the two exceptions were a call in 2000 for a “more ambitious 
external affairs policy for Scotland” in light of, in the opinion of the SNP, a lack of 
Scottish Government strategy heading into the EU summit at Nice.88  In December 2001, 
a single press release with a statement by Michael Matheson, SNP MSP for Central 
Scotland, called for legislation on human cloning to be devolved, but there were no 
further mentions of the topic following this initial release.89  
In the party manifestos from 2001-2007 for the U.K. and Scottish elections, the 
SNP continued to either hint at or state directly a need for more powers at Holyrood.  In 
the 2001 “Heart of the Manifesto” for the General Election, the SNP called for the control 
of the housing benefit to be devolved as well as issues of equality. The manifesto also 
declared that a vote for the SNP was “a vote to win more powers for the Scottish 
parliament.”90  
By the 2003 Scottish election, the SNP messaging on this point was far clearer: 
there was an entire section of the manifesto on “prosperity” and it contained four key 
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points. First, for the SNP, it was “our duty” to make Parliament work better on a number 
of key issues (among them the economy, crime, poverty, education and health) by 
“giving it powers” in these areas.91  Next, there was little to do about the economy 
because “At the moment the Scottish Parliament can do little to change” it; likewise, the 
“single core problem facing the Scottish economy” was “the limited powers of the 
Scottish Parliament.92  And, finally, the SNP maintained that the “full powers of 
independence” would be the only way to build long-term economic growth.93  This 2003 
manifesto used the notion of “limited” in the context of the Scottish Parliament on six 
different occasions throughout its discussion—including those mentioned above as well 
as the opening lines of the manifesto about “being honest about what we can’t do within 
the limited powers of the Scottish Parliament” being limited on transport policy, and the 
extensive limitations on external relations.94  Then the 2005 General Election manifesto 
made no mention of these types of issues, and the 2007 Scottish election manifesto only 
followed this train of thought on limited powers in one case: budget maneuvering, though 
it also called for more power for the Parliament in creating an independent civil service, 
policing firearms, and in broadcasting.95  Yet, even as the SNP prepared for the 2007 
Scottish elections, Salmond declared in the last minutes of the PEB, “It is time for a 
parliament with real power” suggesting this item had never been fully removed from the 
agenda.96 
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 As had been the case throughout the SNP’s history, Scottish Broadcasting 
remained a focal point—now with the end goal of devolving broadcasting powers.  The 
1999 party manifesto had a lengthy section on how “the current government refuses to 
allow Scots control over broadcasting” and how the SNP would establish a broadcasting 
committee in Parliament but the emphasis, created by larger and bolded text, was on 
independence and the creation of “autonomous broadcasting institutions.”97 Almost 
immediately after the parliament opened, Russell was drawing attention to the topic as 
situations arose.  First, in December of 1999, he was the key spokesperson in a press 
release that called for “a new vision of Scottish Broadcasting,” and that companies should 
challenge at the local, national, and international to push Scottish interests in this way.  
He went on to declare: 
The devolution of broadcasting powers to the Scottish Parliament is of vital 
importance because it would allow the Scottish Parliament to create a modern, 
forward looking broad structure. Simply replicating the old fashioned British 
institutions on a Scottish basis would merely delay the seemingly inevitable 
elimination of those institutions.  Scotland has to think ahead and I’m sure the 
Parliament would live up to its reputation as being innovative and ambitious if it 
was to succeed quickly in getting powers over broadcasting.98  
 
He then added, in addition, that the current situation “holds back Scottish talent.”99  Later, 
in February of 2000, Russell would blame the BBC and New Labour for preventing 
Scottish broadcasting from being devolved; in the press releases, he again spoke strongly 
saying, “The BBC are being pressured by UK Labour ministers to prevent broadcasting 
in Scotland from being devolved.  Tony Blair and his cronies believe that this will lead to 
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a growing demand for Scottish control over Scottish affairs.”  He went on to cite “opinion 
polls” that showed “overwhelming levels of support” in Scotland to replace London-
based coverage with more local work.  He finished saying, “The SNP, the Lib Dems, all 
the key Scottish groups, Scottish broadcasters, BBC staff—and even the Tories—are 
supportive of giving BBC Scotland far more independence.” 100  The following spring, 
Russell spoke in a keynote debate at the 21st Celtic Film and Television Festival in 
Aberystwyth saying that broadcasting powers may be the first transferred from 
Westminster to the Scottish Parliament: “The devolution settlement is capable of moving 
to independence, and accruing additional powers on the way.  Broadcasting could and 
should be at the forefront of this process, so that Scotland can have a distinctive window 
on the wider world.”101 When the Government Communications White Paper was 
published, Russell again commented, as he said he welcomed it regarding thoughts on 
modern broadcasting but that it failed to address the key issue of ensuring the Scottish 
broadcasting has its own distinct identity and agenda. He felt there were  
no provisions to help maintain and increase the level of Scottish media ownership, 
which is vital to ensure a balanced and appropriate broadcasting and news agenda 
in Scotland.  The bottom line is that until the Scottish Parliament get the power to 
regulate and address broadcasting, issue and problems such as this cannot be 
properly addressed.102  
 
The SNP manifesto for the General Election in 2001 emphasized this need as 
well: calling for the devolution of broadcasting including both the budget and schedule of 
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BBC Scotland.103 When there was limited progress in this regard, Russell continued to 
champion the position, as in October of 2001 when he again called for devolved 
broadcasting over fears that STV and Grampian would be forced to reduce local outputs 
as result of lost advertising revenue since 9/11.104  After 2001, however, the press 
releases did not mention expansion of devolved powers—but they did continue to point 
out inconsistencies of coverage and lack of balance with regard to covering Scottish 
issues and officials. (See section on “Increase Exposure.”).  While the party manifestos in 
1999, 2001, and 2003 all mention greater control of broadcasting being transferred to the 
Scottish Parliament, the 2005 General Election manifesto did not discuss it; however, the 
2007 Scottish election manifesto had a complete section (albeit on page 56 of a 76-page 
long manifesto) and a clear vision, stating: “Broadcasting Scotland needs a dedicated 
news service and more quality programming made in Scotland. An SNP government will 
push for the devolution of broadcasting powers to the Scottish Parliament.”105  
Besides broadcasting, another potential area for greater devolution was fiscal 
powers; however, unlike broadcasting, the call for greater fiscal powers had changing 
tones and messaging. In 1999, the party manifesto referred, three times, to “fiscal power” 
as only being possible via independence.  In 2001, there was no mention of fiscal powers 
as a whole—though there was a call to devolve control of housing benefits and the BBC 
Scotland budget. In that same year, there were a couple of press releases emphasizing the 
same point, but they were prior to the election and did not seem to carry much sway in 
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shaping party priorities.106 Yet, by 2003, the entire opening “prosperity” section of the 
manifesto mentioned the need for Parliament to have fiscal powers, and the 2005 
manifesto made no mention before the 2007 manifesto acknowledged that “At present the 
Scottish Parliament does not have the fiscal powers to deliver this (policy for artists) 
directly,” but instead offered, in several specific examples how the SNP would manage 
the Scottish budget—a clear shift from grievances about budget and fiscal limitations.107  
Yet in the 2007 PEB, Salmond said, “for Scotland to flourish, our economy must be free 
from London control.”108  
Finally, in terms of working within the institutions of the Scottish Parliament, the 
death of First Minister Donald Dewar in mid-October of 2000 led to the need for a 
leadership selection process. In a series of press releases in October Swinney and 
Salmond both voiced their concerns that the selection was too quick (Swinney, 19th), only 
by a limited number of people (Swinney, 19th), and should not be picked in the same 
manner as business is conducted at Westminster because it is “so obscure it almost defies 
belief” (Salmond, 22nd).  While the SNP was unable to change the pattern established by 
the leadership, their key talking points in the press certainly focused on the lack of 
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The EU and Westminster 
 In addition to designing their methods for participating in the Scottish Parliament, 
the SNP had to work out how to navigate multi-level governance with the EU, 
Westminster, and the Scotland Office.  While working with the EU had been part of the 
party’s normal procedures since the late 1970s, the addition of the Scottish Parliament 
meant that some devolved competencies overlapped with EU policy.  Therefore, the SNP 
pushed for more direct Scottish representation in Brussels while simultaneously 
advocating for independence in Europe—with the aim of holding seats on the Council 
and in the Commission.  With Westminster, the key issue seemed to be the protection of 
devolved areas but also working out how Westminster officials would work in relation to 
Scotland. One unresolved issue was if the Scottish Parliament could require Westminster 
ministers or civil servants to appear in Holyrood for questions.  Finally, with regard to the 
Scotland Office, the SNP maintained that this office was no longer needed now that 
Scotland had its own parliament. Besides pointing to fiscal redundancies and a London 
bias of the officials in the Scotland Office, the SNP also objected to all three Scottish 
Secretaries appointed between 1999 and 2007 based on each person’s prior record in not 
supporting devolution or outwardly attacking the SNP and its positions on independence. 
With regard to the EU, the SNP had three main focuses: first to continue 
establishing strong connections to the EU while increasing Scotland’s influence on policy 
(in the face of being pushed to the side by Westminster) and drawing attention to the 
Scottish Executive’s lack of participation in the EU processes. Second, they used 




proceedings.  Finally, they continued to discuss the merits of “independence in Europe” 
and at times displayed their commitment to the European Project, including support for 
joining the Euro and supporting the efforts to write a new constitution in 2002.  
With the aim of keeping Scotland closely tied to Europe and the EU, the SNP was 
pleased with the creation of a Scottish House in Brussels110 and the official recognition 
given to the Scottish Parliament111 but remained frustrated by the lack of Scottish 
Executive involvement in Europe—especially with regards to regional funds and fisheries 
policy.  On this second point, the SNP had a range of grievances.  For example, in 
November of 1999 the SNP sought to push a story to the press about how Scotland lost 
out on new Objective 2 (regional structural funds provided by the EU) because of the 
Treasury rules. In this case, the grievance was more with Westminster than the Scottish 
Parliament as the issue at hand was whether the structural fund affected overall spending 
(with the SNP arguing they do not) and that Scotland was “not getting its full 
entitlement” from the EU.  Yet, two days later, the SNP celebrated the opening of the 
Scottish House in Brussels.  Although pleased that it was “a step towards better 
representation,” the SNP’s Ian Hudghton, MEP, stated, “The SNP is determined to ensure 
that Scotland’s elected representatives have the platform necessary to speak with a 
strong, unified voice in Europe.”112  Later the same month, the SNP press releases 
focused on a push to get Scotland more control over fisheries via European discussions—
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this perspective included a call for a full account of Scottish Fisheries Minister in 
European Fisheries Council meeting in Luxembourg as he supposedly described fishing 
as “boring.”113  The SNP could present itself as protecting a vital Scottish industry both 
with interest and experience, as Ewing had been working on behalf of Highlands and 
Islands in the European Parliament for two decades by 1999.   
Besides policy areas, there was also general concern about the lack of engagement 
by the Scottish Executive in European Affairs.  In November of 1999, the SNP press 
release entitled “SNP Reveal Executive Non-Attendance in Europe” emphasized that 
there was no Scottish presence at 29 of 30 European Council meetings.114  A year later, 
the SNP drew attention to the same theme: this time citing that Scottish Government 
Ministers attended 9% of 103 EU Council of Ministers meetings.115  Eventually, in 2001, 
the SNP set up a formal external affairs investigation into the lack of Scottish Executive 
engagement in the EU.116  
In addition to pointing out lack of attendance by Scottish officials, the SNP also 
frequently pointed to individual EU summits as examples of further lack of Scottish 
representation in the Europe.  Whether calling for a more ambitious external affairs 
policy for Scotland while citing a lack of Scottish Government strategy for the EU 
summit in Nice117 or using the same summit to boost the independence argument by 
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saying that Scotland would have more votes if it were its own country in the EU,118 the 
SNP messaging on EU summits was quite consistent.  In March of 2001, the SNP again 
pushed independence in Europe—pointing to how Scotland was not represented at the 
European Council meeting in Stockholm on economic reform119 and again the following 
year when an EU meeting was held in Seville.120 
Besides pointing to these moments where Scotland should use its existing 
representation in Europe better while also pushing for more via independence, the SNP 
also consistently showed support for ongoing European integration.  In November of 
1999 Salmond said the “Sterling is a millstone around Scotland’s neck”—and went on to 
espouse the virtues of the Euro.121  A year later, Neil MacCormick wrote to First Minister 
Henry McLeish about a Herald newspaper report that the UK was opposing a Belgian 
proposal at Nice for devolved administrations to have direct access to the European Court 
of Justice.122  In part because they learned of this key proposal via the media rather than 
government channels but also due to the nature of the proposal, the SNP asserted that 
London was trying to block Scottish EU powers by planning to oppose.123  Similarly, 
when Robin Cook, the Labour Foreign Secretary, remarked that an independent Scotland 
would keep its EU membership, a change from past claims that Scotland would have to 
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re-apply,124 Salmond wrote Blair to draw attention to the claim and ensure it was on a 
public record.125  Lastly, the SNP backed both a call for a new constitution126 and a new 
EU referendum on that constitution127 in continued support for the European project and 
Scottish involvement in it. 
In addition to trying to work through Scottish government relations with Europe, 
the SNP was also, especially as the opposition party and a historically minor one at that, 
trying to protect the powers of the Scottish Parliament against encroachment by 
Westminster while also simultaneously trying to establish norms for inter-governmental 
relations.  On the first point, there were three key moments of clarity in which the SNP 
pointed to Westminster’s heavy handedness in Scottish politics. The first incident, which 
was already discussed, was the staging the of the Mike Tyson boxing fight in 2000.  The 
SNP was “outraged” when Scotland on Sunday revealed that Home Secretary Jack Straw 
held secret meetings with the Tyson team.128  The next day at Holyrood the SNP Shadow 
Justice and Equality Minister Roseanna Cunningham moved to discuss the Tyson fight at 
Hampden Stadium—with the aim of not allowing the fight.129  The discussion was tabled 
and the follow-up press release said that Mary Mulligan, Scottish Labour’s Convener of 
the Education, Culture, and Sport committee—believed that Straw awarding Tyson a visa 
as an “undemocratic move” and called on the Scottish Executive to ensure that Tyson not 
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be on Scottish television. 130  In the entire scenario, the SNP was trying to be sure that due 
process was followed in allowing the newly devolved government more participation in a 
process that directly impacted Scotland. 
In a similar vein, the SNP pointed out in 2002 that the Scottish Parliament had 
passed more Sewel Motions (permission for the U.K. Parliament to legislate on devolved 
issues) than actual bills, and SNP’s Fiona Hyslop as Shadow Minister for Parliamentary 
Business suggested this statistic revealed the extent to which the Scottish Parliament “is 
still being controlled by Westminster.”131 Similar points were made in regard to a trade 
emissions deal in February 2002 when the SNP press release headline read “Westminster 
is trying to steal powers from the Scottish Parliament through the backdoor; Scottish 
Ministers must develop Scottish solutions to Scottish Problems”132 and again in 2003 
when Annabelle Ewing, SNP’s spokesperson on Westminster Home Affairs, asserted that 
the government violated its own concordat by not consulting the Scottish Executive and 
needed to give prior notification on a devolved competency.133  
However, while these concerns about Scottish Parliamentary power were talking 
points, a true procedural question had to be answered: could the Scottish Parliament call 
upon Westminster officials in order to respond to questions.  In May of 2000 Gordon 
Brown refused to be in front of Scottish Parliament regarding Structural Funds questions 
which led John Swinney, SNP’s Deputy Leader, to comment in the press that London “is 
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treating the Parliament with contempt” and is “trying to undermine the effectiveness of 
the Parliament.”134  At the same time, Alasdair Morgan, MSP and Shadow Rural Affairs 
Minister, was railing in the press that Nick Brown, the UK Agriculture Minister, did not 
let the Scottish Rural Affairs Minister, Ross Finnie, know that Scottish farmers had been 
sold genetically modified seed for over a month.135 A few weeks later the SNP would be 
calling Nick Brown to appear before Scottish committees.136  This latter situation led 
Salmond to make lengthy comments to the media regarding UK cabinet ministers and the 
repeated notion of “treating the Scottish Parliament with contempt.”137   
In short, this question of appearances and providing information was a key 
institutional question as the 1998 Scotland Act Section 23 clearly stated that the Scottish 
Parliament has the power to “require any person (a) to attend its proceedings for the 
purpose of giving evidence, or (b) to produce documents in his custody or under his 
control, concerning any subject for which any member of the Scottish Government has 
general responsibilities.138  Yet, according to the popular media, “The Scottish Parliament 
has no powers to compel UK government ministers to attend its committees.”139 
Therefore, the UK government continued to provide written evidence rather than 
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appearing in person. 
The Scotland Office 
In addition to addressing the relationships between Holyrood and Europe and 
Westminster, there was also the question of how the new Parliament would operate in 
relation to the long-standing Scotland Office—which have been the Office of the 
Secretary of State for Scotland since 1926 and had since been renamed after 1999 as “the 
Scotland Office.”  When the Scottish Parliament first was formed the SNP continually 
raised concerns about redundancies and expense.  Almost immediately the SNP was on 
the attack against John Reid, the Secretary of State for Scotland, and how that office 
would “play a diminishing and disappearing role in Scotland’s public life.”140 However, 
most of the SNP focus in this regard was in resistance to specific officeholders and the 
expense of maintaining the office.  For example, the SNP opposed the appointment of 
Brian Wilson because he had been opposed to devolution. Swinney stated that Wilson’s 
appointment was “Tony Blair’s reminder to the Scottish Executive, to ensure they don’t 
get ideas above their station.”141  The next winter the SNP was calling for the 
abolishment of the Scotland Office all together as the £17 million could be put to better 
use.142 In May of 2000 the SNP was pressing for the office to be scrapped.143 Pressure 
increased in June as Salmond commented on Reid having admitted there was an 
argument for him to appear before Scottish Parliament committees—and then Reid “u-
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turned” and Salmond went on a familiar tirade: 
John Reid and his sidekick Brian Wilson are ministers without real jobs. They are 
using public money to attack the SNP, which all that they seem to do these days, 
but don’t have the guts to face questioning by Scottish Parliament members. Reid 
is clearly running scared of Scotland’s new democracy. …His conduct is 
unacceptable and must be brought to an end by the irrelevant Scotland Office 
being abolished before the General Election.144  
 
Almost as predicted, in July, Swinney commented about an increase in staffing at the 
Scotland Office: “Labour Party electioneering on the public purse in Scotland is 
unacceptable and undemocratic and must be brought to an end by the burgeoning 
Scotland Office being abolished before the General Election.”145 Somewhat predictably, 
the SNP opposed the appointment of Helen Liddell to Scottish Secretary. The initial press 
release on the issue stated that the position was now irrelevant and how she was “air-
brushed out of Labour’s election in 1999, because her ‘nat bashing’ campaign became an 
embarrassment.  She has been sent to Scotland once again to attack the SNP on the public 
purse and will be just as big a failure this time around.”146  Later that year, when the 
Scotland Office was moved to Dover House in London, the SNP commented again on the 
position’s lack of future and how the now £6 million budget was still too much.147  
With the move to Dover House, the SNP continued to question the role of 
Scottish Secretary.  In February of 2002, the SNP launched into a two-day press flurry 
demanding to see who Liddell was meeting (via her diary) because it was “a non-job” 
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(Wishart commenting on a Daily Telegraph article), and wanting to know who was 
paying for Liddell’s trip to campaign in Wales for Labour (Swinney).148 By May, Blair 
had fired several members of the Scotland Office, but Salmond complained that Blair had 
sacked “the wrong half”—and should end it entirely. (Blair had downgraded Liddell’s 
deputy to an under-secretary.)149 By the following year, Blair reshuffled again and did 
eliminate the Secretary of State for Scotland but there was no information on the duties of 
the alleged defunct Scotland Office—Swinney, as Shadow First Minister of Scottish 
Parliament, had to write to Blair about it, but there were no follow-up press releases on 
the matter.150  
Much like the questions about the costs of Liddell’s campaign trip, the SNP was 
quite focused on how the structures of current institutions favored the political 
positioning of its rivals.  Most notably, the SNP was concerned about expenses, the use of 
public office and supplies for electioneering, and absenteeism among the dual mandate 
MPs and SMPs, though there were also important incidents concerning political 
connections and government contracts or at least links between business and sitting 
Parliamentarians.  A particular scenario—concerning Beattie Media and its “special 
access” to Labour officials as well as large public contracts awarded them—led to 
Salmond calling for an emergency meeting to discuss the allegation of connections 
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between the Scottish Executive and Beattie Media.151  While there were no further press 
releases on the issue in 1999, there was follow up call in 2001 for Jack McConnell, then a 
candidate for Labour leader, to reveal customers as employee of Beattie Media to see 
about political patronage.  Especially since he was the only candidate, Roseanna 
Cunningham said the situation made the selection of leader “a joke.”152  
While that one media company and its connections drew SNP ire at points, the 
more common complaints filed by the SNP had to do with the politicization of the civil 
service and parliamentary committees as well as the use of office space and positions to 
run campaigns.  In the first case, Swinney drew attention in an October 2000 press 
release to the politicization of the civil service as he said the ‘Bringing Politics Back to 
the Heart of Government’ paper would appear to allow taxpayers’ resources to be used to 
support the Labour Parliamentary Group and gives Labour MSPs priority. The next day 
Swinney wrote to the head of the civil service (Sir Richard Wilson) calling on him to 
clarify whether McLeish’s proposal breached the civil service code.153  Within days 
Swinney was also commenting on how McLeish needed to respect the fact that 
committees are supposed to be non-partisan and that McLeish was repeatedly “preferring 
party first.”154  When the Daily Record reported that Labour party officials stopped Henry 
McLeish’s face being projected on the Edinburgh International Conference Centre at a 
Labour gala (last night)—which would have cost the taxpayer £2,000—the SNP referred 
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to the whole situation as a “stunt” that once again reflected the use of position for party 
purposes.155  
This theme of use of office for party benefits would appear in several press 
releases as the SNP attempted to draw public attention to the innate inequities in the 
existing institutions.  For example, there were accusations against McLeish that he was 
breaking parliamentary rules by using his publicly funded Fife office as an official 
headquarters for the local Labour Party.156  The accusations eventually led to Swinney 
calling for McLeish to resign because he had broken the public trust.157 Then, before the 
2003 General Election, Hyslop attacked the Scottish Executive’s decision to employ 40 
new policy analysts with less than a year to go to the election and Labour was trying to 
write manifesto.  She felt it was a little too much of a coincidence to suddenly be 
employing these new policy analysts.158 Finally, the SNP would also object to Liddell 
“attacking the SNP” at the 10th anniversary of Scotland Europa.  Angus Robertson 
commented in the press release:  
With the SNP breathing down New Labour’s neck in the polls…Helen Liddell  
clearly feels that the SNP’s message is hitting home.  Otherwise she wouldn’t use 
the occasion of the 10th anniversary…to indulge in this feeble ‘nat-bashing’ paid 
for by the public purse.159  
 
Finally, there were cases of out-and-out coercion or corruption that the SNP was able to 
put on display to the public and draw media attention.  In February 2001, Swinney 
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pushed for Lord Chancellor Derry Irvine to lose his job given evidence in the newspapers 
that he was pressuring barristers to make a contribution to the Labour party in order to 
secure second terms.160 On another occasion Salmond wrote to John Ormerod, Managing 
Partner for Arthur Anderson, on “pro bono” economic policy work prepared for the 1997 
election.  The work had previously been denied but was documented in an autobiography 
by Geoffrey Robinson, the former paymaster general.161 Also Peter Wishart called on 
Blair to make Nigel Griffiths resign after revelations regarding found counts of misuse of 
House of Commons allowances.162  
However, nothing drew as much SNP attention as dual officeholders failing to 
complete the tasks required for both jobs. Given their ability to point to their strong 
records of attendance at both Westminster and Holyrood, the SNP went on the attack 
early in the first parliamentary session.  On 12 October 1999, a release discussed the 
complaint by Russell about the appointment of Joan Aitken to the new Prison Complaints 
Commission without any form of approval by MSPs.  He pointed to the cronyism of New 
Labour being “on show” as she had lost the election was being appointed to a high paying 
position in quango.  The following year, the SNP drew attention to the appointment of 
Esther Robinson to Chair of the Scottish Higher and Further Education Funding 
Council—yet there was no announcement on Executive web site (one paper did cover 
it—the Courier on 17 November), yet she already held another job—Chair of Fife Health 
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Board.  SNP MSP for Mid-Scotland and Fife, Tricia Marwick wanted to know if 
Robinson was going to be paid for both and how she would manage both sets of 
responsibilities.163 At other points, the SNP simply referred to “cronyism”—such as when 
“today’s figures” (which are not clearly identified but likely refer to a Parliamentary 
document) show that several Labour officials had not just one but two or three jobs—and 
thus the SNP tabled a question asking the Executive to list every one with more than one 
quango job and how much each is paid.164 These figures led to a new SNP leaflet against 
Labour cronyism: the pamphlet addressed fair voting in local elections, increased scrutiny 
of public appointments; democracy and open government; and the highest standards in 
public life.165  
Finally, the SNP was also attentive to misuse of local government funds and 
office as Labour had been relatively unchecked in a number of local councils.   For 
example, a Fife Council with SNP leaders on it blocked Gordon Brown from asking 
teachers to distribute letters supporting the Children’s Tax Credit.  John Mellon, SNP for 
Dunfermline East said that Brown was “trying to drag hard-pressed and hard-working 
teachers into New Labour’s election campaign.  …He should apologize to the 
teachers.”166 Not long afterward the SNP called for the Dundee City Lord Provost, Helen 
Wright to resign because she took money out of office’s petty cash to make church 
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donations. After responding to the accusations, she returned £247, but they still wanted 
her to resign.167 There were a few more similar events: protesting at the appointment of 
Hugh Henry to the Scottish Executive when he had a bad record on the Renfrew Council 
when public money went missing168 or denouncing “secret Labour and Tory” meetings of 
the Dundee City Council leading up to the budget169 because these meetings kept the 
council workings only between the two major parties rather than including the elected 
SNP officials. 
This opposition to the SNP as political actors was often turned on its head as the 
SNP grew to equate its political positions with Scottish interests.  When Blair, early in 
the first sitting of the Scottish Parliament, commented that the SNP wanted to “wreck” 
the Parliament, Russell responded quickly.170 He cited the notion of being in opposition 
and the importance of democratic process as well as the position that the SNP always 
spoke for Scotland the nation when it has been disparaged or ignored.  Few other 
examples from the 2000-2003 period included attention to the football development 
program which got increased funding in England while funding in Scotland remained the 
same.171 Likewise, there was a “Make your voice heard” campaign in England and Wales 
but not in Scotland—that was meant to inform voters on registration system. Tricia 
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Marwick, MSP (SNP’s business manager) wrote to Liddell demanding the campaign be 
in Scotland too.172 Similar spending complaints about the “Barnett squeeze” were 
repeated on 18 September 2000, 13 December 2000, and July 2002.  There were also 
concerns about domestic tourism ads173 and how university tuition, teachers’ pay, and 
elderly care could not be kept up due to the Barnett Squeeze—which meant that “public 
spending cannot increase at the same time as it does in England.”174 While these 
complaints were generally about Scotland as a whole and spending, the SNP also got 
more direct in this period (1999-2007) with regards to how it challenged its political 
rivals—especially with regards to how they framed the other parties’ intents. 
Messaging vs. other parties 
 
Finally, the SNP sought very specific new modes of attack versus its political 
rivals, especially now that the SNP was truly contesting every seat in Scotland at every 
level of governance.  Thus, in addition to attacking Labour in particular for being corrupt 
in using institutions and resources that were for public consumption for the party’s own 
good, the SNP also sought to draw attention to a seemingly increasing divide in the 
Labour Party between interests in Holyrood and policy demands from London. Likewise, 
the SNP, rather consistently, painted the Tories as anti-Scottish.   
Devolution simply meant a continuation of SNP grievances that the other 
parties—and Westminster at large—ignore Scottish interests; it provided the opportunity 
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for the SNP to equate itself with Scottish national interests.  For example, in February 
2001, in giving a detailed response to Tony Blair’s speech at Glasgow conference, the 
SNP publications office pointed out that he “didn’t mention Scotland once” and that 
“Scotland’s reality is local.” 175 Salmond would make similar claims in the SNP’s  2010 
General Election PEB as he talked about how the televised debates (to be held that night), 
would not be about Scotland: “None of it will apply to Scotland,” he said, but it will be 
about England and the “cozy Westminster parties…three London parties [that have] the 
same agenda.”176 
However, what did change with devolution was how the SNP was able to attack 
other parties—both on the basis of how they did their jobs and how they stood for 
Scotland.  For example, the SNP press releases in May 2001 cited “publish[ed] research” 
on Westminster participation which “expose[d] very poor participation levels for many 
New Labour and Liberal Democrats MPs.” Salmond said, “The fact that the SNP’s six 
MPs have the best six records out of all the dual mandate members conclusively proves 
that we are the true champions of Scotland at Westminster.”177 Just a few days later, on 6 
May, the SNP press releases were responding to a Sunday Herald article about McLeish 
(who was the First Minister of Scotland at the time) which said he would be “totally 
absorbed” in New Labour’s General Election.  Swinney said, “…[his] first responsibility 
is serving the people of Scotland—not his New Labour bosses in London.”178  Later in 
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the year, similarly, Wishart, the SNP Party Chief Whip MP, pointed out that only SNP 
MPS—and no other Scottish MPs—were present for a parliamentary debate on drug 
policy.179  
Otherwise, the two tropes about the big London parties were that Labour was 
declining and divided (yet also was SNP’s biggest competitor, according to the SNP, in 
Scotland), while the Tories were just simply anti-Scottish.  The idea of Labour 
weakening in Scotland was a common theme, such as was the case in July of 1999 when 
Swinney said: 
Labour are scared stiff of SNP, and are deeply divided over the fact that the 
Scottish Parliament is part of a process of change in Scotland.  Labour wrongly 
said that devolution would mark the end of change, whereas the question marks 
over Scots MPs at Westminster and the existence of the Scottish Secretary post 
indicates that Scotland is in a process of Independence.180  
  
While he was trying to point to an ideological divide among Labour members, the more 
common trend to was to discuss Labour as divided between Westminster and Holyrood—
a point Swinney may have been trying to make in 1999, but the leadership became far 
clearer about it in other contexts over the years. In February 2000 Swinney again 
commented that Labour was on the “decline” in Scotland and that the SNP was 
benefitting from New Labour abandoning “mainstream” Scotland.181 Then in May 2001 
the SNP’s responded to a Sunday Times article that Labour moved its phone box south of 
the border—which showed how Labour could not get enough activists in Scotland.182  
 
179 SNP, Press Release: 9 Nov. 2001. SNP Press Releases: Nov. to Dec. 2001. NLS: PNR. SNP. 2001. 
180 SNP, Press Release: 19 July 1999. SNP Press Releases: July to Sept. 1999. NLS: PNR. SNP. 1999. 
181 SNP, Press Release: 20 Feb. 2000. SNP Press Releases: Jan. to April 2000. NLS: PNR. SNP. 2000. 




Later, in June 2000, the SNP would comment on a House of Commons Bill debate that 
was proposed by Labour MP Frank Field—which would prevent Scots MPs from voting 
on legislation only affecting Wales and England. Alastair Morgan, SNP Westminster 
Parliamentary Group Leader, commented, “Labour are totally divided on the 
consequences of Scottish self-government.  Labour MPs south of the Border are trying to 
steal the Tory Party’s clothes, leaving their counterparts north of the Border—including 
Scottish Secretary John Reid—trying to explain why London Labour sound increasingly 
anti-Scottish.”183  In August, the SNP claimed that Reid was “out of touch” and showing 
the “divide” between New Labour in Scotland.184  Then, in November, Scottish Labour’s 
Alistair Campbell called Jack Straw and told him to scrap the ideas of a British soccer 
team (at the expense of losing the Scottish one) because it was losing too many Labour 
votes in Scotland.185   
By 2001 this divide between Westminster and Holyrood became the chief theme.  
Tony Blair sent Lord Lipsey to Scotland to get Henry McLeish and others to change their 
stance elderly care—so that they would be in line with previous legislation and Labour 
policy.  Sturgeon commented on how they cannot send enforcers and need to understand 
the powers of the devolved government, yet two days later the SNP press release showed 
that sure enough Scottish Labour did change its elderly policy. 186  The SNP would stay 
on this theme—mocking the Labour conference in Glasgow with a press release that read 
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“Oh look, the leaders of Scottish Labour are up from London.”187 In April of 2001 there 
were two releases relating to “in-fighting” in Labour, and by November, the SNP 
announced they were launching a “Westminster Watch”—to expose New Labour 
contradictory messages in Westminster versus Scottish Parliament.188 Later, these claims 
would also be about finances, especially once it was revealed that 90% of the 1999 
Scottish election money spent by Labour was from London.189  
Finally, with regards to the Conservative Party, the SNP consistently tried to 
present them as anti-Scottish, as the Tories remained unpopular north of the border since 
the 1980s if not earlier.  For example, 3 June 2001, the SNP press releases drew attention 
to “Tories in meltdown”—and the idea that Tories might not win any seats—again 
resulting in Scotland’s election being a two-horse race with Labour and SNP.190  “Tories 
are an irrelevance in Scottish Politics,” Swinney opined in another  press release, going 
on to say that whoever became their leader, the individual will be “hostile to Scotland.”191 
Similar sentiments were echoed in August: “Tory Party in Disarray” read the headline of 
a press release which described the resignation of Nick Johnston from the Scottish 
Parliament—as Johnston’s statement made it clear that he did not feel he was supported 
by the party.192  Salmond would call Kenneth Clarke’s (Tory leadership contender) 
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manifesto as “anti-Scottish in line.”193 The SNP was still making similar comments in 
2002—criticizing a Tory Commons debate on quality of life in London and southeast and 
saying the “Tories don’t care about Scotland.”194  Finally, the SNP’s 2007 manifesto 
stated the desire to bid for the 2016 European Championships.195 When there was not 
support from the Tories for the bid, Salmond described them as “anti-Scottish” and 
“against all things European.”196   
All told, the period from 1999-2007 was an important period of growth for the 
SNP with regards to consolidation of its methods.  The “methods” in question included 
with whom to contest each level of elections, how to split party decision-making and 
policy between Westminster and Holyrood, how to oppose at Holyrood and still position 
the party on independence, how to work within existing institutions among the multi-
levels of governance, and how to attack its opponents from its relatively new position in 
British politics.  On each point the party was able to move relatively quickly: in part 
because the pathway forward was relatively clear based on the consolidation of the party 
ideas and method between the 1960s and 1990s and also because the SNP was getting 
gradually more specific in policy areas as it gained both experience and access to 
government.  Yet, there remained the continued challenge of how and how much the SNP 
was presented in the mainstream media—as that form of outreach was still more 
accessible to most Scottish voters as compared to the party’s own direct communications 
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and mailings.  
Increase Exposure 
 
In the last cycle of party development from 1964-1999, the SNP was pushing for more 
Scottish-based broadcasting, seeking ways to access markets as cheaply as possible, and 
chasing attention from the major news outlets. In this cycle of growth from 1999-2007, 
the party was simply expanding all those processes.  The party’s aim for Scottish 
broadcasting became getting it devolved as a power to the new Scottish Parliament.  The 
party designed more complex outreach of its own and still sought more coverage by 
media outlets, though now there were greater concerns about framing and accuracy of 
reporting.  On the first point—wanting broadcasting to be devolved—the SNP put this 
aim in manifestos and often pointed to it in press releases.  For the second point, a 
detailed content analysis and discourse analysis of the manifestos and PEBs reveal 
greater specificity of policy and approach over time, especially as concerned the Scottish 
Parliament while SNP press releases reflect continually changing tactics in how the SNP 
produced its own outreach.   Finally, the rising saliency of the SNP, measured by the 
volume of its press releases and newspaper coverage, reveal more prominence of the 
party in the media but also continued internal accommodation as the SNP sought parity 
and “fair” coverage by the existing media outlets.    
Protecting Scottish broadcasting 
 
As discussed regarding the SNP and functioning in the new Scottish Parliament, the SNP 
immediately sought an expansion of devolved powers to cover broadcasting.  This policy 




media and the sense that Scottish audiences and on-screen talent were treated as 
secondary concerns by the London-based media.  Devolved broadcasting power was 
present in the SNP’s General Election and Scottish election manifestos—with the lone 
exception of the 2005 General Election manifesto.  The statement in all four (1999, 2003 
and 2007 for Scotland plus the 2001 General Election) was essentially the same. In 1999, 
the section read: 
The current government refuses to allow Scots control over broadcasting. The 
SNP will continue to campaign for the devolution of broadcasting legislation but 
in the meantime will establish a Broadcasting Committee of the Parliament to 
support Scottish broadcasters, monitor and analyse broadcasting output and 
examine broadcasting in Scotland and those responsible for it furth of Scotland.197  
 
By the 2007 Scottish Election manifesto was far more specific as it discussed the 
specifics of BBC revenues (“Scotland generates 8.8% of BBC revenues in license fees 
and only receives 5.7% of the revenues raised.”) and the goal of retaining more of those 
fees in Scotland in addition to increasing access.  The manifesto also pointed out the 
effects of devolution: “Devolution has resulted in significant divergences in policy and 
practice north and south of the Border. This must be reflected in news coverage.”198 
Otherwise, the SNP, as it had in previous periods, continued to defend the power 
and presence of Scottish broadcasters—drawing attention to labor disputes and situations 
in which providers or leadership were moved from Scotland to London. In most cases 
these efforts seemed to be the product of the work of one SNP member—Russell, who 
had a professional background in production and served as the first Scottish Shadow 
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Minister of Culture, Broadcasting, and Gaelic in 1999. For example, Russell criticized the 
Scottish Media Group (SMG) for moving senior personnel to London,199 warned of the 
impending strike due to SMG’s actions,200 called for a “fair settlement” of that dispute,201 
had concerns about the take-over of Border Television by Capital radio202 would 
negatively impact local broadcasting, and celebrated the ITC’s ruling on Grampian in 
favor of Russell’s position on the labor dispute.203 He also fought to protect any available 
Gaelic television service especially when Grampian Television lost the contract for its 
Gaelic news service,204 and he raised concern over job loss and loss of news coverage 
when the ITC ruled on a new Nations and Regions charter which Russell said would just 
reflect how the BBC is not sensitive to Scottish needs.205 Again, these topics reveal 
specific knowledge and expertise that required constant attention to these types of issues 
and incidents, perhaps something that was now easier with bigger staffs and more 
funding. 
In other cases, the main grievance was the potential cut of Scottish 
programming—especially with regards to a Scottish-produced news program—and the 
 
199 SNP, Press Release: 19 July 1999b. SNP Press Releases: July to Sept. 1999. NLS: PNR. SNP. 
1999. 
200 SNP, Press Release: 17 March 2000. SNP Press Releases: Jan. to April 2000. NLS: PNR. SNP. 
2000. 
201 SNP, Press Release: 24 March 2000. SNP Press Releases: Jan. to April 2000. NLS: PNR. SNP. 
2000. 
202 SNP, Press Release: 19 April 2000. SNP Press Releases: Jan. to April 2000. NLS: PNR. SNP. 
2000. 
203 SNP, Press Release: 10 May 2000. SNP Press Releases: May to July 2000. NLS: PNR. SNP. 2000.    
204 SNP, Press Release: 29 Sept. 2000. SNP Press Releases: Aug. to Oct. 2000. NLS: PNR. SNP. 
2000. 





solution the SNP favored most was the devolution of broadcasting as a whole.  For 
example, Russell wrote to BBC Scotland Controller John MacCormick and BBC 
Director-General Greg Dyke over a rumor in the Sunday Herald that the BBC had 
decided “in principle to scrap the Newsnight Scotland opt-out” and responded in a press 
release to The Daily Mail’s article that ITV companies were “secretly” planning to cut 
regional coverage by 50%—changes  he said could not be made “without changes in 
legislation.”206 He often expressed concern about reductions in output both at the local 
level207 and simply in general with regards to Scotland.208  
As a result, the focal point became the creation of a Scottish-produced nightly 
newscast (in addition to the long-term goal of devolution).  In October of 2000, the BBC 
decided to move the news from 9 p.m. to 10 p.m. and Russell objected saying that it was 
only to compete with ITV and not provide necessarily good coverage.209 Then when ITV 
moved its News Ten back to 10 p.m. from 11 p.m., the SNP was concerned that the 
regional bulletins would not be moved—leaving them until 11:20 p.m. to be aired.210  
With these changes, the SNP began pushing for the creation of a Scottish-produced 
evening program.  Eventually, a meeting of the Scottish Affairs Select Committee in the 
House of Commons which included BBC managers, the BBC Scotland controller John 
McCormick, and the Head of News and Current Affairs Blair Jenkins, backed a new 
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Scottish-produced evening news bulletin to coincide with the end of the first Scottish 
Parliament, and the move was celebrated and supported by the SNP.211 Yet by March, the 
SNP and the Liberal-Democrats issued a joint release on the failure of the Scottish 
Affairs Select Committee to deliver support for the “Scottish Six.”212 The SNP felt this 
had to do with lack of political will, and they pointed to the lack of coverage on Tartan 
Day as evidence of the need for a Scottish Six.213 Eventually in October of 2002 it was 
revealed in the Sunday Herald that Tony Blair had “intervened” to drop the Scottish Six.   
Two days later the SNP demanded a meeting with Greg Dyke, Director General of the 
BBC, and at this point Salmond became the point person in the releases (prior the main 
voice had been Peter Wishart). Salmond railed against the situation being “…entirely at 
odds with the commitment in the BBC’s royal charter that it is intended to be an 
‘independent corporation’” and gave the history of the SNP’s efforts for a Scottish Six—
stretching back to being told in 1998 that the answer was no due to broadcasting reasons.  
By November, Dyke wrote back to Salmond saying that there would be an upcoming 
decision based on broadcasting only, that he had no idea about Blair’s position, and that 
they (Salmond and Dyke) would meet in short order. Salmond published the letter and 
tabled a Scottish Six motion in Parliament to “condemn the conspiracy.”214  (As of 2019, 
there still was no launch but promises remained.) 
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Additionally, the SNP regularly drew attention to the theme that the BBC, and the 
media at large, was London-centric and often left Scotland (and the SNP by association 
or directly) out of coverage.  For example, Russell complained that the Edinburgh 
Television Festival ignored the Scottish Six215 and that Sky TV had exclusive rights to 
the European Championship football match between England and Scotland—which 
would have Scottish fans waiting to see the match.216  The following year Russell was 
upset that Scotland was not receiving the value of its money back from London 
(especially when the BBC raised license fees)217 and that the BBC had shelved the 
Scottish Six without much public knowledge.218 A 2002 study by the Scottish Consumer 
Council at least substantiated the theme that the BBC was “massively biased towards 
London-based broadcasting output” and called for a Scottish-based main evening news 
bulletin.219  
Back in 2000 the SNP did its own assessment of media coverage, and though the 
specific substantive study was not repeated directly by the Scottish Consumer Council, 
the themes were similar—and substantiated by significant statistical analyses. In studying 
the BBC Scotland, BBC Network, ITV and Scottish Television over the month of 
February in 2000, the report, which the SNP commissioned, supported many of the points 
they had been making about reporting in Scotland. They reported that Scottish politicians 
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and parties were all but completely excluded from BBC and ITV Network coverage.  The 
SNP secured only .83% of broadcast seconds of interviews on BBC and 1.04% on ITV.  
While Labour was “name checked” 143 times by Network BBC, the SNP wasn’t 
mentioned once. ITV managed three mentions of 267 (1.12%).  Additionally, the BBC 
and ITV failed to broadcast one single report about any subject or development devolved 
to Scotland whereas 54 reports by BBC and 31 on ITV covered domestic English or 
English/Welsh topics.  Finally, the BBC failed to make clear when issues were not 
applicable to Scotland 63% of the time; ITV failed 83%.  These results, according to 
Richard Lochhead, MSP, were sent to the BBC and ITV in London and urgent meetings 
called with senior management.220  
Media Strategy 
Drawing attention to these cases of being ignored or left out were often the focus 
of the SNP’s media strategy but the difference was that after 1999 the other parties had 
more cause to respond or even, in some extreme cases, apologize.   In January of 2000, a 
press release headline read “SNP demand apology from Eddie George” and featured 
Salmond talking about George, then the Bank of England governor, and how he attacked 
the SNP during his appearance on Newsnight Scotland.221 Salmond also responded the 
same day as a so-called “attack on the SNP” by Tony Blair;222 he would say something 
similar when Blair gave a speech in Wales wherein he “attacked Scottish 
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independence.”223  However, while Salmond was the most common voice in these types 
of releases, Russell also figured in—upset at Brian Wilson, Deputy Scottish Secretary, 
for his “outburst” on Newsnight Scotland—calling it a “Mickey Mouse bit of television” 
when Wilson was asked about the diminished role for Scottish MPs post-devolution.224 
Likewise concern was raised by the SNP’s Shadow Minister for the Economy when 
Aussie Bank chief Frank Cicutto said the Scottish economy has been in recession for 200 
years. On this occasion, Gordon Wilson welcomed the public apology the next day.225  
Similarly, the SNP drew attention, especially during campaign seasons, about 
imbalance in coverage or when the institutions were being used unfairly to prioritize the 
position of the parties or individuals in government. In looking at this particular type of 
grievance Swinney seemed to be the point person.  In December of 2000 Swinney had 
written to the ITC (Independent Television Commission) regarding an hour-long program 
with Tony Blair the week before the by-election and how it is unfair and should not be 
done. Four days later, the ITC ruled in his favor—forcing Scottish television to broadcast 
hour-long programmes with SNP, Tories and Lib-Dems following the unfair coverage 
given to Labour.  Swinney commented that 70% of Blair’s comments were on devolved 
issues that would not even be under discussion for a Westminster seat.226 Two days later 
the SNP release celebrated the STV special program with Swinney to make up for the 
Blair one. Swinney said he would insist on fair treatment up to the General Election as 
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well: “For many years the SNP has argued that London based broadcasting treated 
Scottish politics unfairly.  Now that the argument has been won….[it must be] observed 
to the letter of the law by all broadcasters.”227 A year later, he was back at it as Grampian 
and Border Television screened 15-minute interviews with Swinney during their main 
evening broadcast to balance a prior program with William Hague and Charles Kennedy 
on the ITV Network.  In this case Russell said the problem was caused by not including 
SNP, but he was happy with this solution because the Swinney interview would be during 
peak broadcast hours.228  
Historian Peter Lynch cited even greater media hostility than the SNP press 
releases would reveal—especially in the 1999 Scottish election.  Lynch wrote, “The party 
faced an almost unanimously hostile media especially amongst the tabloids” (Lynch-
2013, 244), and he described a situation in which Labour withdrew £10,000 of 
advertising from The Herald because it was giving SNP too much coverage (Lynch 
quoting Ritchie-2000).  Finally, he also cited that attacks were so common that the SNP 
cancelled press conferences in the last weeks of the campaign and launched its own 
paper, Scotland’s Voice (Lynch-2013, 244).  
Not surprisingly, most of the SNP releases between 1999-2003 are like any other 
party: focused on policy and campaigns; however, they used their press releases for other 
somewhat routine purposes, too, including disputing figures or points made in print or on 
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television and to challenge other politicians to televised debates. For example, Salmond 
disputed numbers published in the Daily Record claiming SNP spent £279,000 pounds on 
“The Scotland’s Voice” newspaper…Salmond says it was £62,642.50.  He also said, 
“The Daily Record no doubt feels aggrieved by the success of Scotland’s Voice, with 
almost 500,000 papers distributed in the last week of the election;” and then the next day 
the paper did print a retraction.229 Similarly, Russell disputed McLeish’s claim on a BBC 
Holyrood programme on Sunday (it was Tuesday when this was released) that the 
situation with the Scottish Qualifications Authority (test results) was actually not as 
McLeish claimed.230 In this case, the delayed test results took months of remedy and 
eventually led to McLeish’s resignation.  Other situations lacked clear endings—such as 
when Salmond released a statement to the press entitled “Brian’s BBC Blunders: Gets oil 
wrong, and wants more private health investment.” Salmond went on to say that Brian 
Wilson had figures wrong on BBC Scotland’s “Campaign 2001” programme—where he 
understated the value of North Sea oil.  Wilson, Salmond claimed, stated the value 
between £2-3 billion but government figures are £6 billion.231   
In order to challenge these types of differences in figures, the SNP frequently 
sought to debate other politicians. Of course, these challenges were two-fold: first, 
several SNP leaders, particularly Salmond but also others, were known as skilled 
debaters.  Second, these situations would gain the SNP continued exposure in the role of 
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peer.  However, it was not just Salmond that issued the challenges: Swinney in 2001 
called for live television debates among party leaders as “any such debates broadcast in 
Scotland must include the SNP on a full and equal basis.  The SNP are clearly the second 
party in Scottish politics.”232 However, Labour pulled out of discussions on televised 
debates, and so Swinney took to the air to continue the pressure as he pushed for the 
debates on the BBC Good Morning Scotland program.233 However, they would not be 
included in party leader debates, especially for Westminster elections, until 2010. 
The SNP releases throughout the 1999-2003 era sought to draw attention to 
moments when sitting politicians used their position to take target or demonize the SNP 
or times when the region was simply being left out of policy.  This theme came in short 
bursts—namely, in October of 1999, sporadically in 2001, and then the spring of 2002.  
In 1999 the SNP was angered by Robin Cook who, according to SNP Euro-MP Professor 
Neil MacCormick, attacked SNP at the opening of the Scotland House. MacCormick said 
Cook was “unable to stand together in a courteous manner with the SNP this morning.”234 
This type of presentation—that the political elites did not accept the SNP as peers—was 
in part exasperation and in another way self-serving: the SNP was able to take the higher 
ground.  Later, in 2001, the SNP was frustrated with Blair’s speech at his party’s 
Glasgow conference as he “didn’t mention Scotland once” and made 20 points of 
“Labour spin” which denied “Scotland’s reality”—as in most instances the statistics used 
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by Blair were UK-wide and were not Scotland’s reality with regards many public 
concerns including hospital waits, childhood poverty, plans for primary schools (that 
were not applicable to Scotland due to devolution), crime (he said it was falling—but at 
the time it was not in Scotland).235 This type of critique was frequently deployed by the 
SNP—whether concerning the Queen’s Speech, other parties’ conferences, parliamentary 
debates, or speeches by the PM or other figures in British politics.  For example, there 
was criticism of Tory Commons debate in 2002 on quality of life in London and 
southeast—which the SNP submitted was proof the Tories did not care about Scotland.236  
While these themes of being ignored and overlooked were reminiscent of the past, 
so were the situations when the SNP continued to address circumstances or claims which 
misrepresented or overlooked Scotland or Scottishness—though these events are less 
frequently than in the 1970s-1990s.  For example, Annabelle Ewing, Shadow Home 
Affairs Minister was the primary voice in a press release condemning Home Secretary 
David Blunkett’s comments on people feeling British and how they “become English” 
(Independent on Sunday, 9 Dec.)—a sentiment that left no room for Scots.237  A release 
later in the month would strike a similar tone or theme—as the SNP’s Pete Wishart, SNP 
Westminster Spokesman on Culture, Media, and Sport, criticized a BBC Radio 4 
Programme on the “Greatest British Monarch” when three of the five listed reigned in 
England before the Union of Crowns in 1603—which makes them English, not British.238 
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Similarly, Russell reacted to Northern Ireland Secretary John Reid’s comments about 
Scottish soccer when Reid commented on how Celtic and Rangers should leave the 
Scottish Premier League and referred to the two teams in sectarian terms.239 For another 
four days this incident would be a focal point in SNP press releases.240 A similarly sports-
related moment occurred a month later when the SNP was upset about the Saltire being 
banned at winter Olympics (Swinney reacted to British officials banning Scottish athletes 
from sporting it at all, and he planned to write to British Olympic Association).241 There 
was a follow-up press release on the Olympic ban and how the Catalan flag had official 
status in the 1992 games. Then, the SNP drew attention to a mistake by the US Olympic 
web site (as Salt Lake City were the hosts) which touted “England stuns Canada” in 
curling when it was a Scottish team.242  Swinney would release a separate release 
congratulating them on their gold medal. 
Lastly, the SNP did continue, to some extent, to utilize “stunts” to draw attention 
to their cause, but in the entire 4,305 press releases from 1999-2003, there are only two 
releases that drew attention to these tactics.  First in December 2000, the SNP gave 
handouts at a soccer match where Falkirk was at home versus Inverness Caledonian 
Thistle that talked about New Labour looking to dismantle Scottish team.  The same 
release also talks about Santa Clauses appearing at party events throughout the 
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constituency.243 Then in 2001, when the SNP was particularly invested in fisheries 
policies and outcomes, there was the “Scottish Armada” which was a series of fishing 
boats in Edinburgh protesting the tie-up scheme on white fish.244 Russell said of these 
events, “It was true when we went into Parliament we were still in that phase (of using 
stunts to draw media coverage) sometimes.  There is a level beyond which it just looks 
silly.”245 
Changes in Media Saliency 
With all of these tactics, the underlying theme—simply in the volume of press 
releases and the additional use of a companies to help with the dispersion of releases—
was a continued concerted effort to increase the SNP’s presence in the news cycle.  The 
results were clear in the form of volume of coverage. (See Fig. 5.1.) To measure saliency 
in the UK print media, the Proquest News and Newspaper database provided full-text 
articles from The Times, Financial Times, Sunday Times, and The Guardian from 1998 
onward.  The time period is important as 1998 provides a data point prior to the first 
Scottish parliamentary elections in 1999; likewise, all four papers are based in London 
and all endorse different political parties.  All data is based on five separate searches:  
1. “Conservative” and “Party” or “Conservative Party”  
2. “Labour” and “party” or “Labour Party” 
3. SNP” or “Scottish National Party”  
4. “Lib-Dem” or “Liberal Democrat”  
5. “Plaid Cymru” or “party of Wales” 
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Fig. 5.1. SNP, Labour, and Tory Saliency in Four UK Newspapers: 1998-2007 
 
Clearly, an increase in press releases as well as the opening of the Parliament helped the 
SNP’s mission for greater volume of coverage.  In 2000, the SNP sent 1,312 press 
releases and followed with similar in numbers in 2001 (1, 389); by comparison, the SNP 
produced 310 press releases in all of 1987 and 259 in 1988, as based on archival data at 
the NLS.  While these numbers cannot produce a clear link between the volume of the 
SNP’s output and actual coverage, the two do have upward trends in the time period.  
Yet, for context, this is a total of 9,690 articles that mentioned the SNP whereas there are 
75,827 for Labour and 77988 for the Tories.  For comparison, the Liberal-Democrats 
appeared 21,963 times and Plaid Cymru just 1,156 times. Likewise, the SNP experienced 
a small bump in coverage in 1999—around the election and opening of the Parliament—
but not nearly to the extent as was gained in 2007 when it formed the minority 



























 At the same time, the trend did begin to shift in Scotland—an indication of this 
evolutionary process beginning with the creation of the Scottish Parliament.  Using 
Proquest and the same search terms but looking at The Herald, which is based in 
Glasgow, and The Scotsman, which is based in Edinburgh, over the period in question 
(See Figures 5.2 and 5.3), the saliency of the SNP was not far behind its peers in 1998, 
though it did have the least coverage of the three parties. In The Herald, the volume of 
the parties’ coverage merged in 2002 and the SNP then remained the most covered party 
thereafter.  In The Scotsman, the merge was a little later (around 2005), but the overall 
trend at the end of the period was the same—the SNP rose ahead of its peers and reached 
levels significantly higher than the other two parties. 
 

























Fig. 5.3. Party Saliency in The Scotsman: 1998-2007 
 
Thus, in terms of exposure, the SNP continued to battle for volume—a goal that it 
certainly did not reach in terms of catching the two big parties in the London-based 
media, but it had in fact caught—and then held—the attention of the print media in 
Scotland.   In this case, like the case in 1965 of the first PPB and the 1997 case of being 
endorsed by a newspaper and presented as a peer of the mainstream parties, a key media 
breakthrough preceded a key electoral breakthrough. In this case, the SNP became the 
party in Scotland with the highest volume media saliency in key Scottish print outlets by 
2005 and then won the 2007 Scottish election. 
 
Persistence: The Creation of the Holyrood Gap 
 
Persistence should be measured in three ways: electoral results, membership, and media 
saliency.  For the SNP between 1999-2007 all these markers improved.  Electorally, the 






















Rather, the creation of the Scottish Parliament meant the SNP was now contesting to be 
the party of government at Holyrood.  While the conditions at Westminster, with limited 
seat numbers and resistance from opponents to consider the SNP as viable coalition 
partners, would not change in any meaningful way, the SNP was gaining valuable 
experience—and exposure—via politics in Edinburgh.  All told, the party had an 
established representation presence which was a legacy of the prior period.  Having not 
lost an election deposit since 1987 while contesting all available Scottish seats at 
Commons, the SNP continued to do the same throughout the period between 1999 and 
2007—and this while also contesting all three Scottish elections as well. For contrast, the 
Conservatives did lose one deposit in both 2001 and 2005.  However, the period from 
1999-2007 did see the emergence of the “Holyrood Gap” in which the SNP regularly 
achieved 27-31% of the vote in Scottish elections but only 17-20% of the vote in General 











In Comparison Turnout 
1999 Scottish 
Election 
35 27.3% Labour: 56 seats (43.4%) 
Tory: 18 (14%) 
 L-D: 17 seats (13.2%) 
Greens: 1 (0.8%)  
Scottish Labour: 0  




27 29.9% Labour: 50 (38.8%) 
Tory: 18 (14%) 
L-D: 17 (13.2%) 
Greens: 7 (5.4%) 
Ind.: 3 (2.3%) 




47 31.0% Labour: 37 (32.9%) 
Tory: 4 (16.6%) 
L-D: 11 (16.2%) 
Greens, Ind. And Scottish 
Senior Citizens 1.2% or less 
52.4% 




5 20.1% Labour: 56 seats (43.9%) 
Lib-Dem: 10 (16.4%) 
Conservative: 1 (15.6%) 
Scot. Socialist: 0 (3.1%) 





6 17.7% Labour: 41 seats (39.5%) 
Lib-Dem: 11 (22.6%) 
Conservative: 1 (15.8%) 
Scot. Socialist: 0 (1.9%) 
Scot. Green: 0 (1.1%) 
60.6% 
Table 5.2: Election Results: 1999-2007 
 In this period membership numbers are readily available, and the trend is clearly 
upward as shown by Mitchell et. al. (Mitchell-2012, 42).  
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Members 9,450 10,854 10,995 12,571 13,944 
Branches 225 246 228 226 230 




 Otherwise, the other measure of “persistence” is the media cycle, and in this 
regard the SNP achieved new marks of average yearly coverage but was not able to 
achieve near the likes of their major party counterparts—as noted in the previous section.   
Resource Reallocation 
Despite the success of fundraising in the 1990s, the SNP went into the 2000s in a weak 
economic position.  In part, the party spent too much in 1999 and then had to make up for 
it. However, the period from 1999-2007 would be one of remarkable growth for the party 
in regard to the party’s fundraising and budget, as the SNP would go from being the 
lowest spender in the 1999 Scottish election to the highest in 2007.  This shift would be 
in part because the SNP began prioritizing Scottish elections—even going so far as to 
position their platforms in General Elections as a preview for the next round of Scottish 
elections, as was the case in 2005 in particular. 
 At the same time, the tensions between desiring independence and yet putting 
forth platforms to govern needed to be resolved.  In 2003 SNP leader John Swinney 
instituted structural changes in the party’s leadership selection process and other aspects 
balancing members and leadership that prepared the SNP for the eventual electoral 
breakthrough in 2007. 
Funding and spending 
 
The 1999 Scottish election was challenging for the SNP both in terms of 
ideological positioning in regard to the new parliament and independence.  In the end, the 
SNP spent £607,489 in 1999 (Lynch-2013, 247) while, by comparison, Labour spent 




in Edinburgh slimmed down, and the party’s debt was around £429,000 (Wilson put it at 
£419,672 and Lynch at £429,000), some of which was made up when the party sold its 
headquarters offices at 6 North Charlotte Street for £260,000 (and instead rented at 
MacDonald Road). (Wilson-2014, 59).    However, Lynch put the party’s financial 
deficits after 1999 as high as £600,000 (Lynch-2013, 247). 
 The issues of spending and debt would be a point of contention both internally 
and externally.  In August of 1999 Salmond disputed numbers published in the Daily 
Record claiming SNP spent £279,000 pounds on “The Scotland’s Voice” newspaper.  
Salmond said it was £62,642.50.246 At the party conference the following month, 
Salmond’s speech was focused on the party’s financial integrity: 
We can and will enhance our finances, our organisation and our policy.  Money 
doesn’t win elections—the Tories spent twice as much as us and got half the 
seats—but it does help to deliver campaign messages.   
Organisation does win elections and we should aim to raise every constituency to 
the organizational position of our best.  We are a national party and we must 
organise across the nation.247  
 
In the coming months, the SNP would attempt a couple of fundraising schemes. A CD 
entitled “A New Sang: Twelve Songs for Scottish Independence” was released in time for 
the holiday season248 and then a new company, “Independence Merchandising Limited” 
which sold items connected with the independence theme,249 was launched. Finally, the 
SNP created a party line which was described as “a premium rate phone service” with 
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news, views and humor from leading party figures.  This idea came from these types of 
lines being successful in entertainment industry and the SNP being “sure” it will work in 
politics.250   
 However, these efforts and a heated dispute between Salmond and National 
Treasurer Ian Blackford eventually ended in both men leaving their party leadership 
roles—clearing the way for a change in approach. First, in June of 2000 Blackford was 
suspended, and Salmond appointed Kenny MacAskill to serve as acting treasurer until the 
National Executive Meeting the following month.251 The dispute between Salmond and 
Blackford came down to how expenses were logged and what parts of tabs the party 
would pick up.  According to Wilson, the disciplinary action against Blackford, at a 
National Executive meeting, was done without Blackford present. Salmond moved a vote 
of no confidence on the basis of Blackford’s lack of competence and the “destabilization 
of the party.”  Blackford countered with a threat of going to court over defamation—
because it would hinder his reputation as an investment banker.  In the end, the contest 
between them was still dragging on and did not seem to have an end point other the 
national conference. (Wilson-2014, 65-66).  In July, as Blackford was already suspended, 
Salmond announced he would step down as National Convener.252 In the resulting 
leadership election, John Swinney defeated Alex Neil and took the reins while Salmond 
remained an MP for Banff and Buchan. 
For Swinney, one of the first issues facing him in terms of party finances was the 
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recent passage of The Representation for the Peoples Act 2000 which limited foreign 
donations and meant Sean Connery’s monthly £4800 donation would be cut down to the 
new law’s maximum of £200 per person. (Lynch-2013, 248). However, there was at least 
one SNP press release that drew attention to a Daily Record report that Connery would 
make his usual donation (£50,000 pounds per annum) in one lump sum instead of 
monthly so he could do it ahead of the law taking effect on 16 Feb. 2001.253 For the SNP, 
the passage of the law was interpreted as an attempt to cut off their money supply; as a 
result, Swinney went on the offensive. In January of 2001, again just prior to the bill 
taking effect, Swinney was the prominent figure in an SNP press release about 
“Loadsmoney Labour” and their £2 million donations from Lord Sainsbury, Christopher 
Ondaatje and Lord Hamlyn—while SNP is prevented from taking money from Sean 
Connery due to “discriminatory legislation.”254 Likewise, Swinney commented on a 
Sunday Times report that a donation of £2 million was channeled to Labour’s general 
election war chest by a wealthy businessman using offshores haven in Bermuda.255   
 Besides paying off debt, shrinking headquarters costs, and attempting several 
fundraising attempts, the SNP and Swinney were also facing a rise in daily costs.  The 
Scottish Parliament did not offer much on party research support, as Lynch cited that the 
six SNP MPs from 1997-2001 got £ 134,643 in support vs. £ 175,000 for the 35 MSPs.  
Also, while the Westminster opposition got £500,000 for the lead office, there was no 
such funding in Scotland. Finally, the FPTP SMPs got more than the list SMPs, and SNP 
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MSPs were expected to add £5000 out of pocket. (Lynch-2013, 248) In short, a key issue 
was lack of research funding.  
In order to make up these gaps, Swinney opted for a relatively normal political 
move—to court political allies.  He announced a “Business for Scotland” dinner in 
Glasgow to present the SNP’s proposal for a Scottish Fund for Future Generations to 
ensure long-term income stream from Scottish oil and gas256 and then a week later a press 
release celebrated a meeting between the SNP and STUC (Scottish Trades Union 
Congress) in order to forge better relationships—not necessarily to fundraise directly.257 
This STUC meeting was a shift for the SNP—as it was the result of being the official 
opposition in the Scottish Parliament and playing a role in policymaking: roles the party 
had not previously held.  For all their complaints about other parties’ comparative 
advantage in existing institutions, this case was the first in evidence of the SNP gaining 
specific access it had not had—due to its new political fortunes after 1999. 
Otherwise, in terms of spending, the SNP remained behind the other parties in 
every election. In the 2001 general election the SNP spent £226,203 on 2001 election 
(Lynch-2013, 251) which comes to £0.06 per registered voter in Scotland (based on 
3,966,801 registered eligible Scottish voters in December 2001).   Meanwhile, the other 
parties’ spending in Scotland during the election amounted to £1,113,426 for Labour, 
£972,967 for the Conservatives, and £178,146 for the Liberal Democrats.258  In the 2003 
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257 SNP, Press Release: 6 Feb 2001.		SNP Press Releases: Jan. to March 2001. NLS: PNR. SNP. 
2001.	
258 U.K. Electoral Commission: “Election 2001 campaign spending” https://image.guardian.co.uk/sys-




Scottish election, the SNP was “not strong organizationally” and spent £437,107 to 
Labour’s £726,702 (Lynch-2013, 254), the Conservatives’ £323,279 and the Lib-Dems 
130,360 (Mitchell, Bennie, and Johns-2012, 42). [The eligible electorate was 3,887,059 
people in December of 2002.] 
While the spending story did not change in 2005, other the SNP spending an 
astounding low £193, 987, the 2007 election was a remarkable change in SNP spending. 
In part buoyed by bigger donations from three key figures (£625,000 from Brian Soutar; 
£183,142,32 from Gordon Slayer and £100,00 from Tom Farmer (Lynch-2013, 266)), the 
SNP outspent all competitors, including Labour.  Even with each party increasing its 
campaign spending for the Scottish Parliament, the SNP’s was the largest increase by far.  
This 2007 election reflected developments that had been decades in the making—though 
the highest impact was the strategic choice not to spend as much in 2005 in order to 
compete on equal footing with the other large parties in 2007.   
Party Amount Spent Increase over 2003 Amount per eligible voter* 
SNP 1,383,462 192.4% .35 
Labour 1,102,866  51.8% .28 
Conservatives 601,983 86.2% .15 
Liberal Democrats 303,740 133% .08 
* Based on 3,926,262 eligible voters 




The available financial resources certainly did not hurt the SNP’s overall performance in 
the 2007 Scottish election; however, a more critical element of their success was the re-
writing of the party constitution and the reforms put forth by Swinney in 2003.  The focal 




presence at all levels but also to solidify the terms of independence now that a devolved 
parliament existed.  In the process of the reforms, the SNP found out that membership 
was not what they thought—although membership had been listed at 16,112 in 2002, 
after the reforms they found it was more like 9,450. 
Swinney’s reforms were two-fold. First, it used to be that activists could vote for 
regional party lists and some branches existed only in name to increase delegates to 
regional selection meetings.  This archaic process meant that Russell, Andrew Wilson 
and Margo MacDonald were all deselected at a key moment in party development and 
that any member could be nominated to stand for leader—with support of just one 
branch.  In a 2004 special conference, the leader and deputy leader would not be selected 
by conference delegates any more but by OMOV (One Member One Vote) of all party 
members. Suddenly, there was the need to get support from members across the branches. 
Likewise, the rules for branches were tightened so that there could no longer be dead or 
phantom branches, and the party took control of recruitment, retention and finances.  The 
branches now focused just on recruitment, but headquarters took control of retention and 
finances.  It took until 2010 to get to 16,000 members but it was on the basis of a new 
membership scheme that meant fees and donations would be automatic from members’ 
bank accounts. (Lynch-2013, 256). 
Besides the immediate impact on the party’s income, the changes also did well to 
shrink some aspects that had gotten swollen at the top of the party’s structure.  
Previously, the NEC was not large because there were only limited MPs. Now with a 




chances for SNP members to develop full careers in politics without simply serving in the 
party administrations. Finally, Swinney also introduced changes to how the local 
branches were structured (to better reflect relatively recent redistricting) and a new code 
of conduct in order to tighten party discipline.  In Wilson’s words, “the party accepted the 
new, radical constitution” (Wilson-1994, 95).  While the structure stayed mostly the 
same, Wilson viewed it as radical for the impact it had on how the party was 
administered. The National Conference now was large and significant; the National 
Council only met twice per year and no longer had the impact it had enjoyed in the past.  
Likewise, titles changed, in part to be more like the parties the SNP was now competing 
with, so that for the first time there was an official Party Leader (as opposed to National 
Convener) and a Deputy Leader (as opposed to a Senior Vice Convener).  At the same 
time, the party’s goals, as Wilson admitted, did not change. (Wilson-1994, 95). 
Conclusion 
 
The cycle of party growth was executed in perfect order between 1999-2007.  Devolution 
provided the opportunity, and the SNP did respond.  While the first two Scottish elections 
saw the SNP with a role as the opposition, in 2007 the party suddenly crossed the 
governing threshold—taking control of the Scottish Parliament, albeit as a minority 
government.  By 2007 Labour had been in for a decade and governed with the Liberal 
Democrats in Scotland, which was clearly an opportunity for the SNP to bring on change. 
However, the SNP had worked through its ideas in order to resolve the seeming conflicts 
between governing and seeking full independence, its methods (how to contest elections 




outreach and saliency—especially among the Scottish media). In the process, the SNP 
establish persistence at all levels of elections and then reallocated its resources and 
restructured its functions in order to enter a new phase of party growth: forming a 
majority government and yet still pressing for independence and greater devolution 
powers.  In this short period of growth, the ideas had been preset in the 1990s, the 
methods and resource allocation were completed in 2003, the new exposure breakthrough 
was in 2005, and the electoral breakthrough occurred in 2007.  There is an element of 
path dependence in each of these elements of the taxonomy, and this period is the closest 
to fitting the hypothesized order of the requirements of party growth.  The issue for the 
SNP, following 2007, remained reaching independence but also how to balance long and 







External Accommodation: The SNP in Government 2007 to 2017 
 
While 1999-2007 was a period of the SNP making internal changes to accommodate 
systemic alterations in the landscape of UK and Scottish politics, the period since 2007 
has seen the party have to adjust to becoming a party of government while still 
advocating for independence.  Meanwhile, the Scottish print media appeared to have 
accepted the rise of the SNP, at least as reflected in their volume of coverage of the party, 
but the SNP still lagged behind its peers among the London-based media, which was 
probably appropriate given Scotland is roughly 8% of the U.K.’s overall population. 
The SNP formed a minority government in Scotland in 2007, and then after some 
pretty standard results in the European (2009) and General Election (2010), the SNP 
raced to a historic win in 2011—forming the first-ever majority government at Holyrood. 
In doing so, the SNP “defeated” an electoral system designed for the singular purpose of 
preventing a majority government—and specifically to prevent the SNP in particular 
from forming a majority government. Yet, just a decade from the formation of the 
parliament, they “broke” the designed system.   
 While the 2014 European elections did not dovetail on those results, the 2015 
General Election did as the SNP won 56 seats (up from 6 previously) and then dropped 
back in 2017, winning just 35 seats (still the second-best result in party history and good 
enough to be the third largest party in the UK).  Besides these major elections, there were 
also the two referendum, both of which the SNP lost: the 2014 Scottish Independence 




the SNP was the primary mover in getting the vote to the polls.  For the latter the SNP 
supported staying in the EU—a position reflected by Scottish voters, who despite posting 
62% for Remain, would be forced to face an exit. This outcome would supply the SNP 
with another narrative in support of independence. 
Throughout these rises and minimal falls, the SNP acted as most literature would 
predict—much line with any professional-electoral party.  Likewise, other political actors 
were forced to recognize the power and effectiveness of the SNP—as well as its 
seemingly more permanent role in Scottish politics.  Yet, out of principle, the two largest 
UK parties, as well as the Liberal Democrats (who are now smaller than the SNP in 
membership), continued to refuse to join in coalition with the SNP beyond the level of 
Scottish local councils.   
Once again, broadcasting and media relations took centerstage as Salmond 
lamented the SNP being left out of the first televised leaders debate in the 2010 General 
Election—only for Nicola Sturgeon to be included in 2015.  Her participation contributed 
to the SNP’s landslide victory in Scotland and even generated some commentary from 
some people south of the border that they would have preferred the option to vote for her 
as Prime Minister.  During the 2014 independence vote, the SNP would protest against 
the London-centric media coverage and the lack of balance in reporting.  To some extent, 
this complaint continued through the 2019 General Election as news outlets made choices 
regarding which party leaders would be included in the televised debates.1  
 
1 The SNP and Lib-Dems lost a court case to be included in the ITV debate as the court ruled that 




At this point in party history, the taxonomy of party development can still provide 
a relevant framework for evaluating how the party functions, but this current cycle is 
ongoing.  Unlike most parties for which the primary goal is to form the government as 
often as possible, the SNP’s raison d'être of independence means it is still seeking farther 
development towards that goal.  Evidently, holding the 2014 referendum was a key step, 
and the party continues to advocate for another vote.  For the period since 2007, SNP’s 
consolidation of ideas has meant careful consideration of independence and how much to 
emphasize it in a given election.  For methods, this new era has meant both the ability to 
utilize the institutions of the regional government to support efforts towards 
independence and properly allotting resources to run fully professionalized campaigns, a 
task which includes focusing the party messaging in each cycle.  Persistence, on the other 
hand, has reached maturity: the SNP no longer has difficulty yielding competitive results 
in all levels of elections, though the risk of backsliding always exists.  Expectations have 
been raised on the basis of increasingly impressive results, and while the last decade has 
seen consistency, several more election cycles would help strengthen the persistence 
measure especially in the General Election context. Lastly, the reallocation of resources 
has also matured in terms of budgeting and campaign finances.  In terms of party 
structure, the next most significant step will be preparations for after independence.  This 
process would be path dependent as well.  One can imagine this process would be just an 
incremental step beyond the way the SNP now functions but with the extension of fiscal 
 





powers, foreign affairs, and defense as well as rejoining the EU and taking seats on the 
Commission and Council. The fear, however, could be the party fracturing without the 
independence platform unifying its primary sense of purpose.  
Data for this period (2007-2017) included the party manifestos, PEBs and PPBs, 
interviews with Salmond, Russell and Pringle, (all of whom shared intimate knowledge 
of the party’s approach to the media and prioritized it in their own careers), campaign 
spending figures from the U.K. Electoral Commission and measures of media coverage 
by volume based on the ProQuest News and Newspapers database as well as secondary 
sources.   
Consolidation of Ideas and Methods 
Over the course of party history, the “consolidation of ideas” was evolutionary.  
Between 1934-1948, the internal debates were over which type of nationalism would take 
centerstage.  In the next round of development (1948-1967), the discussion was about 
“self-government” and what form it might take. Then, after gaining access to the 
representation threshold, the focus from 1967-1999 was about making the best 
arguments, both in terms of logic and popular appeal, in favor to self-government.  By the 
time the SNP was sitting in opposition in the Scottish parliament in 1999, the ideas being 
debated were about the context of independence—until the party gained its access to 
government in 2007. Now, as a party of government, the main ideational conflict was 
between short-term goals in governing and policy versus the long-term aim of 
independence.   




they had one beyond opposing) and the current political climate. Unlike other parties, the 
SNP had to calculate its risk factor in terms of how much to put independence in the 
forefront.  Ideas and methods merged: the SNP had to decide how to campaign as a party 
of government that also wanted to change the constitutional structures.  Throughout the 
period they did continue to emphasize the same policy areas they had since the 1980s or 
even earlier, though the emphasis was on devolved areas such as jobs, education, arts and 
culture, and sport or moments of saliency for nationalism (such as concern historical 
claims, for example).  At the same time, the SNP has gotten more specific in its policy 
aims on the economy, broadcasting, the NHS, and the EU—much of which remained in 
the control of Westminster. 
The party’s biggest challenge became a question of timing and emphasis in 
relation to independence, as the “method” for how to gain independence had been 
decided.  Again, there had been evolution on this point. Between 1934-1948, the question 
of whether to be a pressure group or a political party had been decided in favor of the 
latter, and as a result the logical progression was to take all the Scottish seats at 
Westminster and then secede or to win a majority of the seats and ask the other parties 
occupying Scottish seats in the House of Commons to join the SNP in a Scottish 
Parliament.  The latter of these methods was akin to devolution.  It was the 1997 General 
Election, under the leadership of Salmond, when the party, based on an academic paper 
on the topic, determined the pathway was through negotiations with SNP MPs at 
Westminster and a parallel process in Europe that would then be approved by a general 




course—and offered in the manifesto for the first Scottish election that if the SNP were to 
make the government in Scotland, then they would offer a referendum first.  Therefore, 
when the SNP indeed was elected in 2007, the process did begin towards a referendum—
though not in earnest, as the SNP was a minority government. When the SNP did achieve 
its majority in 2011, then they delivered on the independence referendum—via the 
permissiveness of the UK government and Prime Minister David Cameron.  While the 
SNP would have preferred, perhaps, to wait until the polls were more favorably in-line 
with independence, the referendum was held in 2014.  The polling gap—which was 29% 
for independence at the May 2011 election (Lynch-2013, 286) did narrow with the final 
referendum vote in 2015 with 55.3% for no and 44.7% for yes.  Like many SNP elections 
of the past, the referendum campaign was fought with the hope of winning but at least the 
minimal intention of decreasing that gap—and indeed they had. 
The other ideational concern in this period was the Brexit referendum.  In 2016 
Scotland would vote overwhelmingly to stay, and in the process provided the SNP with 
another opportunity to maintain this position of the need for Scotland’s voice in Europe. 
The narrative of the open, inclusive European society in Scotland versus the closed, 
inward-looking tendencies in England provided the ideation for a return to simple SNP 
tropes: the need for independence in Europe and how the other parties are just not serving 
Scottish interests as well as the SNP. 
In this regard, the SNP was well-positioned as their dialogue on Europe was 
decades old and their stance on Europe had been clear at least since the 1980s if not 




participation in Europe. The one policy area—support for an independent Scotland 
joining the Euro—did attract skepticism and criticism during the Euro debt crisis of 2009 
and since then the SNP has been less consistent on its messaging regarding currency after 
independence (stating now that the decision would be put to popular vote).  In terms of 
the currency issue and support of Europe, Salmond was forced to do an about face.  
Dating back to 1999, Salmond said that the “Sterling is a millstone around Scotland’s 
neck”—as he went on about the virtues of the Euro.2  However, in the 2014 independence 
debates, the SNP and Salmond in particular advocated for a currency union with the 
U.K.—and this point continues to be contentious with regards to independence. 
 Yet, ultimately, the SNP’s support for the European project relies on a simple 
point that has been reiterated since the 1930s in slightly different terms each time.  The 
party’s 2004 European election manifesto stated in its Foreword, written by Swinney: “If 
even tiny Malta can sit at the top table of Europe, then why shouldn’t Scotland?”3  Since 
its creation, the SNP has been in the business of drawing attention to how the other U.K.-
wide parties do not tend to Scottish interests and needs.  When the party was founded, 
this grievance took the form of being anti-English at times.  However, between the 1940s 
and 1960s, the SNP leadership, a group of individuals with limited power as the party 
functioned with its strength of decision-making at the branch level, sought to expel that 
type of thinking and instead turn criticisms toward policy grievances.  Between the late 
 
2 SNP, Press Release: 9 Nov. 1999. SNP Press Releases. SNP Press Releases: Oct. to Dec. 1999. 
NLS: PNR. SNP. 1999. 





1960s and 1990s, the SNP shifted its rhetoric slightly on this theme as the blame was 
placed on the “Westminster system” especially under Thatcher as Scotland never voted 
Tory in those years.  Finally, between the 1990s and the current day, there was another 
shift, due to devolution, as the SNP pointed out how the two larger parties are what have 
been failing to support Scottish interests. The SNP would draw attention to the wedge 
between the Labour Party at Westminster and Scottish Labour, while the Tories were 
viewed simply “anti-Scottish.”  In short, the overall theme—that the other parties do not 
look out for Scotland—has changed minimally over time only in order to meet the 
changing political conditions in Scotland.  
In terms of Brexit, this narrative has proven to be convenient to continue to 
dispatch as the Tories bear the blame for calling the referendum in the first place and 
Labour has been able to do little about the results.  Likewise, while the two major parties 
have appeared split on both position on Europe as well as what to do with the referendum 
result, the SNP has been clear on its position from the beginning—the SNP desires an 
independent state of Scotland as members of the EU. They do not support Brexit.  Thus, 
the SNP pointed to these inconsistencies among the other parties while working through 
Brexit and now is in the position of Europe having “left a light” on for Scotland’s 
potential return to the EU.  
Riding on this “Remain” position, the SNP won most of the seats in Scotland in 
2015 and then slid back a bit in 2017.  The conventional wisdom was that Sturgeon was 
hurt by the timing of her pressuring for a second independence referendum on the basis 




SNP’s positioning. Clearly, Nicola [Sturgeon] had positioned on a second referendum 
based on the belief that the election was two years away.  Which would have given you 
the time and ability and Brexit to build up support for the second referendum.  You don’t 
expect to be caught…before you develop the case.”4    Thus, SNP successes are, like all 
professional-electoral parties, now interpreted by party leaders on the basis of timing and 
an understanding of political context.  A quantitative content analysis of SNP manifestos 
can determine how they balanced the simultaneous demands of governing and seeking 
independence—especially after losing an independence vote.   
 
Fig. 6.1: References to “Independence” in SNP Manifestos: 1992-2017 
 
 When considering the extent to which the party emphasized independence in its 
campaigning, the overall trends of the content analysis of manifestos from 2007-2017 are 
clear: the most significant factor was the independence referendum (both before and 
after).  Overall, the SNP has emphasized independence less in elections since devolution 
and, at least by volume of mentions, prioritizes it most in Scottish elections. (See Fig. 
6.1.).  However, this hard count can be deceiving as there is significant variation in the 
 
4 Interview with author. 
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length of manifestos. Therefore, measures of mentions as a ratio of independence 
references to word count are more indicative of the volume of emphasis and is aided by 
an analysis of prominence (based on using “independence” in bold or utilizing it in the 
table of contents or a section header) and an analysis of the themes in the PEBs of a given 
cycle.  
 “Nation” Independence(t)/ 
pglength (word 
count) 






15 13 in 24 pages 
(6, 345) 
1 per 488 words 
In opening statement; and focus 
of p. 2. 





9 12 in 12 pages 
(2,855) 
1 per 237 words 
Several on first page.  
Average 1 per page. 






28 19 times in  
76 pages 
(22,714) 
1 per 1,195 words 
Tof C; ref in opening statement 
to referendum 
Average much lower—only once 
every four pages. 






67 41 times in  
44 pages 
(40,854) 
1 per 996 
Table of contents, message, p. 3 
(after jobs/econ—about 
referendum—3rd paragraph.) 
Average about once per every  






16 9 times 
76 pages 
(30,230) 
1 per 3,358 
First mention on pg. 9—on the 
36th item in a list: about new 
work to persuade 





46 22 times in 
32 pages 
(8,620) 
1 per 392 
Not until pg. 5 (which is part of 
opening statement—but midway 
through 5th paragraph).  Not in 
Table of Contents. Averages 






11 4 times in 56 
pages 
(19,008) 
1 per 4,752 words 
Not until pg. 10; independence 
and home rule.  
Averages 1 time every 14 pages. 
-no mention 
- “who really is going to 




5 10 times in 48 
pages 
(20,748) 
1 per 2,074 
Opening message-referendum; 
averages 1 time every 8 pages 
-Tory cuts and tax breaks  
Ends: “What kind of 
country do you want…?” 
Table 6.1. Use of “Nation” and “Independence” in SNP manifestos and PEB: 2007-20175 
 




Taking the ratio of usage into account, independence was featured the most in the 
2014 European election (which was just a few months ahead of the Independence 
Referendum in September) and the least in the 2015 General Election (which was eight 
months after the referendum).  The 2014 European election PEB was the “Two Futures” 
feature that was aimed at the independence referendum campaign.6  When conditions did 
not surround a referendum, independence was featured most in European elections, and 
then Scottish elections, and finally General Elections.  Because EU elections often have 
lower turnout and are likely to bring out the more ardent party supporters, this order of 
prioritizing independence makes sense based on who is likely to vote as well as what that 
given institution can do in the push for independence.  In the period from 2007-2017, 
there was a peak in the 2010 General Election and 2011 Scottish elections—reflecting the 
party’s sense of its strength at that time.  The victory in the 2011 Scottish election, while 
making the party’s stance on a referendum quite clear, was a signal that the SNP’s 
independence platform was no longer scaring away voters—at least in a Scottish context. 
Finally, once the independence referendum was held, the SNP backed off its emphasis on 
independence, as the 2015 General Election manifesto has an all-time low number of 
references to seeking independence. In that manifesto, two of the four references to 
“independence” were actually in the context of how the General Election was “not about 
independence”—something the SNP had never said in a prior election cycle.7 
 
 
6 The PEB featured a child to be born on the day of the independence referendum and juxtaposed her 
future in the U.K. versus her potential future in an independent Scotland.  SNP, “Two Futures.” < 
https://www.bbc.com/news/av/uk-scotland-27157698/party-election-broadcast-scottish-national-
party> 




 The SNP had to overcome the “Holyrood Gap” between Scottish and General 
Elections, and to do so they had to find ways to contextualize the elections. As Salmond 
would admit, it was harder to contest the Westminster elections as there is no real record 
to go on.8 Yet, in 2015, after losing the independence referendum in 2014, the SNP saw a 
record victory—winning 56 seats at Westminster (up from 6).  Clearly such a staggering 
victory needs to be explained by voter behavior. But, what did the SNP do to put 
themselves in the position to make that leap?  
First, the SNP benefitted from several aspects of the independence referendum 
process, which itself was a result of winning Scottish elections, proving their competency 
in governing in Scotland, and getting Cameron to agree. On the first point—winning 
Scottish elections—Salmond believed in the need for a clear message.  His explanations 
of ups and downs in elections places the emphasis on how strong the messaging was in a 
given cycle.  For example, he suggested that in the 2017 snap election—when he lost his 
own seat—that the messaging was simply not strong or clear enough.9 As a counter-
point, he offered the clarity of the 2011 messaging of the SNP and in particular the PEB 
Monty Python “Life of Brian” spoof of “What has the Scottish Government done for 
you?”10 (as opposed to “What have the Romans ever done for us?”).  As he admitted, the 
clarity of that message was easier because there was a record to stand by.   
 Given the opportunity to hold the referendum, due to convincing people that an 
 
8 Interview with author. 
9 Interview with author. 





election vote for the SNP was not an immediate pathway to independence and then 
winning that 2011 election and getting Cameron to agree to hold the vote, the first effect 
of the referendum on the SNP was the open discussions of independence as a viable 
political option. After that, the next biggest impact was that the SNP’s media coverage 
spiked to levels never before seen (see following section on Increase Exposure). 
Likewise, they were presented on par with potential political rivals— there were a series 
of televised debates on STV and the BBC.   Sturgeon debated Michael Moore, Anas 
Sarwarm, Alistair Carmichael and Johann Lamont; Salmond debated Alistair Darling 
twice, and there were also televised round-table debates.  While the devolution debates in 
1997 had presented the SNP as having grown in political leadership to be on par with its 
competitors, this time, in 2014, independence as an idea was no longer outlandish but 
viable and worthy of being debated and considered by region.  Additionally, the SNP 
continued to enjoy a spike in interest and coverage through the 2015 General Election—
getting more coverage for the election than they had in any previous cycle. 
Increase Exposure 
In previous rounds of party development, exposure simply meant how to get access to 
free exposure and how to increase the volume of coverage.  These general aims do not 
really change when a party is in government—though the focus on volume also is 
accompanied by an increased concern about framing.  As the party grows, it is no longer 
important just to stay in the news cycle but also to be understood both as a peer of the 
long-established parties and, more critically, as a competent government.  The SNP saw 




with Labour leaders, and the Scottish Parliament only provided even more opportunity in 
this regard. However, in terms of volume of coverage and being presented on par with 
political opponents, the 2014 independence debates (and campaigns) meant that both 
independence took centerstage as having a real potential political outcome and the SNP, 
as a capable political entity, was presenting a challenge to the old order and the 
established parties. 
 Thus, it is not surprising that the volume of coverage of the SNP increased 
surrounding the referendum. However, what is counterintuitive is that the SNP grew after 
the vote—both in terms of membership and electoral outcomes (at Westminster) and thus 
even more in coverage.   Therefore, it would appear that nothing promotes media saliency 
more than electoral victories.  The SNP began the period with a volume of coverage well 
below its competitors, but by this 2007-2017 period, it pushed upwards in the UK media 
after having risen to be the most-covered party in two key Scottish print outlets, The 
Herald and The Scotsman, back in the early 2000s.  
 To measure saliency in the UK print media, the ProQuest News and Newspaper 
database provides full-text articles from The Times, Financial Times, Sunday Times, and 
The Guardian from 1998 to 2017.  All four papers are based in London and all endorse 
different political parties.  For the 2017 General Election, The Times and Financial Times 
endorsed the Tories while The Guardian has backed the SNP or Labour in Scotland—
whomever could beat the Tories in a given constituency.  All four papers were for the 
“Better Together” or “No” campaign during the 2014 independence referendum.   All 




1. “Conservative” and “Party” or “Conservative Party”  
2. “Labour” and “party” or “Labour Party” 
3. SNP” or “Scottish National Party”  
4. “Lib-Dem” or “Liberal Democrat”  
5. “Plaid Cymru” or “party of Wales” 
 
The overall trend that is clear is that both Labour and the Tories sustained a greater rate 
of coverage in these London-based outlets for the full duration of the time period in 
question. (See Figure 6.2.) This result is as expected given that the two parties are 
historically the strongest in the UK and that they both run throughout the entire country. 
 
Fig.  6.2. Party Saliency by Volume in Four U.K. Newspapers 1998-2017 
 
Looking even more closely at a comparison of Labour and the SNP shows that coverage 
of Labour continued to be far greater than that of the SNP among the four London-based 
outlets. The SNP ranged from 9-37% of the coverage that the Labour Party received. (See 
Table 6.2.)  Given that Scotland composes roughly 8% of the UK population, the 
coverage of the SNP in the earlier years was actually more reflective of the amount of the 
U.K. which Scotland comprises.   
From an SNP perspective, this movement in volume—clearly an upward trend—
























2010 General Elections, the SNP saw just 9% of the coverage, supporting SNP claims 
that they, as a Scottish voice, are often left out of Westminster elections. 
 SNP or “Scottish 
National Party”  
“Labour” and “party” or “Labour 
Party  
% of SNP coverage to Labour 
coverage 
2005 699 7,745 9.02% GE 
2006 803 6,815 11.78% 
2007 1,771 6,739 26.28% 
2008 1,524 6,186 24.64% 
2009 1,476 9,109 16.20%   
2010 1,154 12,390 9.31% GE 
2011 1,461 7,424 19.68% 
2012 1,506 7,703 19.55% 
2013 1,274 8,404 15.16% 
2014 2,843 10,283 27.65% 
2015 5,422 14,395 37.67% GE 
2016 3,389 10,316 32.85% 
2017 3,505 10,911 32.12% GE 
Table 6.2. SNP Saliency in Four U.K. Newspapers: 2005-2017 
(Based on ProQuest News and Newspapers database, this data is results for “SNP” and “Labour Party.” 
The data includes full-text for the full period in The Times, Financial Times, Sunday Times, and The 
Guardian.) 
 
However, there was a surge at the 2007 Scottish election (at least in terms of percentage 
if not in the actual volume of articles) and a sustained 15-19% of Labour’s coverage—
until the referendum in 2014 (27.65%) and then a surge even higher with the General 
Election success in 2015 (37.67%).  Since then the SNP has maintained about a rate of 
about 32% of Labour’s coverage.  This pattern would support the notion that Westminster 
elections are the key moments for gaining saliency in the UK print media.   
An important question to consider is if the media follows the success or predicts 
it.  Current scholarship and even media watchdogs claim that the media coverage of UK 
elections has shifted to an American-style horse race narrative: with more television 
segments and newspaper headlines drawing attention to polling and who is out in front.  




can tell whether the media was following the success or predicting it. 
 “SNP” or “Scottish 
National Party”  
“Labour” and “party” 
or “Labour Party” 
SNP percentage in 
relation to Labour 
April, 2010 168 2,019 8.32% 
May, 2010 176 2,068 8.51%     
 Peak days  
(6 May 2010 election) 
19 on 9 May  
16 on 2 May 
164 on 7 May 
153 on 8 May 
11.59% 
10.46% 
April 2015 999 1,905 52.44%    
May 2015 1,058 1,848 57.25%      
Peak days  
(7 May 2015 election) 
108 on 9 May 
77 on 8 May 
147 on 9 May 
103 on 7 May 
73.47% 
74.76% 
May 2017 379 1,405 26.98% 
June 2017 476 1,378 34.54%     
Peak days 
(8 June 2017 election) 
79 on 10 June 
40 on 9 June 
182 on 10 June 
98 on 11 June 
43.40% 
40.81% 
Table 6.3. Saliency of SNP and Labour During General Elections 2010-2017 
All indications are that the media followed this horse racing trend in reporting, as the 
SNP’s percentage of coverage—as a percentage in relation to the Labour Party—
increases significantly following election day. (See Table 6.3.)  In 2010, when the SNP 
performed on par with expectations (winning six seats) and Labour lost the election, the 
SNP saw its percentage of coverage in relation to Labour’s coverage only increase by less 
than 2-3% around the peak days.  However, when the SNP won the majority of Scottish 
seats at Westminster in 2015, the percentage of SNP’s coverage, again in relation to 
Labour’s coverage, rose by 16-20% whereas when the SNP suffered significant loses in 
the 2017 election, their coverage only rose by 6-7%.  Similar statistical analysis of the 
SNP in relation to the Tories (See Table 6.4.) yields the same result, and possibly is more 
telling as in each case (2010, 2015, and 2017), the Tories were the party that formed the 




suggest that in terms of volume of coverage, the U.K. outlets followed the vote and did 
not predict it as the SNP’s increase of percentage of coverage as compared to the two 
largest parties is actually highest in the days following the election (when all the parties 
see an relative increase in coverage). 
 At the same time, the overall trend—in relation to both Labour and the 
Conservatives—is that the SNP’s media coverage increased significantly surrounding the 
2015 election.  The SNP’s saliency in this 2007-2017 period in these four UK 
newspapers can best be explained as reaching certain thresholds.   Receiving just 8% of 
coverage in comparison to Labour surrounding the 2010 General Election, the SNP’s 
exposure in 2015 was far stronger, at about 52% before dropping in 2017 to 26-34%.  
While 2015 saw a spike, the bottom did not drop back to the default of 8%.  These 
patterns suggest that these four UK publications seemed to be following the polls.  
 “SNP” or “Scottish 
National Party”  
“Conservative” and 
“party” or “Tory” 
SNP percentage in 
relation to Tories 
April, 2010 168 2431 6.91% 
May, 2010 176 2431 7.23% 
 Peak days  
(6 May 2010 election) 
19 on 9 May  
16 on 2 May 
165 on 7 May 
165 on 8 May 
11.52% 
9.7% 
April 2015 999 1919 52.06% 
May 2015 1,058 1972 53.65% 
Peak days  
(7 May 2015 election) 
108 on 9 May 
77 on 8 May 
170 on 9 May 
131 on 10 May 
63.53% 
58.78% 
May 2017 379 1707 22.20% 
June 2017 476 1803 26.40% 
Peak days  
(8 June 2017 election) 
79 on 10 June 
40 on 9 June 
220 on 10 June 
104 on 11 June 
35.91% 
38.46% 
Table 6.4. Saliency of SNP and the Tories During General Elections: 2010-2017 
Thus, coalition potential may have led to greater exposure for the SNP. However, there is 




received during the independence referendum—as well as the fact that the party’s 
membership had grown to record levels and had now surpassed the Liberal-Democrats.  
There is some indication that the London-based media, or at least these print outlets, were 
following the SNP’s ability to sell newspapers, as it worth noting that print media was on 
the decline over this same period of time in question. 
 These patterns suggest that the SNP was already being over-reported given its 
relative size in the UK system back in 2010, and even with its historic gains in 2015, the 
percentage of coverage far outpaced the party’s overall presence in a UK-wide context. In 
2010, the SNP held .9% of the seats in Commons; in 2015, it held 8.6%, and in 2017 it 
held just 5.4%.  Yet, looking at the coverage the party received in terms of the two larger 
parties, the SNP does in fact get a disproportionate amount of attention—if one considers 
regional populations or the seats in Commons.  It is also worth noting the SNP’s 
percentage of coverage was increasing—even as overall volumes of coverage in print 
mediums were decreasing.   
 


























 In charting five parties in these four publications over the full duration of the time 
period (See Fig. 6.3.), the most significant change for the SNP, besides this trend of 
overall increase in coverage, was its surpassing the Liberal Democrats in 2015—the same 
year that the SNP membership outpaced the Lib-Dems for the first time.  Yet, again the 
press seemed to follow the voters as this shift in saliency occurred after the SNP’s 
membership had risen past that of the Liberal-Dems in September and October of 2014. 
At the same time, the Lib-Dems had been in a coalition with the Tories after the 2010 
election and suffered significant setbacks at the polls in 2015, as they dropped 49 seats 
and garnered 15% less support from voters. The change in coverage by volume between 
the SNP and Liberal Democrats occurred between 2014 and 2015 (See Fig. 6.4.).   
 
Fig. 6.4. SNP vs. Lib-Dem Coverage in Four U.K. Newspapers: 2014-2015 
 
The SNP surpassed the Lib-Dems in September of 2014—surrounding the independence 













































































2015 the SNP appeared in 65 more articles than the Lib-Dems; whereas in April, the 
number was 999 for the SNP to 659 for the Lib-Dems.). The SNP has been more 
prominent in the newspapers’ coverage ever since. 
In total, the SNP certainly improved both its volume of coverage and its 
percentage of coverage in relation to the big parties between 2007-2017, establishing 
itself solidly in third place in the country—something remarkable for a party that can 
only win 59 seats, or 9% of the Commons. Meanwhile, the media in Scotland was 
following a slightly different trend—namely that the SNP became the most covered party 
in both The Scotsman and The Herald in the mid-2000s.  The volume of coverage 
received by the SNP was nearly on par with Labour and exceeded that of the Tories for 
much of the 1998-2017 period—both in total (See Figure 6.5) and within each year (See 
Figures 6.6 and 6.7.)  
 
Fig. 6.5. Total Coverage in The Scotsman and The Herald 1998-2017 
 
In total, the SNP got more coverage in these two papers (71,656 articles between 1998 
and 2017) than the three (plus Sunday Times) UK papers (33, 244). While this difference 
in volume is not surprising overall, it is remarkable that the SNP saw the gap between 
itself and Labour close almost immediately with devolution and then exceed Labour’s 






















Scotsman (Edinburgh) and The Herald (Glasgow): the SNP’s coverage passed Labour 
since 2006 and has steadily remained the same ever since. (See Figures 6.6 and 6.7.)  
There are spikes in 2015 in these papers (as well as the others) due to the SNP’s 
performance in the General Election.  
 
Fig. 6.6. Saliency by Party and Volume in The Scotsman 1998-2017 
 
 
Fig. 6.7. Saliency by Party and Volume in The Herald 1998-2017 
 
The SNP approach to exposure was different at the Scottish elections than contests for 
Westminster.  In General Elections, the SNP focused on getting attention and “being the 












































SNP was left out of the televised leadership debates—even after the 2007 law suit against 
television channels for unequal coverage. In a 2010 PEB, Salmond discussed how the 
televised debates (to be held that night), will not be about Scotland: “None of it will 
apply to Scotland,” he said, but it will be about England and the “cozy Westminster 
parties…three London parties [that have] the same agenda…”11  After being included in 
2015, to widespread praise for Sturgeon’s performance in the debates, the December 
2019 General Election leaders debate on ITV featured  only Labour’s Jeremy Corbyn and 
the Tory’s Boris Johnson—with both the SNP and Liberal-Democrats being shut out of 
the process.  This decision by ITV was a reflection of the continued barriers to entry. 
With no chance of becoming the PM due to the limited number of seats the SNP 
challenges, Sturgeon has no claim to a leaders’ debate. (Though the court case was not 
decided on this point but rather that the debates were not determined to be a public 
service.)  Likewise, with the SNP now the third largest party in the UK, the Lib-Dem 
claim to the debates are dubious as well—as they are behind the SNP in membership and 
electoral results—but are at least more feasible with regards to challenging constituencies 
throughout the country. 
 For the SNP, this disparity between the London-based media and the Scottish-
based outlets is not lost.  Salmond had complaints about the ownership being from 
outside Scotland.12 When he accepted the role of First Minister in Scotland in 2011, with 
the majority government for the first time, a key portion of his acceptance speech focused 
 
11 SNP, “SNP Party Election Broadcast—Thursday April 15, 2010.” 
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p0kzXFHKagk> 




on the role of broadcasting in democracy and elections. Salmond said:    
Another key aspect of our national life controlled by Westminster is broadcasting. 
All of Scotland is poorly served as a result.  If we had some influence over that 
currently reserved area, we could, for example, create a Scottish digital channel, 
something that all parties and every member in the last session of Parliament 
supported as long as 8 Oct. 2008. (Wilson-2014, 146).   
 
He went on talk about developing domestic (Scottish) talent and “How Scotland 
promotes itself to the world is important; how we talk to each other is also critical.  These 
are exciting times for our country.  We need more space for our cultural riches and for a 
lively, intelligent discourse about the nation we are and the nation that we aspire to be.” 
(from Wilson-2014, 146—quoting Salmond’s full speech).   
 Finally, the argument that the London-based media is biased has been a constant 
SNP grievance as well.  In Wilson’s book, he wrote about the UK television coverage on 
7 July 2014 and the independence referendum, calling the Channel 4 Dispatches 
programme—“a slick hatchet job” as the SNP and YES did not even take part. (Wilson-
2014, 258).  There has been plenty of popular press coverage on this theme—ranging 
from coverage of SNP comments13 to other news outlets commenting on the need for the 
BBC to recover from the bias14 to actors making broader appeals.15  Academic work on 
the topic has substantiated the SNP and popular claims (Greig-2016, Robertson-2015), 
 
13 Green, Chris. “Scottish independence: BBC Scotland’s referendum coverage ‘institutionally 
biased,’ Alex Salmpn claims.”The Independent. 14 Sept. 2014. < 
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/media/bbc-scotland-protests-scottish-independence-referendum-
coverage-institutionally-biased-salmond-9732095.html> 
14 Bond, David. “BBC works to restore trust in Scotland.” Financial Times. 26 Aug. 2016. < 
https://www.ft.com/content/57715d74-6ad1-11e6-a0b1-d87a9fea034f> 
15 Press Association. “Peter Mullan: BBC showed ‘horrendous bias’ in Scottish referendum 





though the conclusion, in part, has been that the support of “no” by the major parties also 
influenced the volume of coverage on that viewpoint.  Robertson found that the 
statements favorable to YES (736) actually outnumbered No (622)—though he himself 
was in a maelstrom of attention regarding his accusations that the BBC was not fair in its 
coverage of the independence debates in 2012-2013 (Robertson-2015, 7).  
 All told, for the SNP in 2007-20017, the progress on exposure was two-fold. First, 
they became the party of focus in the Scottish press—especially once they took control of 
Holyrood. Second, they continued to battle for air space and exposure in General 
Elections, but the volume of coverage in those cases, despite the swings back and forth 
on leadership debates, has also seen a remarkable rise to about 30% or more of the 
coverage the two biggest parties receive—a percentage that far exceeds their potential 
share of seats at Westminster. Put differently, the SNP, by 2017, has, mostly through its 
election results, exceeded all reasonable exposure expectations by volume.  While these 
complaints about bias are not new, they do represent a new phase in coverage—which is 
that there are expectations that the idea of independence can and should be presented by 
the BBC and other major news outlets as an option as equally viable and valid as 
remaining in the union—something that was not conceivable even 10 years ago let alone 
when the party was founded in 1934 or when it first gained access to Westminster in 
1967. 
Persistence 
Besides exposure, the next step in the cycle of a party’s development is persistence. 




Westminster (roughly 6 seats and 20% of the votes in Scotland) as well as 20-30% of the 
votes for Holyrood, the period since then has seen even more significant growth.  While 
the 1999-2007 period meant the creation of the Holyrood gap, that gap disappeared in 
2015 as the SNP “broke” the Westminster system and is now positioned as the third 
largest party in Scotland.  Persistence at this advanced stage of party growth is simply 












 69 53.49% Labour: 37 seats (28.68%) 
Conservative:  15 (11.63%) 
Lib-Dem:  5 (3.88%) 
Scottish Green: 2 (1.55%)  





 63 41.7% Conservative: 31 seats (24.0%) 
Labour: 24 (1.6%) 
Scottish Green: 6 (4.7%) 
Lib-Dem: 5 (3.9%) 
55.6% 




 6 19.9% Labour:  41 seats (42.0%) 
Conservative: 1 (16.7%) 





 56  50.0% Labour: 1 seat (24.3%) 
Conservative: 1 (14.9%) 





 35 36.9% Labour: 7 seats (27.1%) 
Conservative: 1 (14.9%) 
Lib-Dem: 4 (6.8%) 
66.4% 
Table 6.5. Election Results: 2008-2017 
 
Resource Allocation 
Like persistence, resource allocation at this point in party history is mostly about 
budgeting for campaigns and making spending decisions.  The SNP no longer was trying 
to hatch plans to raise money through various fundraising schemes—instead they, too, 




from individuals.  Salmond reported that the key in campaigning still meant having a 
message: “The politicians decide the message; then you hire other people to package and 
market it.”16 However, it was also true that by 2007 the party had more choices it could 
make in terms of campaign expenditures. 
Category of Expenditure 2007 2011 2016 
PPB £90,726.00 £71,961.16 £98,570.70  
Manifesto £56,999.00 £14,066.81 £44,327.02 
Marketing research/canvasing £178,705.00 £201,613.25 £17,054.71 
Media £45,041.00 £32,268.57 £5,291.00 
Advertising £494,642.00 £294,601.06 £731,897.90 
Balancing Item £0.00 ________ ________ 
Overhead and general 
administration £76,146.00 £65,777.07 ________ 
Rallies and other events £64,652.00 £20,688.82 £18,216.50 
Unsolicited material to 
electors £323,580.00 £405,728.06 £532,770.29 
Transport £52,239.00 £34,957.35 £17,414.28 
TOTAL £1,382,730.00 £1,141,662.15 £1,465,542.40 
 Data from the UK Electoral Commission 
Table 6.6. SNP Spending in Scottish Parliamentary Elections: 2007-2016 
 
 Throughout this period, again, the SNP made clear distinctions about the relative 
importance of elections based on the amount of money they were willing to spend (see 
Fig. 6.6 and 6.7).  Two key points are clear in their 2007-2017 campaign budgeting. First, 
in Scotland, the SNP was clearly the party investing the most in those elections.  The 
SNP outspent Labour for the first time in 2007 and has continued to do so in the 2011 and 
2016 Holyrood elections. Second, in terms of Westminster elections, the SNP did not 
 




spend as much in 2010 but did make more significant expenditures in 2015 and 2017—
mostly as a result of having more resources available.  Overall, the SNP spent at or near 
the maximum amount in Scotland elections, and with the exception of the 2010 UK 
election, where perhaps they chose not to spend as much in order to be ready for 2011, 
spent similar amounts in General Elections, roughly £1.4 million. 
 How that money was spent varied a bit by election, but a few themes are clear in 
comparing expenditures between 2010-2017.  First, the party frequently prioritized 
advertising and unsolicited materials (flyers, campaign buttons) in almost every cycle, 
though the advertising aspect was more consistently a priority in the Scottish elections 
than in the General Elections.  Likewise, the party broadcasts often were a priority 
(ranking from second through fourth as an expenditure in any given election)—and were 
a much larger proportion of spending from 2015 onward.  Finally, marketing was a clear 
priority between 2007 and 2011; however, by 2015 when the SNP was coming off the 
independence referendum, marketing dropped down to 7th in priority (down from 1st-3rd 
in the other cycles).  This decision may reflect two realities. First, that change marked the 
transition from Salmond to Sturgeon—and perhaps Sturgeon did not prioritize it the same 
way. More likely, though, is that 2015 represents the time period when the SNP had 
become a known entity and likely did not need the same time of expenditure to get into 





Category of Expenditure 2010 2015 2017 
PPB £71,583.00 £83,581.80 £326,070.40 
Manifesto £1,458.00 £33,324.20 £14,367.54 
Marketing research/canvasing £104,287.00 £29,563.44 £45,492.60 
Media £16,479.00 £36,262.69 £66,266.22 
Advertising £47,823.00 £714,204.94 £320,116.96 
Transport £905.00 £40,222.14 £51,483.06 
Rallies and other events £21,201.00 £24,550.65 £72,768.88 
Unsolicited material to electors £48,966.00 £513,768.20 £726,560.97 
TOTAL £315,777.00 £1,475,478.06 £1,623,126.63 
 Data from the UK Electoral Commission 
Table 6.7. SNP Spending in General Elections: 2010-2017 
All told, these expenditures are a far cry from the party’s bare existence in the 1980s.  
The available funds are both the result of past successes—including campaigns like in the 
1990s to raise money—and recent ones (like the exposure and validity gained in the 
independence referendum process).  The mere reality that the party could choose to spend 
almost £100,000 on just the broadcasts in 2016 in Scotland is in itself remarkable for a 
party who just 20 years earlier was producing them via internal expertise and creativity.   
 Expenditures were only part of the story from 2007-2017.  The SNP saw the idea 
of independence rise to the level of being put to a popular vote.  In the process the 
concept and the resulting policy questions were debated at length—an opportunity which 
meant the SNP regularly appeared as formidable rivals of the two big parties.  Even after 
failing to win the independence vote, the SNP managed to “win” in its historic rise in 
membership immediately afterwards.  The entire experience led to greater exposure—
setting up the situation for the SNP to pass the Lib-Dems first in membership and then in 




2020s having made another round of astounding strides in each element of the taxonomy 








The hypothesis was a taxonomy of requirements for party development which 
posited a five-step process which serves as a feedback loop as developing parties cycle 
through the elements repeatedly. The components were the consolidation of ideas, the 
consolidation of methods, increasing exposure, establishing persistence, and reallocating 
resources.  The hypothesis also posited that when these steps are conducted in order and 
the reallocation of resources or party restructuring is conducted in a proactive manner 
prior to institutional changes or electoral breakthrough, then the party’s growth will 
become entrenched. 
 The hypothesis generally held, in that the elements were present but not in order, 
for the first evolutionary cycle of the SNP (1934-1948) as the party’s ideas (concerning  
Thomson’s “new” nationalism or what scholars call civic nationalism) were consolidated 
in 1945, its methods in 1947, and its peak exposure was at the end of 1947.  The SNP 
broke through the representation threshold for the first time in 1945 and lost that lone seat 
just a few months later. Party reforms were enacted that enforced singular membership 
(whereby SNP members could not join other political parties or groups).  The SNP did 
not maintain its presence at Westminster at least in part because there was no persistence 
in challenging seats let alone winning and there were incredibly limited resources with 
which to campaign. 
 The proscribed order of the hypothesis also did not hold for the party’s second 
cycle (1948-1967) as there was concurrency between the party’s consolidation of ideas 




exposure.  The desire for increased exposure covered much of the period from 1951-1965 
and required the SNP to gamble on election persistence by challenging for more seats 
than ever before in 1964.  Put differently, ideas and methods were decided before 
increased exposure was gained, but political conditions required the party to seek 
persistence before exposure—with the promise of free exposure as a reward. In doing so, 
the party qualified for a PEB on the next cycle.  Even though the SNP lost 12 of the 15 
deposits, the party’s membership and resources grew as a result of the exposure from the 
running of the 1965 PPB, and the SNP was in position to contest 23 seats in 1966, losing 
just 10 deposits.  Meanwhile, Wilson took the lead on party structural reforms that took 
place between 1963-1966—overlapping with both exposure and persistence.  Clearly, the 
theory did not hold with regards to order of steps; however, each element had been 
developed prior to Ewing winning the 1967 Hamilton by-election—at which point there 
were reactionary changes to a novel situation: having a sitting Parliamentarian. 
 For the third cycle, from 1967-1999, the hypothesis in terms of order again did 
not hold as too many aspects were simultaneous; though, again, each element of the 
taxonomy of requirements was present.  The consolidation of ideas and methods as well 
as the key moment of exposure all surrounded the 1997 General Election and the 
devolution referendum. While these aspects were building, persistence was gradually 
being built from 1987 onward as the SNP stopped losing significant numbers of election 
deposits. Likewise, the Challenge of the 90s increased party funds while all these other 
actors were also evolving. Finally, the party prepared for Scottish Parliamentary elections 




restructuring prior to 1999.   
What the taxonomy can also inform about the 1967-1999 period was why the 
electoral spike of the 1970s occurred and was not sustained.  Most explanations offered 
have focused either on other parties or exogenous events.  However, this taxonomy on 
party development would indicate that the party was simply not prepared for the 
increased demands on it.  There was not a unity of ideas between the party leaders and 
activists. There remained unresolved the issue of how to achieve independence—either 
gradually or otherwise, and there was limited experience dealing with the type of 
exposure that came with 11 Parliamentarians.  Likewise, the interpretation of the spike as 
a mandate on independence only to see the seats lost quickly would be a harbinger for 
future SNP generations—to be careful about dispensing with independence without 
careful consideration of political climate not to mention a lack of policy information and 
detail. Later the party would utilize both academics and economists to present the case 
for independence in greater detail and with stronger evidence in support of its potential. 
The hypothesized order held more strongly, though not perfectly, for the period 
between 1999-2007, when again all five elements were present.  Perhaps this period fits 
best because the steps happened in relatively quick succession over a short period of 
time.  The consolidation of ideas had really happened in the 1990s and were simply a 
continuation in the 1999 period onward as press releases focused on softer notions of 
nationalism like sport, arts, and culture—which all happened to be devolved 
competencies as well. Methods really solidified with Swinney’s leadership selection in 




had won over the “radical” position held by Wilson and Neil.  This resolution allowed the 
SNP to begin making the case that a vote for them in an election did not mean a vote for 
independence—just support for a potential referendum if they were to achieve a majority.  
The party continued to build its exposure—and in 2002 they received more coverage 
from The Herald than any other party.  Then in 2005 that The Scotsman also crossed the 
same threshold—thus signifying a change in saliency for the SNP within some outlets of 
the Scottish print media.  For this period, persistence held at both the General and 
Scottish elections in the form of the “Holyrood Gap.”  Swinney made the 2003 party 
structural reforms and though that had minimal impact on the 2005 General Election 
(when the SNP did gain one seat but actually received a lower percentage of votes), the 
reforms placed the party in strong position to campaign, with Salmond as leader, to be the 
party of government in the 2007 Scottish elections.   
Finally, the period since 2007 also rejects the hypothesized order of the 
components, as the SNP has matured fully on points regarding electoral and membership 
persistence yet continues to grow and develop in terms of ideas (and how to govern while 
advocating independence), methods (using state institutions in support of the 
independence effort and contextualizing elections), and exposure (still seeking more 
balanced coverage).  A content analysis of SNP manifestos in the period revealed the 
party has softened its emphasis on independence over time and that it has dropped off 
significantly since the 2014 independence referendum.  Likewise, this period, as with 
each of the others, did show that exposure breakthroughs continued to matter for electoral 




saliency in London outlets tested—just before the record 2015 General Election success. 
All told, the theory did help in determining that path dependency and cycles are 
important to party growth. However, ideas and methods seem to be simultaneous under 
most conditions (1955, 1997, and 2003)—with the exception of the party’s founding.  
Further testing could help indicate if this condition is only relevant for the SNP’s 
growth—or if in fact doing both simultaneously at the party’s point of origin could speed 
up effectiveness in elections.  Likewise, persistence is only established over a period of 
time and is difficult to determine as a chronological step.  Finally, it would appear based 
on the SNP case that both an exposure breakthrough and resource reallocation are 
necessary conditions for party development breakthroughs. 
Therefore, the taxonomy, based on the SNP case, would be better stated as the 
necessary conditions for electoral breakthroughs: an exposure break through and 
evolutionary party restructuring.  A significant change in exposure was a key contributing 
factor for each sustained electoral threshold breakthrough (1965 PEB for 1967 seat; 1997 
debate for 1999 elections; volume threshold in Scottish print media before 2007 election; 
and the 2014 surpassing of Lib Dem saliency in the London-based media before the 2015 
General Election).  Likewise, as posited from the beginning, reforms done in preparation 
for new breakthroughs are more effective.  Some cases (i.e. getting into Parliament in 
1967) cannot be helped due to lack of exposure to the institution, but the optimistic 
restructuring and spending ahead of the 1997 devolution vote and the 2003 reforms by 
Swinney are both good examples of proactive reforms. 




established with further testing.  In particular, a comparison with Plaid Cymru, which 
holds many institutional factors the same, could reveal whether these “necessary 
conditions” of exposure and party restructuring are indeed critical. Another consideration 
would be if each step must be done separately or if concurrency strengthens or weakens 
party growth.  The challenge to the comparison with Wales is the difference in media 
systems and the relative size of population (Wales has just over 3 million people to 
Scotland’s 8 million).  Salmond is keenly aware of the media differences: 
The press has been significant in SNP’s advance in the sense that there has been a 
Scottish press—and therefore that gives the SNP an advantage over say Plaid 
Cymru because there really is not really a Welsh press to speak of.  So even a 
hostile press is probably better than no press. One of the great lessons of politics 
is the worst thing that can happen to you is to be ignored.17  
 
Despite his significant electoral victories, Salmond’s will to be seen and heard is another 
key element of his legacy to the SNP. His understanding, combined with the expertise of 
many of the people around him including Russell, of how the press operates and how to 
gain access was a critical element of SNP’s evolution over the past two decades.  
More could also be understood about the role of each step perhaps by treating 
each topic area—ideas, methods, exposure, persistence, and resource allocation—as its 
own evolution.  For the SNP a path dependent process has unfolded as ideas about 
nationalism and identity developed from 1934-2017. It began as deciphering between old 
(ethnic) and new (civic) nationalism and expanded into resolving seeming paradoxes 
between nationalism and internationalism as well as national history and inclusion of all 
people living in the region.  Another, similarly path-dependent, process was underway 
 




regarding how to achieve independence.  Initially there was disagreement about 
contesting elections versus being a popular movement. Then, the idea was to withdraw 
from the House of Commons and form a new assembly.  With the addition of the Scottish 
Parliament, the notion of a referendum took hold.  Each step was based on resolutions of 
the past and emerging new institutional conditions—such as actually being able to win 
seats in Commons (as of 1967) and the opening of the Scottish Parliament (in 1999). 
Even more clear were the evolutions of increasing exposure and resource 
allocation: two progressions which could be tested versus other cases.  The range in the 
exposure component of the taxonomy is from internally produced, limited exposure, to 
seeking as much free exposure as possible in existing outlets to being concerned about 
media effects such as agenda-setting and framing.  For resource allocation, it is simply 
the gradual increase in available funding, but the range would also include gradually 
changing from a decentralized party to a highly centralized one by first limiting members 
to singular membership, then revising the leadership structure before remedying the 
decentralized branch structure.   
Every fringe party starts small by definition, so this notion of incremental growth 
could help political actors consider the taxonomy as a blueprint for a pathway forward.  
While an overwhelming and diverse range of questions face new parties, the notion of 
incremental growth and prioritizing steps could be helpful in shaping party strategy on 
everything from policy to fundraising to exposure.  While Deschouwer’s party lifespan 
can help mark the evolutionary nature of increasing electoral results, this taxonomy can 




application.   
Could other parties follow?  It would appear that much of this taxonomy is 
replicable and is not contingent on a specific set of institutional designs.  For example, 
perhaps it could be applied to the American context even—in the form of the creation of 
a viable third party.  While it is not likely that party would be secessionist in claims, 
given the nature of the American electoral map, it is conceivable that a regional party 
from one of the coasts, the South, or the Midwest could emerge.  While third party 
candidates in the U.S. have often gained the most leverage and coverage as Presidential 
candidates, that track is the hardest to achieve—and is akin to the SNP notion in its 
infancy that a one-time big event would achieve independence.  Substantive democracies 
with long-standing national institutions do not tend to initiate change quickly, and in this 
sense, a nascent third party in the U.S. would do well to follow the incremental aspects of 
the taxonomy: operate in an identifiable region, focus on a primary agenda or idea, figure 
out how to campaign on that premise, seek free exposure at first, and then grow 
incrementally—especially with the aim in mind of convincing people that America can 
handle a third party.   
As for other regional parties in Europe, the taxonomy is certainly relevant and 
generalizable.  For example, Plaid has not had the success of the SNP—perhaps for the 
due to the lack of a Wales-based press.  In the Catalan and Quebec contexts, both 
movements, consisting of coalitions of parties, have had success in moving towards the 
independence agenda at points.  A more careful case study of those two cases, especially 




party restructuring to centralize, may show where these parties diverge from the SNP 
case—beyond the permissive nature of the UK government which does not exist in Spain. 
As for the SNP and Scotland, this taxonomy would suggest that the independence 
goals are within reach. After Deschouwer’s “governance” stage of a party lifespan, the 
SNP envisions “independence.”  In still chasing another electoral breakthrough (in the 
form of winning a referendum), the SNP remains in what today is casually referred to as 
“growth mindset.”  Russell summarized this approach when he said, “How we win 
independence is as important as winning independence. We have to be open, and 
responsive. We have to engage with people. We have to think about where Scotland is 
and put ourselves there too. … We have had one independence referendum, and we came 
pretty close, I think in time we will do it.”18   
Based on the case study here, the intervening variable between Russell’s party 
and independence is its final exposure breakthrough: gaining balanced and fair coverage 
on the independence debate from the BBC as well as other outlets.  Salmond thought the 
Scottish papers were even a target in this regard. Talking about The Herald and The 
Scotsman in particular he said, “The press [is] more hostile to independence than they are 
to the SNP.  When the SNP doesn’t look like winning independence, then the press can 
be quite favorable to the SNP.”19  Russell agreed, citing “institutional bias in the media 
against independence.”20  
Their own party history and the hypothesized taxonomy can aid in advice for 
 
18 Interview with author. 
19 Ibid. 




moving forward.  If media frames are the next exposure threshold, then the SNP should 
be working with The Herald and The Scotsman to gain more favorable coverage—before 
trying to the London-based media.  A recent article in The Herald voiced key sentiments: 
For all this warfare to end, the Scottish nationalist side needs to convince a 
significant number of people to switch over to them, but I don’t think that’s going 
to happen any time soon until their supporters change their strategy. Some of it is 
about changing the language, the words, and some of it is about better 
understanding the way in which many voters think. Properly done, it could be a 
way to convince people like me to support independence.21 
 
The writer, Mark Smith, went on to describe emphasizing “self-government” and not 
“independence” while also taking seriously voter concerns about the economy and 
borders. While these word choice distinctions seem to be throwbacks to prior discussions 
in the party (notably in the 1970s—when the SNP last saw such dramatic electoral 
spikes), the key point Smith introduced was that the SNP needs to make clear how an 
independent Scotland would actually protect British identity—an ideational concept that 
may be critical for a new round of consolidating ideas.  The other implication of Smith’s 
news column was that the move from fringe to mainstream may be complete, but the final 
hurdle is to move independence support on to the next category: the majority.  In that 
sense, it would appear the SNP is also on an incremental journey—the notion of 
independence and the party started on the fringe, then moved to a minority viewpoint 
before joining the mainstream in 2014.  The journey to majority viewpoint is not over 
yet, and it remains to be seen if this taxonomy of party growth requirements can help 
 
21 Smith, Mark. “How to Sell Scottish Independence to People Like Me.” The Guardian. 2 March 





point to incremental strategies that will work in the long run to break a threshold as 
unique and demanding as parting ways from one of the most entrenched and long-












Held Seats Ideology on self-
government** 
Belgium      
Flanders 
 
Lijst Dedecker (List 
Dedecker, LDD)  
2007- N: 2007-2014 N, R Federalist 
 Nieuw-Vlaamse 
Alliantie (New Flemish 
Alliance, N-VA) 
2001- N: 2003-2014 
 
N, R Separationist 
 Vlaams Blok (Flemish 
Bloc, VB)   
Vlaams Belang 
(Flemish Interest, VB) 
1979-2004 N:1991-2003 
 
N, R Separationist 
 2004- N: 2007-2014 
 
N, R Separationist 
 Volksunie (People’s 
Union, VU) 








2008- R: 2009-2014 R Federalist  
Wallonia      
 Front Démocratique des 
Francophones 
(Democratic Front of 
Francophones, FDF) 
 
-renamed twice: 2010 
and 2015. Now is DéFI 



















 Rassemblent Walloon 
(Walloon Rally, RW) 
1968- N:1968-1981 
 
N Protectionist (60s) 
Federalist (70s-
80s) 
Canada      
Quebec Action democratique, 
AD 
1994-2012 ---; R:1994 R Ambiguous 
 Bloc Québécois, BQ 1991- N: 1993-2015 N Separationist 
 Parti Nationaliste du 
Quebec, PNQ 
1983-1987 N: 1984 --- Separationist 
 Parti Quebecois, PQ 1968- ---; R: 1970-
2008  
R Separationist 
 Quebec Solidaire, QS 2006- ---; R: 2008-
2014 
R Separationist 

















1980-2009 ---; R: 1981-
2009 
R Separationist 



















(People’s Party, FF) 




 Tjóôvedldi (Republic, 
E) 
1948- N:1973-2015 N, R Separationist 
 Framsokn (Progress, F) 2011- 2011-2015 R Separationist 








R Federalist (40-90s) 
Separationist 
2000s 
Greenland Inuit Ataqatigiit 
(Community of the 
People) 
1976- 1979-20015 R Separationist  
Finland      
 Ålands Framtid (Future 
of Aland, AF) 







1906- 1951-2018 N Protectionist 
(cultural) 
France      
Alsace Aldace d’abord (Alsace 
Frist, ADA) 
1989- --- R Protectionist 








N, R Protectionist (70s-
80s) 
Federalist 2000s 
Corsica Union di u populu corsu 
(Union of Corsican 
People, UPC) 



















1989-2009 1993-2002 --- Ambiguous 
 Corsica Nazione, CN 1992-2008(?) R: 1998-1999  R Separationist 




Germany      
Bavaria Bayernpartei (Bavarian 
Party) 
1946- 1953, 1969, 
1987-2013 









1948- 1953-1957 R Protectionism 
Italy      
Northern 
Italy 
Lega Nord, inc. Liga 
Veneta and Lega 
Lombarda (Northern 
League, LN) 








Sardinia Partido Sardo d’Azione 











and since ’98 
Separationist 
2000s 
 Independtia Repubrica 
de Sardigna 
(Separationist Republic 
of Sardinia, iRS) 
2002- R: 2004-2010  --- Separationist 
 Partito del Popolo 
Sardo-Fortza Paris, 
PPS-FP 
2004- N: 2008 ---- Federalist 
 Lega Sarda, LSar 1940s R: 1946 ---- Separationist 









Meridionale (League for 









 Moviemento per le 
Autonomie (Movement 
for Autonomies, MpA) 
2005- 2008-2018 N, R Federalist 
South Tyrol Südtiroler Volkspartei 
(South Tyrolean 
People’s Party, SVP) 
1945- 1953-2018 N, R Protectionist (’48-
’56) Federalist 
(’57 onward) 
 Die Freiheitlichen (The 
Freedomites, DF) 
1992- 2006-2013  ---- Ambiguous 
 Sud-tiroler Freiheit 
(South Tyrolean 
Freedom, S-TF) 




 BügerUnion für Südtirol 
(Citizens’ Union for 
South Tyrol, BUfS—
was Union für Südtirol, 
UfS) 
1989- 1996-2008 --- Separationist 
 
 Tiroler Heimatpartei, 
THP 
1963-1968 N: 1963 R Protectionist 






   Partito Popolare 
Trentino Tirolese 
(Trentino Tryrolean 
People’s Party, PTTT) 




R:1973-1978  --- Protectionist 
Trieste Associazione per 
Trieste (Association for 
Trieste, APT) 








2006-2018 2006-2013 N, R Federalist 
 Union Valdôtaine 




N, R Federalist 
      Vallée d’Aoste Vive       





 Union Valdôtaine 
Progressiste (Valdostian 
Union, UVP) 







1998-2014 1998-2013 (coalition) Protectionist 
 Rassemblement 
Valdôtaine, RV 
1963-1973 1973 R Protectionist 
Netherlands      
Friesland Fryske Nasjonale Partij 
(Frisian National Party, 
FNP) 
1962- ---; R: 1970-
2015  
R Protectionist 
Spain      
Andalusia Partido Andalucista 






 Partido Socialista de 
Andalucía (Socialist 




Party of Andalusia, 
PSA) 
Aragon Chunta Aragonesista 
(Aragonese League, CA 
or CHA) 
1986- 1996-2008 R Protectionist (80s-
’94) Federalist 
(’95-2000s) 
 Partido Aragones 
Regionalista (Aragonese 
Regionalist Party, PAR) 
1978- 1979, 1986-
1993, 2000 
N, R Protectionist 
Asturias Partíu Asturianista  
(PAS) 




 Unión Renovadora 
Asturiana (Asturian 
Renewal Union, URAS) 
1998- R R (once) Protectionist 
Balearic 
Islands 
Progressistes per les 
Illes Balears 
(Progressives for the 






 Partit Socialista de 
Menorca (Socialist 
Party of Menorca, 
PSM)- from merge of 
PSM-EM and PS-Me) 
1977- 1979-2004 --- Separationist 
 Unió Mallorquina 
(Majorcan Union, UM) 






(Basque Solidarity, EA) 
1986- 1989-2008 R Separationist 
 Euskadiko Ezkerra 
(Basque Left, EE) 
1977-1993 1977-1993 n/a Separationist 
 Aralar (AR) 2000-2017 2004-20017 N, R Separationist 
 Herri Batasuna (United 
People, HB) 
1978-2001 1979-1996 N,R Separationist 
 Partido Nationalista 
Vasco (Basque 
Nationalist Party, PNV) 




 Partido Comunisto de 
las Tierras Vascas, 
EHAK 






1985-1993 1986-1989 N Protectionist 
 Coalición Canaria 
(Canarian Coalition, 
CAN or CC) 








 Union del Pueblo 
Canario (Union of 
Canarian People, UPC) 
1979-1986 1979 N, R Separationist 
 Centro Canaria, CCN 
(into CC) 
2008?-2008 2008 n/a Protectionist 
Cantabria Partido Regionalista de 
Cantabria, PRC 
1978- 1993 R Protectionist 
Catalonia Partit Demòcrata 
Europeu Català (Catalan 
European Democratic 
Party, PDeCAT) 
2016- R: 2016 R separationist 
 Convergència i Unió, 




1978-2015 1977-2008 N, R Federalist (70s-98; 
’02-07) 
Ambiguous (’98-
’02 and post 2007) 
Separationist 2014 
 Coalición electoral 
esquerra de Cataluna 
(Electoral Coalition of 
Left in Catalonia, 
CEEC) 
1977-? 1977 ---- Separationist 
 Ezquerra Republicana 
de Catalunya 
(Republican Left in 
Catalonia, ERC) 




 Candidatura d'Unitat 
Popular (Popular Unity 
Candidacy, CUP) 
1986- 2012-2015 R Separationist 
 Initiative for Catalonia 
(IC) now Iniciativa per 
Cataluyna Verds, ICV 
1988- 1988, 2000-
2011 
N, R Federalist 
Extremadura Coalicion Extremena, 
CEX 
1993- 1996 R 
(coalition) 
Protectionist 





1993 ---- Protectionist 








Galicia Bloque Nacionalista 
Gallego (Galician 
Nationalist Bloc, BNG) 
1982- 1996-2008 N, R Separationist (70s-
1986) Federalist 
(since ’87) 
Navarre Union del Pueblo 
Navarro (Union of the 




N, R Federalist 
 Convergencia 








 Nafarroa Bai (Yes to 
Navarre, NB) 
2003-2011 2004-2008 N, R Separationist 
Rioja Partido Riohano 1982- 1993-2016 R Protectionist 
Valencia Union Valenciana 
(Valencian Union, UV) 
1982- 1986-2000 R Protectionist 
Sweden      
Skane Skånepartiet (Scania 
Party) 
1979- ----; R: 2002-
2014  
--- Separationist 
Switzerland      
Ticino Lega dei Ticinsesi 
(Ticino League) 
1991- 1991-2007 N,R Federalist 
U.K.      
Cornwall Mebyon Kernow (Sons 






Social Democratic and 
Labour Party (SDLP) 
1970- 1974-2010 R, N Irish unification 
 Irish Separationist Party 
(IIP) 
1977-1985 1979 ---- Irish unification 




--- Irish unification 
 Republican Labour (RS)  1964-1970 --- Irish unification 
 Republicans (REP)  1950, 1964-
1966 
--- Irish unification 
 Republican Clubs (RC)  1974-1979 --- Irish unification 
 Sinn Féin  1950, 1955-
1959, 1983-
2017 
 Irish unification 
Scotland Scottish National Party 
(SNP) 
1934- 1950-2017 R, N Separationist 
 Scottish Labour Party 
(SCLP) 
1976-1981 1979 N Separationist 




1992 ---- separationist 
 Scottish Socialist 
Alliance (SSA) 
1996-1998 1997 ---- Separationist 
 Scottish Socialist Party 
(SSP) 
1998- 2010-2015 R Separationist 
 Scottish Green Party  1990-- 2001-2017 R Separationist 
Wales Plaid Cymru (Party of 
Wales, PC) 
1925- 1950-2017 R, N Separationist 
(since 2003) 




1949-1966 1950 ---- Separationist 
*national only listed—then regional if national is not available. 
*based on Massetti and Schakel-2016 where possible; italicized means author changed their categorization 






Appendix B: Electoral Results for strongest regional parties in Belgium, Spain, and 
the U.K. 
1. European Elections 
Unless noted in parenthesis, MEPs sit with Green-EFA. 
 
**  All of these Catalan parties support independence. The CDC and UDC are center-right and the others 
are center-left.  The parties realign with each European election into coalitions.  For example, ICV was in 
a different coalition in each of the three elections represented. CDC and UDC run in a coalition as CiU in 
domestic elections. 
 
2. National Elections 
 
BELGIUM—Flemish vote for Federal Parliament  (79 Flemmish seats) 
Founded Party 2014 2010 2007 2003 
2001 
 











SPAIN—Catalan and Basque in Spanish Congress of Deputies  (mixed system) 
Founded  2016 2011 2008 2004 2000 
1978 
Catalan 
























*As part of coalition entitled “Euskal Herria Bildu.” 
 
  
Country/Region Party 2014 2009 2004 








































































UNITED KINGDOM—Scottish and Welsh in UK Parliament  (Scotland: 59 seats; Wales: 28) 










































3. Regional Elections 
 
Belgium: Flemish Parliament (seats: 124) 
Party 2014 2009 2004 1999 



















Spain: Basque Country Parliament (seats: 75) 
 2016 2012 2009 2005 2001 













Spain: Catalan Parliament (seats: 135) 
 2017 2012 2010 2006 2003 
CiU 
   CDC 












United Kingdom: Scottish Parliament (total seats: 131) 












United Kingdom: Welsh Assembly  (total seats: 60) 
 2016 2011 2007 2003 1999 
















Appendix C: National Election Results—Percentage of vote in region  
 
 2001-2004 2005-2008 2009-2011 2012-2016 2017- 
N-VA 3.1% (1) 26.9% (5) 27.9% (27) 20.26% (33)  
VB 18 Seats 24.07% (17) 16.5% (12) ---- (3)  
E 24.9% (1) 25.3% (1) 
25.4% (1) 
19.4% (0) 24.5% (1)  
SNP 15.3% (5) 17.7% (6) 19.9% (6) 50% (56) 36.9% (35) 
PC 10.9% (4) 12.6% (3) 11.3% (3) 12.1% (3) 10.4% (4) 





Appendix D. Pamphlets and Speeches 1948-1967 on Arguments for Self-Government  
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reject 1949 
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European state is 




-“no desire to 































of what CAN be 




Scots would do 
well to heed the 
lesson.” (p. 3) 
(Oxford Group—
U.S.-based) 
 p4.— everyone 
needs to speak 
English but 
anecdote about a 
mom making her 
son wear a kilt 
as punishment—
suggesting the 
need for more 











Appendix E:  Annual Party Conference Resolutions 1954-1963 on ideology 





 Lochwinnoch branch resolution: “The 
Scottish National Party should now adopt 
non-violent, non co-operative methods to 
be used in pressing our claim for a National 








education so every 
student in Scotland 
would learn Gaelic 
 
 











-call to buy Scottish goods, work for 
Scottish firms 
-Gov’t to prioritize Scots for gov’t work IN 
Scotland and to cease encouraging 
emigration, to let Scottish serve in Civil 
Service within Scotland; grants to Scottish 
uni students is ½ English—why there are 



























Appendix F. Coding Handbook 
 




(1) Wording of phrase, clause, or sentence 
(2) Page number in printed manifesto  
(3) Context: Used in reference to an independent Scotland (no 0; yes 1) 
a. Includes party-created documents with independence in title 
b. Excludes use of term in reference to either freedom of choice or neutrality in 
existing or proscribed policy areas (including law as well as review boards or 
standards). 
c. Outcome is for statements of what Scotland would gain with independence. 
d. Aspiration is a hope of getting independence. 
e. Ref(erendum) is in relation to the people’s choice or vote. (Usually stated as 
referendum directly) 
f. Potential or natural are the descriptors used by SNP in describing the state of 
independence. 
g. Process is a reference to the idea that independence is already underway. 
(4) Bolded (0 no; 1 yes) 
(5) Font size (0 for standard in doc; 1 for larger) 




(1) Wording of phrase, clause, or sentence 
(2) Page number of printed manifesto 
(3) Context: used in reference to the nation as an entity or informs an aspect of national 
identity (no 0; yes 1).  
a. Does not include titles of positions, organizations, plans or summits/meetings—
either existing or proposed—that are labelled as proper nouns 
b. Excludes the party name 
c. Excludes nation(s) when preceded by EU, NATO or United 
d. Includes nation in the context of EU institutions or functions as points of 
comparisons or aspiration for the nation of Scotland 
e. Includes use as an adjective only when in reference to national life, identity, 
interests, or holidays.  (Excluded uses of “national” are descriptions of national 
resources, good(s), agendas, skills, policy areas, levels of funding or debt, 
framework, parks, railways, or strategy.) 
f. Excludes items in the index at the end of the manifesto but includes the headings 
and entries in the opening table of contents. 
g. Includes other nations when point of comparison. 
(4) Bolded (0 no; 1 yes) 
(5) Font size (0 for standard in doc; 1 for larger) 






Appendix G.    Content Analysis of SNP Manifestos 
(Credit to Boas-2010 for organization and methods) 
 
Manifesto Formats 
SNP manifestos are not uniform in size or length.  For all years prior to 1999, the 
manifestos are only available in paper form at the National Library of Scotland (NLS).  
After 1999, each election manifesto is available electronically except for the 1999 
European Election manifesto (which is in paper form at the NLS in Edinburgh). 
Therefore, the manifestos (1974-1989) were researched by the author but were not coded 
nor cross-coded.  The manifestos from 1992 onward were addressed in the manner 
described.   
 
Population and Sample 
I analyzed all available manifestos; however, only the electronic versions have been cross 
coded and manifestos prior to 1992 are only based on my count while working in the 
NLS archives.  I did utilize the same criteria across all the manifestos, but only 1992 
onward have been verified by cross coding. 
 
Units and Coding 
Every mention of any form of independence/independent was coded as was any mention 
of nation, national, nations, nationwide, and nation’s.  The total count for the use of each 
term only reflected its use in context. (See Appendix F for determining factors). 
 
Intercoder Reliability  
Reliability was established by Groton School politics students.  After a one-hour training 
session using a sample (the 2011 Scottish election manifesto), each of the ten students 
were randomly assigned an election cycle between 1992-2017 such that each student 
coded approximately 170 mentions total.  This material accounted for over 80% of the 
overall manifesto material analyzed.  For all content the reliability was excellent (well 
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